Low-quality, low-trust and low-adoption: Evidence from the Market for Fertilizer and Hybrid Seed in Uganda Jakob Svensson IIES, Stockholm University; IGC.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
LOCAL AND REGIONAL PROCUREMENT 3. Introduction to Markets
Advertisements

Evaluating New Products Prior to Test-Marketing
Copyright 2010, The World Bank Group. All Rights Reserved. Agricultural statistics part 2 Copyright 2010, The World Bank Group. All Rights Reserved. Prices.
Econometric-Process Simulation Models for Semi-Subsistence Agricultural Systems: Application of the NUTMON Data for Machakos.
4.00 Channel mgt, Selling promotion and Economic trends
Chapter 14 Markets with Asymmetric Information. Chapter 17Slide 2 Topics to be Discussed Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons Market Signaling.
Why is the BBA important? 11 October 2013 Alan Rennison Program Officer, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.
Copyright © 2006 BASES a VNU business 1 The "Secrets" of New Product Success FDIN Seminar 19 April 2006 Presented by Susan Malcolm BASES UK.
EMPOWERING FARMERS IN UGANDA. UNDERSTANDING THE CHAIN.
1 Why is the Development of Agricultural Input Markets Sluggish in Mozambique? Input Voucher Regional Workshop Lusaka - Zambia Emílio Tostão.
Consumption Preferences, Risk and Production Choices – the Case of Ethiopian Farm Households Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse.
AAEC 3315 Agricultural Price Theory CHAPTER 4 Theory of Production Some General Concepts.
©2002 South-Western Chapter 17 Version 6e1 chapter Pricing Concepts 17 Prepared by Deborah Baker Texas Christian University.
Profit Maximization in Pure Competition. Perfect Competition Situation: Situation: Yves and Zoe are neighboring farmers and both grow organic tomatoes.
RISK MANAGEMENT DIVERSIFICATION DIVERSIFICATION MARKETING ALTERNATIVES MARKETING ALTERNATIVES FLEXIBILITY FLEXIBILITY CREDIT RESERVES CREDIT RESERVES INSURANCE.
Location Patterns Dominated by Cohesion Chapter 5.
Incomplete markets, land and fertilizer use in Ethiopia Workshop on An African Green Revolution Tokyo December 7-8, 2008.
The Organization of the Firm
Diagnostic Country Report Roehlano Briones Ivory Myka Galang
A business case to reduce rural poverty through targeted investments in water in sub-Saharan Africa WWF5 Session How can food market measures boost.
Chapter 2: The External Environment: Opportunities, Threats, Industry Competition and Competitor Analysis Overview: The firm’s external environment.
CME Group and Informa Economics May 16, 2013 Pan American Grain and Oilseed Conference.
Biostatistics-Lecture 9 Experimental designs Ruibin Xi Peking University School of Mathematical Sciences.
Liquid Milk and Feed Value Chain Analysis for Wolmera District
Copyright © 2011 Pearson Education, Inc. Multiple Regression Chapter 23.
MIFIRA Framework Lecture 9 Competition: supply chains Chris Barrett and Erin Lentz February 2012.
Perfect Competition *MADE BY RACHEL STAND* :). I. Perfect Competition: A Model A. Basic Definitions 1. Perfect Competition: a model of the market based.
Contract Farming One Option For Creating A Role For The Private Sector In Agriculture Development?
IMPACT OF HIGH FOOD PRICES ON PRODUCERS AND REQUIRED INTERVENTIONS John Purchase Agricultural Business Chamber (ABC) Gauteng Food Summit 10 & 11 July 2008.
Heterogeneous welfare effect of cotton pricing on households in Benin Presenter : Didier Alia, PhD Student University of Kentucky Policymaker : Epiphane.
BALANCED USE OF FERTILIZERS-FARMERS’ PERCEPTION Khuda Bakhsh, PhD Institute of Agricultural and Resource Economics, UAF.
West Hills College Farm of the Future The Precision-Farming Guide for Agriculturalists Chapter Eight Precision Farming – Issues to Consider.
INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE sustainable solutions for ending hunger and poverty Ghana Strategy Support Program Targeting smallholders.
AAMP Training Materials Module 1.1: Production Cost and Farm Productivity Steven Haggblade (MSU)
Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development Soil Fertility, Fertilizer, and the Maize Green Revolution in East Africa Tomoya Matsumoto.
The Seal of Quality - - A New, Market-Oriented Agricultural Development Tool Association for International Agriculture and Rural Development Washington,
Direct Teacher: Professor Ng Reporter: Cindy Pineapple 1 Summarized from :
Revisiting Uganda’s Inorganic Fertilizer Supply Chain
1 Competition Among the Big and the Small Ken-Ichi Shimomura and Jacques-François Thisse.
Smallholder Market Participation: Concepts and Evidence from Eastern and Southern Africa Christopher B. Barrett, Cornell University FAO workshop on Staple.
Findings from Diagnostic Country Report (DCR) Ghana Maize Sector.
Chapter 14 – Increasing Yields. Crop Yields  Worldwide cereal yields have more than doubled since the early 1960s.  What makes yields increase?  Productive.
4.0 Understanding the Local Economy Exploring the Human Resources/Economic Development Connection Community Choices: Public Policy Education Program 8.
Towards a fair and efficient economy for all Comments on IPAP Simon Roberts Public Hearings on IPAP Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry 2 March 2010.
Nonparametric Tests IPS Chapter 15 © 2009 W.H. Freeman and Company.
Chapter 9 Perfect Competition McGraw-Hill/IrwinCopyright © 2009 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
GLOBAL MARKETING Distribution Management. Why A Distribution Strategy? To make the right quantities of the right product or service available at the right.
Chapter No.7 Agricultural Marketing. It includes all those activities and directions, which are necessary for the flow of agricultural goods from cultivator.
1 Agribusiness Library Lesson Agribusiness in a Free Enterprise System.
Types of Hypotheses Research Hypothesis –a statement of what the researcher believes will be the outcome of an experiment or a study. Statistical Hypotheses.
Understanding Local Economies Goals To present export base theory as a model of the way a local economy works. To relate general export base theory to.
COST ACCOUNTING. Unit 1 Cost Accounting and Information for Decision Makers.
Implications of pro-competitive reforms in the Zambian maize sector on small scale farmers Cornelius Dube 4 th CUTS-CIRC Biennial Competition, Regulation.
Investigating Competition & Regulation in the Retail Market for Malaria Treatment in Rural Tanzania Goodman C 1, Kachur SP 2,3, Abdulla S 2, Bloland P.
Effectiveness of cassava stem pruning for inducing delay in postharvest physiological deterioration (PPD) of fresh roots By Muyinza H., Nyakaisiki E.,
Maize Price Differences and Evidence of Spatial Integration in Malawi: The Case of Selected Markets BY LOVEMORE NYONGO ICAS VI: RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL.
Sports and Entertainment Marketing 2.01 Explain the concept of marketing.
Weather index insurance, climate variability and change and adoption of improved production technology among smallholder farmers in Ghana Francis Hypolite.
ICT-BASED MARKET INFORMATION SERVICES INCREASE AGRICULTURAL SEED ADOPTION AND INCOME AMONG UGANDAN FARMERS Policy Brief 15, June, 2016 Silver Spring Hotel.
International Livestock Research institute
Agriculture and Growth in Uganda
Does inclusion of large farms reverse the farm-size productivity relationship? Evidence from Ethiopia Sinafikeh Gemessa, Daniel A. Ali, Klaus Deininger.
Competition.
Comparing Three or More Means
The Business of Plant Breeding:
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 790 SEMINAR
Introduction to Markets
Asymmetric price adjustments under ever - increasing costs Evidence from the Retail Gasoline Market in Colombia Marc Hofstetter Jorge Tovar Economics.
Christopher B. Barrett, Cornell University
Presentation transcript:

