Reliability of the Quench Protection System for the LHC s.c. Elements F. Rodriguez-Mateos and Antonio Vergara (both TS now, AT when the work was done)

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
André Augustinus 15 March 2003 DCS Workshop Safety Interlocks.
Advertisements

Oliver Bitterling  Introduction to the QPS  Radiation damage in electronic systems  Construction of radiation tolerant systems  Radiation test and.
TE-MPE-CP, RD, 03-Dec Quench Detection and Energy Extraction Systems R. Denz (Quench Detection), K. Dahlerup-Petersen (Energy Extraction Systems),
BIW May 2004 LHCSILSystemsBLMSSoftwareResults Reliability of BLMS for the LHC. G.Guaglio, B Dehning, C. Santoni 1/15 Reliability of Beam Loss Monitors.
TE-MPE-EP, VF, 11-Oct-2012 Update on the DQLPU type A design and general progress. TE-MPE Technical Meeting.
Openlab Workshop on Data Analytics 16 th of November 2012 Axel Voitier – CERN EN-ICE.
The HiLumi LHC Design Study (a sub-system of HL-LHC) is co-funded by the European Commission within the Framework Programme 7 Capacities Specific Programme,
How to achieve higher redundancy of the UPS for QPS ? -The lack of redundancy concerns the supply lines from UPS to consumer but equally parts of the UPS.
TE-MPE-EP, RD, 06-Dec QPS Data Transmission after LS1 R. Denz, TE-MPE-EP TIMBER PM WinCC OA Tsunami warning:
Chamonix Risks due to UPS malfunctioning Impact on the Superconducting Circuit Protection System Hugues Thiesen Acknowledgments:K. Dahlerup-Petersen,
B. Todd et al. 25 th August 2009 Observations Since v1.
Powering of the Superconducting Circuits: Procedures and Strategies for Circuit Validation Antonio Vergara on behalf of the Hardware Commissioning Coordination.
9 September 2009 Beam Loss Monitoring with Optical Fibers for Particle Accelerators Joint QUASAR and THz Group Workshop.
LER Workshop, CERN, October 11-12, 2006Detector Safety with LER - Henryk Piekarz1 LHC Accelerator Research Program bnl-fnal-lbnl-slac Accelerator & Detector.
Eric Thomas - Safety systems for LHC experiments 1 Safety Systems for LHC experiments Baseline specifications – Additional needs – Actions taken.
Eva Barbara Holzer ICFA HB2006, Tsukuba, Japan June 1, Eva Barbara Holzer, CERN CLIC Workshop CERN, October 18, 2007 Machine Protection system:
Training LHC Powering R. Denz Quench Protection System R. Denz AT-MEL.
AT-MEL-PM, R. Denz, CERN, CH-1211 Geneva 23 1 QPS system and its risks  Principal risks  General remarks  Quench heater circuits  Quench detection.
AT-MEI-PE, RD, LIUWG 31-JUL R. Denz AT-MEI-PE LHC Luminosity Upgrade Protection of the Inner Triplet, D1, Correctors and Superconducting Links/Leads.
Status of ITER collaboration for Machine Protection I. Romera On behalf of the colleagues who contribute to the project Thanks to: Sigrid, Markus, Rüdiger,
HC Review F. Rodriguez-Mateos Powering tests The outcome of the work conducted within HCWG and many discussions among colleagues.
Hardware Commissioning Tools Robin. AB-CO TC 8th February 2007Hardware Commissioning Tools - RJL2 Summary Hardware Commissioning View Slides from Antonio.
LHC Enhanced Quench Protection System Review 24 – 26 February 2009.
5 th Joint Hi-Lumi LHC-LARP Annual Meeting 2015 SC Link Protection A.Ballarino 28/10/2015.
Hardware Commissioning  Preparation Documentation MTF Programme  Status The Review The commissioning activity in Resources  Outlook The new.
Essential lessons from commissioning of the 28 EE systems of LHC sector A corrector circuits.
Beam Interlock System MPP Internal ReviewB. Puccio17-18 th June 2010.
BCWG - 16/11/20102 Content WHY do we need a HW Commissioning campaign? WHAT are we going to do? HOW are we going to do it? ElQA QPS Powering Tests Planning.
TE-MPE-CP, RD, LHC Performance Workshop - Chamonix Feb R. Denz TE-MPE-CP on behalf of the QPS team QPS Upgrade and Re-commissioning.
Quench Detection System R. Denz TE-MPE-EP on behalf of the QPS team.
