Reducing false positives in intrusion detection systems by means of frequent episodes Lars Olav Gigstad.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Loss-Sensitive Decision Rules for Intrusion Detection and Response Linda Zhao Statistics Department University of Pennsylvania Joint work with I. Lee,
Advertisements

Intrusion Detection System(IDS) Overview Manglers Gopal Paliwal Gopal Paliwal Roshni Zawar Roshni Zawar SenthilRaja Velu SenthilRaja Velu Sreevathsa Sathyanarayana.
Snort: Overview Chris Copeland What is an Intrusion Detection System (IDS)? An intrusion detection system is any system which can identify a network.
Intrusion Detection System Snort. What is Snort? Free and Open Source Intrusion Detection System Monitor network traffic Scan for protocol anomalies Scan.
TRUE Blind ip spoofed portscanning Thomas Olofsson C.T.O Defcom.
Greg Williams CS691 Summer Honeycomb  Introduction  Preceding Work  Important Points  Analysis  Future Work.
Network Traffic Anomaly Detection Based on Packet Bytes Matthew V. Mahoney Florida Institute of Technology
1 Reading Log Files. 2 Segment Format
Nick Duffield, Patrick Haffner, Balachander Krishnamurthy, Haakon Ringberg Rule-Based Anomaly Detection on IP Flows.
Snort: A Network Intrusion Detection Software Matt Gustafson Becky Smith CS691 Semester Project Spring 2003.
Snort - Open Source Network Intrusion Detection System Survey.
Fusing Intrusion Data for Pro-Active Detection and Containment Mallikarjun (Arjun) Shankar, Ph.D. (Joint work with Nageswara Rao and Stephen Batsell)
Cyber Threat Analysis  Intrusions are actions that attempt to bypass security mechanisms of computer systems  Intrusions are caused by:  Attackers accessing.
1.  To analyze and explain the IDS placement in network topology  To explain the relationship between honey pots and IDS  To explain, analyze and evaluate.
************************************************************** ****************** * Alert: ident=2635 * Classification type: unknown * Classification:
Snort - an network intrusion prevention and detection system Student: Yue Jiang Professor: Dr. Bojan Cukic CS665 class presentation.
5/1/2006Sireesha/IDS1 Intrusion Detection Systems (A preliminary study) Sireesha Dasaraju CS526 - Advanced Internet Systems UCCS.
Martin Roesch Sourcefire Inc.
Modified slides from Martin Roesch Sourcefire Inc.
IDS Colloquium 2001John Kristoff - DePaul University1 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) John Kristoff DePaul University.
Modified slides from Martin Roesch Sourcefire Inc.
Modified slides from Martin Roesch Sourcefire Inc.
Report on statistical Intrusion Detection systems By Ganesh Godavari.
Bro: A System for Detecting Network Intruders in Real-Time Presented by Zachary Schneirov CS Professor Yan Chen.
CIS 193A – Lesson12 Monitoring Tools. CIS 193A – Lesson12 Focus Question What are the common ways of specifying network packets used in tcpdump, wireshark,
Using Argus Audit Trails to Enhance IDS Analysis Jed Haile Nitro Data Systems
Network Forensics Networking Basics Collecting Network-Based Evidence (NBE) Collection of Packets using Tools Windows Intrusion UNIX Intrusion.
USENIX LISA ‘99 Conference © Copyright 1999, Martin Roesch Snort - Lightweight Intrusion Detection for Networks Martin Roesch.
A Machine Learning Approach to Detecting Attacks by Identifying Anomalies in Network Traffic A Dissertation by Matthew V. Mahoney Major Advisor: Philip.
Data Mining for Intrusion Detection: A Critical Review Klaus Julisch From: Applications of data Mining in Computer Security (Eds. D. Barabara and S. Jajodia)
Polytechnic University Introduction 1 Intrusion Detection Systems Examples of IDSs in real life r Car alarms r Fire detectors r House alarms r Surveillance.
TCP/IP Vulnerabilities. Outline Security Vulnerabilities Denial of Service Worms Countermeasures: Firewalls/IDS.
IIT Indore © Neminah Hubballi
Intrusion Detection: Snort. Basics: History Snort was developed in 1998 by Martin Roesch. It was intended to be an open-source technology, and remains.