Low-quality, low-trust and low-adoption: Evidence from the Market for Fertilizer and Hybrid Seed in Uganda Jakob Svensson IIES, Stockholm University; IGC

Starting point Low productivity in agriculture Low use/adoption of modern technologies (high-yielding varieties of seed and fertilizer), especially by smallholder farmers

Exploitable yield gaps for maize

The question Why is the adoption of these technologies so low, especially for smallholder farmers ? Research has focused on market failures

Existing literature: Market failures Output market failures Lack of information and learning Credit constraints Lack of insurance Weak or imperfect property rights BUT, evidence of how important these constraints is mixed

Input market failures HYPOTHESIS: Is it possible that smallholder farmers do not adopt basic technologies as due to some combination of adulteration, poor storage and inappropriate handling procedures, the technologies are simply not profitable? Bold, Kaizzi, Svensson, Yanagizawa-Drott (2015)

What do we do First large-scale empirical assessment of the prevalence of, and economic returns to, substandard fertilizer and hybrid seed in Africa Investigate the quality of one of the most popular high-yield variety (HYV) maize seed in the Ugandan market, as well as a generic nitrogen-based fertilizer (urea).

What do we do To measure the quality of the technologies in the market, we combine data on the nitrogen content of fertilizer from retail shops (measured in a laboratory) and experimental yield data from our own agricultural trials.

Data Randomly sampled local retail shops and using a covert shopper approach purchased – 300+ samples of urea fertilizer (“retail fertilizer”) – 30+ samples of branded hybrid seed (“retail hybrid seed”), Purchased urea and hybrid seed in bulk from – main wholesalers for urea (“authentic fertilizer”) – seed company producing the branded seed (“authentic hybrid seed”) Purchased traditional farmer seed from a random sample of smallholder farmers

Measuring quality of fertilizers Each retail fertilizer sample was tested three times for the content of nitrogen (N) in the lab and we use the mean of these tests to determine the quality of a sample. Authentic urea should contain 46 percent nitrogen (%N) and we confirmed this to be the case in our “authentic” sample.