1 J. Mourao (TE/MPE/CP) Enhanced DQHDS functionality  Status for 2011  Increase Magnet diagnostic capabilities  Our proposals.
AB/CO Review, Interlock team, 20 th September Interlock team – the AB/CO point of view M.Zerlauth, R.Harrison Powering Interlocks A common task.
16-17 January 2007 Post-Mortem Workshop Logging data in relation with Post-Mortem and archiving Ronny Billen AB-CO.
Conclusions on UPS powering test and procedure I. Romera Acknowledgements: V. Chareyre, M. Zerlauth 86 th MPP meeting –
Machine Protection Review, R. Denz, 11-APR Introduction to Magnet Powering and Protection R. Denz, AT-MEL-PM.
Control System Considerations for ADS EuCARD-2/MAX Accelerators for Accelerator Driven Systems Workshop, CERN, March 20-21, 2014 Klemen Žagar Robert Modic.
E.Sbrissa EP/TA3 - IC ATLAS EDR_MAG Magnet Project Fault analysis, QA & Failure rate.
Training LHC Powering - Markus Zerlauth Powering Interlocks Markus Zerlauth AB/CO/MI.
MPP Meeting 07/03/2007 MPP Main Ring Magnet Performance Panel Meeting Wednesday 7th March 2007 Agenda: 1)Matters arising 2)Recommendations for the case.
TE-MPE-CP, RD, 12-Dec QPS - analysis of main problems, areas to target, possible improvements R. Denz, TE-MPE-CP Evian 2011.
First discussion on MSS for Katrin March 26, 2013 M.Capeans CERN PH-DT.
LHC’s Modular Machine ITER – Machine ProtectionB. ToddJuly 2010 Thanks to : TE/MPE/MI, CERN Machine Protection Panel, et al 1v0 Protection System.
B. Todd, A. Apollonio, M. Kwiatkowski, R. Schmidt, S. Wagner, J. Walter a Risk-Based Approach 1v2 to Machine Protection Systems.
CERN TE-MPE-EP, RD, 09-April Quench Protection Systems (QPS) for the LHC R. Denz, TE-MPE-EP Acknowledgements: K. Dahlerup-Petersen, A. Siemko, J.
AB-CO Review September Session on circuit commissioning Session on circuit commissioning Post-Mortem requirements F. Rodríguez-Mateos on behalf.
TE-MPE-CP, RD, 28-Sep Problems with QPS DAQ Systems During LHC Operation, 1 st Results from 2010 CNRAD Tests R. Denz TE-MPE-CP.
PLCs at CERN for machine protection and access interlocks Session: Machine Protection and interlock systems at different labs I. Romera Ramírez (CERN /
Logo area HL LHC IT STRING M. Bajko CERN TE-TM and QXF Review.
TEST FACILITY STATUS FOR TESTING CERN Marta Bajko WP10. EUCARD 2 Task 4 - HTS Magnet Tests, June 2015.
Machine Protection Review, Markus Zerlauth, 12 th April Magnet powering system and beam dump requests Markus Zerlauth, AB-CO-IN.
Training LHC Powering – Blanca Perea Solano From Individual System Tests to Powering to Nominal Blanca Perea on behalf of Hardware Commissioning Coordination.
Inner Triplet Protection Strategy LHC & HL-LHC Daniel Wollmann with Inputs from B. Auchmann, G. Ambrosio, R. Denz, P. Fessia, E. Ravaioli, F. Rodrigues.
Hardware Commissioning Review, R. Denz, 12-May Superconducting circuits: what remains to be done during hardware commissioning R. Denz AT-MEL-PM.
Modelling and testing of circuit protection of new superconducting magnets for the HL-LHC project
2007 IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium (NSS)
Dependability Requirements of the LBDS and their Design Implications
Minimum Hardware Commissioning – Disclaimer
The HL-LHC Circuits: Global View and Open Questions
RELIABILITY OF 600 A ENERGY EXTRACTION SYSTEMS
Potential failure scenarios that can lead to very fast orbit changes and machine protection requirements for HL-LHC operation Daniel Wollmann with input.
Estrella Vergara EN-ACE group 24th May 2017
Powering the LHC Magnets
STPA FOR LINAC4 AVAILABILITY REQUIREMENTS
Powering from short circuit tests up to nominal
Re-Commissioning (IST) of Electrical Systems: QPS, EE & PIC
Detailed global view on protection and detection of the circuits
Machine Protection Xu Hongliang.
Simulations of failure cases 1st STEAM Workshop June 2019
Review of hardware commissioning
R. Denz, TE-MPE-EP Acknowledgements: J. Steckert
Presentation transcript:

