UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Transport Studies Unit Review of Introduction of Competition in Railways in Europe Torben Holvad, John Preston and Biao Huang Transport Studies Unit, University of Oxford

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Transport Studies Unit Background Traditionally, railways were organised nationally as state monopolies. key motivation for initiating reforms lack of customer orientation perceived level of cost inefficiencies Allowing alternative providers is crucial to enhance the competitive pressure The extent and form of deregulation vary among the countries in Europe

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Transport Studies Unit Reform Experience in Five Countries Five case study countries are chosen representing a spectrum of market models Emphasis on the issue of competition in the rail market capital market competition product market competition Three types of reform path No significant change in either market Competition mainly introduced in product market Competition introduced in both markets

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Transport Studies Unit Capital and Product Market Competition Monopoly F 01 G 94 DK 93 GB 93 G-n 01 S 88 Duopoly DK 01 Oligopoly S 01 G-r 01 GB 01 Monopolistic completion Perfect competition Gov. Dept Gov. Agency Public Corp. MixedPrivate- listed Private- individual Capital Market Competition Product Market Competition

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Transport Studies Unit Country comparison using 7-Ds Decentralisation of regulatory control Disintegration of the industry (vertical and horizontal) Domain of contractual assignment Discretion of management Distribution of risks Duration of contracts Destination of subsidies

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Transport Studies Unit Decentralisation of regulatory control DK: Largely centralised; Regional authorities responsible for small “private” railways GB: Fairly centralised despite the fragmentation G: The Länders have been responsible for regional traffic operations since 1996 F: Six ‘experimental’ regions took over passenger rail services S: The counties responsible for regional traffic operations since the end of the 1980s

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Transport Studies Unit Disintegration of the industry DK: Vertical separation of operations and infrastructure. Limited horizontal separation GB: Far-reaching vertical and horizontal institutional separation of the industry G: Organisational separation of DBAG; Access for international and regional operations F: Organisational separation of infrastructure; Access for international operations S: Institutional separation of infrastructure and traffic operations

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Transport Studies Unit Domain of contractual assignment DK: Regulated within detailed contracts including minimum service standards GB: Considerable in theory, but limited wrt the planning of services with poor commercial prospects G: National—theoretically the widest conceivable; Länder’s—regions determine F: Similar to Germany S: National—considerable as SJ operates on commercial principles; Regional—very limited

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Transport Studies Unit Discretion of management DK: DSB is now independent public Co. with substantial management autonomy GB: commercial service in theory but extensive specification of service in practice G: National—commercial; Regional—LA involvement institutionalised F: National—performance contract but not formal; Experimental regions—vary S: National—commercial; Regional—local services open to political interference

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Transport Studies Unit Distribution of risks DK: DSB—net-cost contracts; ARRIVA—net- cost contract with penalties/rewards included GB: Operators usually bear all the risks; some contract with additional penalty schemes G: National—commercial operation; Länder’s —operators bear production and revenue risks F: National—Net-cost contract; Regional— Operator shares revenue risk with region S: National—Commercial; NC contract for subsidised service; Regional—Gross cost

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Transport Studies Unit Duration of contracts DK: DSB—5 years; ARRIVA—8 years; GB: As a rule, 7 years; up to 15 years in a few cases; Longer contract for re-franchising G: National—no formal contract; Länder’s— from 1 year (temporary regime) to 15 years F: National—no formal contract at present; Experimental regions—3 years S: National—no formal contract but 1-3 years for subsidised service; Regional: half a year to 5 years

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Transport Studies Unit Destination of subsidies DK: State financing of infrastructure project; subsidisation of non-profitable passenger service; GB: Limited public financing of infrastructure work; Selective financing of traffic operations G: Gov. contributes to the financing of new infrastructure project; Regional service subsidised F: State financing of infrastructure project; subsidisation of domestic passenger service S: State financing of infrastructure project; subsidisation of non-profitable passenger service

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Transport Studies Unit Railway Sector Performance Change Analytical Framework of Performance Measurement PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS Resources Inputs Market take-up UtilityService supply CBA and MCA SERVICE PROVISION EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS MARKET EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Transport Studies Unit Performance: Labour Productivity

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Transport Studies Unit Performance: Capital Productivity

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Transport Studies Unit Performances: Market Effectiveness

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Transport Studies Unit Performances: Service Provision Efficiency

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Transport Studies Unit Performance Change: Overall Assessment

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Transport Studies Unit Conclusions and Recommendations Theory suggests product market competition may be productively and dynamically efficient but may be allocatively inefficient Empirical evidence is inconclusive: increase in demand and reduction in costs Difficult to identify the effect of other external factors and analyse counter factual Requires detailed analysis at micro level, using quantitative models of on-track and off- track competition