Intrusion Prevention System. Module Objectives By the end of this module, participants will be able to: Use the FortiGate Intrusion Prevention System.
Snort: Jason Booth – Intrusion Detection System. Overview Snort / Drawbacks IDS - Theory IDS – Test Practical IDS Setup Scripts Oink-Master Snort-MySql.
Intrusion Detection and Prevention. Objectives ● Purpose of IDS's ● Function of IDS's in a secure network design ● Install and use an IDS ● Customize.
An Analysis of the 1999 DARPA/Lincoln Laboratory Evaluation Data for Network Anomaly Detection Matthew V. Mahoney and Philip K. Chan.
Information Visualization for Intrusion Detection Analysis: A Needs Assessment of Security Experts John Goodall, Anita Komlodi, Wayne G. Lutters UMBC Workshop.
Intrusion Detection Presentation : 2 OF n by Manish Mehta 02/07/03.
Distributed IDS The implementation of a Distributed Intrusion Detection System over a medium scale open network where the focus is availability of services.
CSCI 530 Lab Intrusion Detection Systems IDS. A collection of techniques and methodologies used to monitor suspicious activities both at the network and.
Intruders Detection Systems Presently there is much interest in systems, which can detect intrusions, IDS (Intrusion Detection System). IDS are of very.
An Analysis of the 1999 DARPA/Lincoln Laboratory Evaluation Data for Network Anomaly Detection Matt Mahoney Feb. 18, 2003.
Visualizing network flows Gregory Travis Advanced Network Management Lab Indiana University
Learning Rules for Anomaly Detection of Hostile Network Traffic Matthew V. Mahoney and Philip K. Chan Florida Institute of Technology.
Intrusion Detection (ID) Intrusion detection is the ART of detecting inappropriate, incorrect, or anomalous activity There are two methods of doing ID.
SNORT Biopsy: A Forensic Analysis on Intrusion Detection System By Asif Syed Chowdhury.
An Intrusion Detection System to Monitor Traffic Through the CS Department Christy Jackson, Rick Rossano, & Meredith Whibley April 24, 2000.
Snort Intrusion Detection. What is Snort Packet Analysis Tool Most widely deployed NIDS Initial release by Marty Roesch in 1998 Current version
1 HoneyNets. 2 Introduction Definition of a Honeynet Concept of Data Capture and Data Control Generation I vs. Generation II Honeynets Description of.
An overview.
Advanced IDS Brian Caswell & Jeff Nathan. Kung Fu IDS Brian Caswell Jeff Nathan
S E C U R E C O M P U T I N G Not For Public Release 1 Intrusion Tolerant Server Infrastructure Dick O’Brien OASIS PI Meeting July 25, 2001.
Snort - Lightweight Intrusion Detection for Networks YOUNG Wo Sang Program Committee, PISA
Cryptography and Network Security Sixth Edition by William Stallings.
Intrusion Detection Systems Paper written detailing importance of audit data in detecting misuse + user behavior 1984-SRI int’l develop method of.
IDS 運用の効率化に関する研究 環境情報学部4年 水谷正慶 親 : true / サブ親 : minami.
Machine Learning for Network Anomaly Detection Matt Mahoney.
Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS)
Volunteer-based Monitoring System Min Gyung Kang KAIST.
Lecture 21: Network Primer 7/9/2003 CSCE 590 Summer 2003.
What would you do with a pointer and a size?. Why do we need a new detection framework?
SIEM Rotem Mesika System security engineering
Snort – IDS / IPS.
Modified slides from Martin Roesch Sourcefire Inc.
46 to 1500 bytes TYPE CODE CHECKSUM IDENTIFIER SEQUENCE NUMBER OPTIONAL DATA ICMP Echo message.
SNORT RULES.
Intrusion Detection Systems
Presentation transcript:

Reducing false positives in intrusion detection systems by means of frequent episodes Lars Olav Gigstad

Intrusion Detection Signatures poorly describe the attack making them trigger on benign traffic as a result. Processing time restrictions often leads to shortcuts. Writing correct signatures is a difficult task. Signatures triggers on rare or suspicious traffic. Trigger on low-level phenomenas.