Reliability of the Quench Protection System for the LHC s.c. Elements F. Rodriguez-Mateos and Antonio Vergara (both TS now, AT when the work was done) SubWG on Reliability CERN 26 March 2004

References on the subject “Reliability of the Quench Protection System for the LHC s.c. Elements”, PhD thesis, Antonio Vergara Fernandez, Nov’03 Accelerator Reliability Workshop, Grenoble, Feb’02: “Machine Protection and Interlock System for the LHC”, R. Schmidt European Particle Accelerator Conference EPAC, Jun’02: ”Reliability Analysis for the Quench Detection in the LHC” What do we hope to achieve for the LHC quench protection and beam availability?, F. Rodriguez-Mateos and A. Vergara, Chamonix 2003 Reliability of the Quench Protection System for the LHC s.c. Elements, A. Vergara and F. Rodriguez-Mateos, Nuclear Instruments and methods, Section A, pre-print accepted, to be published CERN Machine Protection Working Group, Nov’01 External Review of the LHC Quench Protection System, Dec’01 CERN Electrical Enginnering Working Group, Jun’02 LHC Main Ring Committee (MARIC), Aug’02

Overview Channels provoking a Power Abort in QPS: Quench detectors: availability on demand (missing a quench is dangerous!) False triggers (false quenches, spurious opening of breakers, accidental HDS discharge) Channels giving the QPS Power Permit: –Baseline: PP given only when 100% of the QPS system is available (including redundancies) PP from QPS is only considered by the PICs for the start-up, not during operation (only needed after a power abort) Estimations on expected global reliability: –Input data, boundary conditions –Results: impact on designs (redundancy, powering, alternatives) Maintenance/monitoring strategies –Maintainability: Maximum repair period to reach desired reliability

QPS Reliability: Motivation Why a reliability study? –QPS is a fundamental system of the LHC directly related to: Commissioning Success. Useful operational time. Total lifetime and cost. –Lack of experience and studies of reliability in this field. Where can the results be applied? –System Design. –Operational Strategy: Supervision. Power permit and abort. Inspection and repairs. –Safety: hazard analysis.

QPS Dependability Experience (mainly String-2, String-1 and also test benches) and simulations have proven that QPS, when it is fully available, can assure the integrity of all the LHC superconducting elements. This dependability study includes: –Experimental and/or theoretical validation of the protection strategies. –Validation of the components under the expected radiation environment. –Reliability modelling using RESQP. (REliability Software for Quench Protection Studies) Its calibration (not to forget!) –Optimisation of subsystem designs considering: Redundant Topologies. Maintainability. Space Constraints. Machine Operation. Cost. –Sensitivity analysis –Outlook of the QPS maintenance strategy. –Estimation of the QPS impact on the overall LHC performance.

