Pacemakers and Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators: Software Radio Attacks and Zero- Power Defenses By: Halperin, Heydt—Benjamin, Ransford, Clark, Defend,

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Presentation transcript:

Pacemakers and Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators: Software Radio Attacks and Zero- Power Defenses By: Halperin, Heydt—Benjamin, Ransford, Clark, Defend, Morgan, Fu, Kohno, and Maisel Presented by: Charlie Allen

Overview IMDs Attacks Defenses – Notification – Authentication – Key Exchange Future Work

IMDs Pacemakers Implantable Cardioverter Defibrilators (ICD) Neurostimulators Drug Pumps Wireless

Implanted ICD

Programming IMDs Commercial Programmers Radio Communicator

Security Model Access to programmers Passive Adversary Active Adversary Assumptions – ICDs Honest

Intercepting Communication Reverse engineering Eavesdropping Limitations

Attacks ICD Identification Disclosing patient data Disclosing cardiac data Changing patient name Setting the ICD’s clock Changing therapies Inducing fibrillation Power denial of service

WISPer Notification Zero-Power Sound Audibility

WISP with Attached Piezo-element

Authentication Uses Master Key known by all programmers Identity specific to IMD Nonce known by programmer in advance Improvements Random nonce

Key Exchange Process Medium

Questions?