Measuring yield Researcher-managed agricultural trials Treatment: – Fertilizers with %N= {0, 12, 23, 34, 46} – Seed = {“farmer”, “authentic”, “retailer”} 15 possible seed-fertilizer quality combinations randomized into six 30m² plots each at each of the five experimental sites

Findings

Market based fertilizers (UREA) contain 33% less nutrients (N) than authentic fertilizers

Measuring dilution of retail seeds To assess the quality of retail hybrid seed, we focus on their yield response Find α? α + (1- α) = Farmer AuthenticRetail

Estimated level of dilution of hybrid seeds Retail hybrid seeds Mix of authentic and farmer seeds (1)(2)  0.55 (0.111) Mean Variance Skewness Kurtosis Weighted sum of squared deviations 0.004

Measuring dilution of retail seeds = Farmer AuthenticRetail

Economic returns to adoption Modern technologies available in local retail markets are of poor quality What does this imply on the returns to adoption (of market quality inputs)?

Economic returns to adoption

Economic returns to technology adoption Source: Technologies available in the market Authentic technologies (1)(2) Mean rate of return (r) -12.2%51.3% Median rate of return (r) -8.6%51.0% Fertilizer samples yielding positive rate of return (r) 18.4%100.0% Fertilizer samples yielding rate of return (r) > 10% 1.4%100.0% Fertilizer samples yielding rate of return (r) > 20% 0.0%100.0% Fertilizer samples yielding rate of return (r) > 30% 0.0%100.0%

Farmers’ beliefs Can poor quality of fertilizer and seeds and low rates of return help explain why farmers do not adopt modern inputs? Yes if (i) farmers expect that inputs in the market are of poor quality (ii) farmers expect high return on adoption of authentic inputs but not on market inputs

Farmers’ beliefs Elicit farmers’ beliefs about quality in the market and the yield generated from using inputs from the market

Farmers are aware that the quality in the market is low (37% less nutrients)

Farmers’ beliefs Farmers know that using fertilizer increases yields, but that the increase depends on whether fertilizer is authentic or sourced from the market. A farmer planting owns seeds expects – 1.47 MT/ha without fertilizer – 2.53 MT/ha with market fertilizers – 5.23 MT/ha with authentic fertilizer

Expected economic returns to fertilizer adoption Source: Technologies available in the market Authentic technologies (1)(2) Mean expected rate of return (r) -0.2%67.4% Median expected rate of return (r) -52.2%10.5% Farmers with expected positive net-return 26.5%53.0% Farmers with expected rate of return > 10% 24.4%50.9% Farmers with expected rate of return > 20% 22.7%46.3% Farmers with expected rate of return > 30% 21.3%41.1%

Discussion Poor quality inputs appear to be the norm in the local retail markets we surveyed Adoption of modern inputs with average retail quality is not profitable. The rate of return of using authentic fertilizer and hybrid seed is large, however. Implication: one reason smallholder farmers do not adopt fertilizer and hybrid seed is that the technologies available in local markets are simply not profitable

Avenues for future research/policy Low quality could be due to a multitude of factors – adulteration, poor storage and inappropriate handling procedures. Quality deterioration could manifest at different points in the supply chain. Anecdotal evidence suggest that adulteration, by bulking out fertilizer or dyeing simple grain to look like hybrid seeds, is common, but more research is needed to determine if this is indeed the case. Exact reasons may be irrelevant for a farmer’s decision to adopt, but important for policy.

Future research and policy We do not explain why the quality of agricultural inputs in local retail markets is poor, or how the problem should be tackled Results, however, suggest that the market is partly characterized by a low-quality, low-trust, low-adoption equilibrium. Specifically, the data show not only low average quality but substantial heterogeneity in quality which is not correlated with price. This suggests that the ability to infer quality may be severely limited, since we would otherwise expect prices to adjust.

Policy Need to know more about the underlying reasons for low quality Need to know more about farmers’ ability to learn about the technology when the quality of the technology is uncertain Identify policies to move to a different equilibrium? – Monitor and enforce existing regulations – Incentives to provide high quality inputs

Incentives to provide high quality inputs The incentives to build up and maintain a high quality reputation in weakly regulated and unmonitored markets may not be strong enough for the small and informal drug stores that currently dominate the market Suggest that policies to facilitate the entry of a larger firm, or a market chain, that can tap into consumers' ability to learn about and pay for quality may be an option to improve quality

Incentives to provide high quality inputs Link the seller of the technology (inputs) with the buyer of the output. Thereby making the seller a partial (indirect) claimant of what is being produced With fixed cost of buying, this provides the seller with incentives to ensure it supplies high quality inputs.

Thank you!

Low adoption of modern technologies