The study was applied to … Quench detectors Quench heater power supplies Energy extraction Designs: redundancies and voting schemes Preventive maintainability strategies The results were applied to …

Redundant Quench Detectors: States Logic k-oo-n Analog n 4 Possible States False Quench Missed Quench Detector Available Magnet Unprotected Safe Failure. Downtime (  5 h) Main Failure. Downtime (  ??? h) Dangerous Failure. Downtime (0 h) AC-DC

DQQDL (MB, MQ): Maintainability (e.g. 2oo4) Maintenance: Inspection and Repair. Two possible checks foreseen: Coherency Check (CT):Flag showing ‘n’ channels coherency. PERMANENTLY AVAILABLE k-oo-n Flag Flag=0 OK Flag=1 WARNING Improves false quench reliability if repaired Quench Test (QT):Amplifier outputs after quench-test signal from CR. Quench Test (required over the machine life) Flag=0 Flag=1 => repair Improves unprotected magnet reliability

RESQP REliability Software for Quench Protection Studies Markov Modeling System Structure Function FQ UM Bath-Curve Poisson Component Availability Random Walk Renewal Theory MQDowntime RESQP - Reliability Data - Maintenance - Expected Quench Rate - Maintenance Failure ‘costs’ (weight function) Machine Status Fault Trees Failure Dependencies Component Failure Screening MIL-HDBK Spec sheets Manufact. data

DQQDL: Topology & Maintenance Detected-Quench Reliability 99.1 % Monthly Quench Tests (id) 41 % Yearly Quench Tests (Test mode+repair) (20 years) 0.6 – 1.2  2 Power Supplies 9 – 12  1 Power Supply Yearly False Quenches Monthly repair after wrong-coherency flag Main Advantage : Maintainability 2016 units in LHC QD 2 k-oo-n QD 1 k-oo-n

Other Detector Families (1oo2 + double powering) PGA Calibration Switch DSP PGA Calibration Switch DSP ADC AC-DC Inst Ampl Inst Ampl REF CC SRAM HTS RES Inst Ampl Inst Ampl REF CC SRA AC-DC Inner Triplet (DQQDT) Insertion Magnets (DQQDI) Corrector Magnets (DQQDG) Current Leads (DQQDC)

QPS monthly tests are required… Over 20 years

Energy Extraction Operation: –All facilities in a powering sub-sector open after a quench in the main magnets. –High demand rate:  15  30 demands/year/facility Failures: –Switch opening failure  Solutions –Accidental opening (e.g. of more than one branch in a 13kA facility)  Spurious beam abort Maintenance: –Post-mortem data after quench  very useful in this case –Scheduled tests Fire arc quench heaters in MB/MQ Open back-up device 13 kA600 A 32 units in LHC 202 units in LHC

EE Reliability Monthly Tests 13 kA 600 A Monthly Tests Main Failure Probability over 20 years 15 demands/year/facility (4 quenches/week) Sensitivity analysis is one of the powerful features of RESQP (good relative precision)

Issues on EE reliability: Post-Mortem analysis and monthly tests, together with repairs are most necessary For the 13kA facilities, decision was taken not to use any backup device: if two of the breakers stay closed over the same branch, heaters are fired selectively For the 600A case, the use of a third switchgear (of equal type, only as a back-up) pays off even for “lower” quality devices. The advantages of these 600A breakers in front of the fuses are: cost and maintainability, as well as the fact that the latter are a better developed technology.

Conclusions on QPS Reliability Probability of protecting LHC S.C. elements IN ALL quenches (20 years)

Conclusions: Maintenance Strategy Summary Repairs after a quench, before Power Permit, using PM Repairs after monthly Quench Test (LHC QPS as good as new)

Room for possible collaborations (are they still needed?) UPC, Barcelona, Spain Prof. Carrasco, Dep. d'Enginyeria Electrònica Politecnico di Milano, Italy Prof. Zio, Dipartimento di Ingegneria Nucleare Montecarlo, safety-oriented, nuclear applications