Ecosel as an Example of Subscription Games Lecture 12 (5/20/2015)

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Presentation transcript:

Ecosel as an Example of Subscription Games Lecture 12 (5/20/2015)

Bundle 3 Bundle 28 The ECOSEL Concept Bundle 31 Bundle 43 Bundle 1 Bundle 31 Bundle 3 Old-Forest: ac Carbon: 25,087 MgC Reserve Price: $80 Bundle 31 Old-Forest: ac Carbon: 76,743 MgC Reserve Price: $291

The ECOSEL Concept (cont.) Bundle 31 Bundle 1 (Max Timber Profit) reserve price Bundle 18

The Auction Component

Classification ECOSEL is a multi-unit, multi-dimension, public good subscription game with incomplete information and asymmetric preferences Subscription games: Bagnoli and Lippman 1989

Mathematical Characterization Notation: I = the set of bundles available in the auction (i indexes I); K = the set of players who play the game (k indexes K); = valuation or utility that Player k assigns to Bundle k; = the final bid that Player k places on Bundle i; and r i is the reserve price of Bundle i

Mathematical Characterization Cont. Social Surplus: Note: Social surplus does not depend on the value of final bids

Mathematical Characterization Cont. Theoretical Welfare Maximum:

Mathematical Characterization Cont. Winning Conditions and Efficiency:

Mathematical Characterization Cont. Payoff Function for Player :

Mechanism Design Design options –Maximize social surplus –Maximize seller revenue Methods –Theoretical testing (game theory and simulation) –Empirical testing (experimental economics) Software development

Mechanism Design cont. Design variables: –Reserve price disclosure –Communication policy –Bid withdrawal policy –Refund policy –Number of bundles –Auction sequencing –And many more….

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