Research Questions Can alerts effectively be correlated with frequent episodes? How effective is false positive reduction?

Data Gathering KDD Cup ’99 –5 Weeks of traffic data. –2 attack free weeks. Honeynet –3 computers Apache FTP SQL Server –Automated attacks

System Overview IDS Alert log Data mining FilterOutput Rules Accepted Rules

Data Mining Data preperation: –Parse SNORT alert log –Parse BRO alert log Data mining: –Phase 1: Frequent episodes. –Phase 2: Remove unwanted episodes. –Phase 3: Attribute rules Analysis: –Present rules

Data Preperation [**] [1:1200:10] ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL [**] [Classification: Attempted Information Leak] [Priority: 2] 03/01-15:28: :80 -> :6243 TCP TTL:63 TOS:0x0 ID:7669 IpLen:20 DgmLen:473 DF ***AP*** Seq: 0xC832EB1A Ack: 0xA Win: 0x7FE0 TcpLen: 20 [Xref => mspx]

Data Preperation Alert attributes –ID, the type of alert. –Source IP. –Destination IP. –Source port. –Destination port. –TTL, time to live. –IP, size of IP header in bytes. –Dgmlen, size of packet in bytes. –Time, time of occurrence.

Data Mining Data preperation: –Parse SNORT alert log –Parse BRO alert log Data mining: –Phase 1: Frequent Episodes. –Phase 2: Remove unwanted episodes. –Phase 3: Attribute rules Analysis: –Present rules

Frequent Episodes Events: –Single action –Alarm –System input Sequence of events

Frequent Episodes Episode: a collection of event. Episode Types: –Parallell –Serial –Complex AC A B A C B

Frequent Episodes Episode: Subepisodes: ABC AB AC BC

Attribute Rules Intra-episode rules –A.SourceIP = B.SourceIP –A.DestinationIP = B.DestinationIP Inter-episode rules –A.DestinationPort = 80 AB

Data Mining Data preperation: –Parse SNORT alert log –Parse BRO alert log Data mining: –Phase 1: Frequent Episodes. –Phase 2: Remove unwanted episodes. –Phase 3: Attribute rules Analysis: –Present rules

Data Mining Data preperation: –Parse SNORT alert log –Parse BRO alert log Data mining: –Phase 1: Frequent Episodes. –Phase 2: Remove unwanted episodes. –Phase 3: Attribute rules Analysis: –Present rules

Rules Generated IF [1:1013:11] THEN [1:1012:12] conf(0.353) freq(0.006) [1:1288:10] IF [1:1013:11] [1:1012:12] THEN [1:1288:10] conf(1.0) freq(0.006) [1].src = [2].src = [3].src [1].dst = [2].dst = [3].dst [1].src_port = [2].src_port = [3].src_port [1].dst_port = [2].dst_port = [3].dst_port [1].ttl = [2].ttl = [3].ttl [1].dgmlen = [2].dgmlen = [3].dgmlen [1].dst_port = 80 [2].dst_port = 80 [3].dst_port = 80 [1].ttl = 64 [2].ttl = 64 [3].ttl = 64 [1].src = [2].src = [3].src = [1].dst = [2].dst = [3].dst = IF [1:1149:13] THEN [1:1149:13] conf(0.53) freq(0.007) [1].src = [2].src [1].dst = [2].dst [1].dst_port = E[2].dst_port [1].ttl = E[2].ttl [1].dst_port = 80 [2].dst_port = 80 [1].ttl = 64 [2].ttl = 64

Results Week 1Week 4

Questions?