Fighting the DDoS Menace!

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Presentation transcript:

Fighting the DDoS Menace!

● Protx (Online payments processing firm) : October 31 st ● WeaKnees.com, RapidSatellite.com (e-commerce) October 6 th ● WorldPay (section of Royal Bank of Scotland) : October 4 th ● Authorize.net (US credit card processing firm) : September 23 rd Recent High Profile DDoS Attacks

Fighting the Good Fight ● Aggregate-based congestion control (ACC) – identify a pattern of packets – apply a rate-limiter to the pattern(s) ● Local ACC versus Global ACC – allow a router to request adjacent upstream routers to rate-limit traffic corresponding to a specific aggregate.

An Illustrated Example “Controlling High Bandwidth Aggregates in the Network” (Mahajan et al, 2001)

ACC Works???

The Scalable Simulation Framework ( ● focus on scalability model scalability: # of nodes, traffic flows, bandwidth, system heterogeneity ● contains a DDoS scenario ● much faster learning curve than NS tools (no tcl/tk)

What's the catch? ● Well, it turns out the DDoS scenario models a TCP SYN flooding denial of service attack. ● This DDoS attacks the TCP/IP stack of the target servers. It is not bandwidth limited! So congestion control is not the appropriate response. ● Quickly, we must model a bandwidth-limited DDoS attack....

Network Topology

Client Topology

Server Topology

DDoS Topology

But What Does It Do? ● 164 iterations, no DDoS enabled: – mean connections, std. dev ● 68 iterations, DDoS enabled: – mean connections, std. dev ● 59 iterations, DDoS enabled & local ACC: – mean connections, std. dev

TODO LIST ● Improve the effectiveness of the DDoS attack ● Use identical random number seeds across all three trial. This will show strict ordering of, DDoS < DDoS + local ACC ≤ no DDoS