BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center Validation of testing algorithms and collection kits for orthopox.

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BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center Validation of testing algorithms and collection kits for orthopox testing utilizing Laboratory Response Network (LRN) methods

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center Vaccination Campaign 2003 Risk of Smallpox as a BT agent “increased” pre-Iraq war.Risk of Smallpox as a BT agent “increased” pre-Iraq war. Available vaccine from original stockpile.Available vaccine from original stockpile. First stage of vaccination campaign began January 2003First stage of vaccination campaign began January 2003

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center Tasks for Biodefense Lab Rapid response clinical vaccinia Rule-InRapid response clinical vaccinia Rule-In Rapid response clinical variola Rule-OutRapid response clinical variola Rule-Out Analysis of environmental unknownsAnalysis of environmental unknowns

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center Vaccinia virus Rule-In Live virus vaccine.Live virus vaccine. Wadsworth Center testing required for adverse event monitoring, transmission, and release of VIG or Cidofovir.Wadsworth Center testing required for adverse event monitoring, transmission, and release of VIG or Cidofovir. Requires rapid turn-around (<24h).Requires rapid turn-around (<24h). Requires enhanced containment measures.Requires enhanced containment measures.

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center Guidelines for Laboratory Testing at the NYSDOH Wadsworth Center Biodefense Laboratory for: 1.Vaccination-associated adverse events (VAE) monitoring and confirmation during the smallpox vaccination program 2. Evaluation of patients with fever and an acute, generalized vesicular or pustular rash (i.e., suspect smallpox). generalized vesicular or pustular rash (i.e., suspect smallpox). Developed based on CDC guidelines Collaboration between Biodefense Laboratory, Clinical Virology Laboratory, NYS LRN, and the NYSDOH Div. of Epidemiology Preparation of Protocols and Submission Guidelines

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center Lab Preparation Assays:Assays: –LRN: real-time PCR, EM –WC: real-time PCR, EM, culture (non-variola only), DFA in development, multiplex rtPCR in development Staffing (24/7):Staffing (24/7): –Current team (4 people) vaccinated. –Additional 6-8 vaccinated staff to perform primary testing and support. –Separate BSL-3 lab for Orthopoxvirus testing.

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center Lab Readiness Collection supply list and kitsCollection supply list and kits –Collection materials –Packaging/transport materials (labels, bags, shipping container). –Forms (test requisition form). –Protocols (specimen collection, packaging, transport).

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center Orthopox Collection Kits Purpose: Used to collect clinical specimens from VAE patients or from moderate to high risk smallpox cases.Purpose: Used to collect clinical specimens from VAE patients or from moderate to high risk smallpox cases. Contents:Contents: –Viral Culturette Swabs –Microscope Slides –Screw-capped Tubes –IATA Certified Shippers, Containers & Gel Packs –Collection Guidance Document –Collection Supply List

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center Orthopox Accessory Kits Purpose: To facilitate safe collection of specimens at non-clinical sites and enhance specimen quality.Purpose: To facilitate safe collection of specimens at non-clinical sites and enhance specimen quality. Contents:Contents: –Absorbent Underpads –Biohazard Bags –Safety Scalpels –Alcohol Wipes –Alcohol Gel Hand Cleanser –Ruler –Sharps Disposal Container

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center Distribution of Collection Kits Distributed to Regional Epidemiology offices.Distributed to Regional Epidemiology offices. Distributed to Regional Resource Centers.Distributed to Regional Resource Centers. Distributed to all local health depts.Distributed to all local health depts. Surplus kits assembled and ready to go in storage.Surplus kits assembled and ready to go in storage. Protocols and guidelines were distributed to all sentinel hospitals.Protocols and guidelines were distributed to all sentinel hospitals. Collection kits, accessory kits, protocols were distributed through Div. of EpidemiologyCollection kits, accessory kits, protocols were distributed through Div. of Epidemiology

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center Testing Algorithm ScreeningScreening –Perform clinical evaluation (rash algorithm, history form). –Contact County HD and Local Epidemiologist. SubmissionSubmission –Contact State Epidemiology. –Determine method of transport to the laboratory. –Collect samples (scabs, slides, wet swabs [SOPs in kit]). –Package samples [SOPs in kit]. –Contact WC lab ( or ) with ETA. –Complete poxvirus testing submission form [included in kit]. Lab and Epi BT coordinators exchange info.Lab and Epi BT coordinators exchange info.

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center Vaccinia Adverse Events Vaccinated:Vaccinated: –825 NYS (excluding NYC) –39,608 USA Adverse Events:Adverse Events: –30 NYS –3 patient specimens sent to the laboratory

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center BDL year old female vaccination volunteer34 year old female vaccination volunteer Distribution of small lesions over bodyDistribution of small lesions over body Team deployed with collection kitTeam deployed with collection kit Samples put through the Adverse Event AlgorithmSamples put through the Adverse Event Algorithm

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center LRN Sample Preparation Extraction for PCR from Touch PrepsExtraction for PCR from Touch Preps –~2 hours using BioRad Aquapure Extraction Kit –~2 hours to run rt-PCR on ABI 7000 Tissue Culture and EM from CulturettesTissue Culture and EM from Culturettes –No extraction time –Grid Prep for EM ~1.5hours –Tissue Culture results can take days to weeks Scabs and blood are other potential sample sourcesScabs and blood are other potential sample sources

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center BDL Results Published in JCM 42: (2004) Result: Laboratory- Confirmed Generalized Vaccinia in 6 hours

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center BDL Not a Vaccination VolunteerNot a Vaccination Volunteer Recent travel to ArgentinaRecent travel to Argentina Atypical rashAtypical rash Negative for Orthopox, Vaccinia and VZV by rt- PCR and EMNegative for Orthopox, Vaccinia and VZV by rt- PCR and EM Low priority of case and high probability of topical skin infection – no further testing requiredLow priority of case and high probability of topical skin infection – no further testing required

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center Aug Mystery Virus “Expect the Unexpected” Female-mid 20’s presented at a clinic with small bump days after sexual contact.Female-mid 20’s presented at a clinic with small bump days after sexual contact. Urine culture and sensitivity performed and swab taken.Urine culture and sensitivity performed and swab taken. Vaginal swab was negative for Herpes but did produce viral response (CPE).Vaginal swab was negative for Herpes but did produce viral response (CPE). Specimen sent to Clinical Virology Laboratory, Wadsworth Center for identification.Specimen sent to Clinical Virology Laboratory, Wadsworth Center for identification. The viral isolate tested negative for HSV 1 and 2 by both PCR and ELISA, negative for enterovirus by PCR and IFA, negative for adenovirus by IFA, and negative for VZV by PCR. The viral isolate was also hem adsorption negative ruling out orthomyxo- and paramyxoviruses.The viral isolate tested negative for HSV 1 and 2 by both PCR and ELISA, negative for enterovirus by PCR and IFA, negative for adenovirus by IFA, and negative for VZV by PCR. The viral isolate was also hem adsorption negative ruling out orthomyxo- and paramyxoviruses. Viral isolate in cell culture was then sent to Biodefense LaboratoryViral isolate in cell culture was then sent to Biodefense Laboratory

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center Mystery Virus Cell supernatant sent to BD LabCell supernatant sent to BD Lab rtPCR Positive for Vaccinia & OrthopoxrtPCR Positive for Vaccinia & Orthopox Negative for Variola, Monkeypox & RabiesNegative for Variola, Monkeypox & Rabies EM confirms Orthopox infectionEM confirms Orthopox infection Further investigation reveals sexual contact with a recent military vaccineeFurther investigation reveals sexual contact with a recent military vaccinee Published in JCM 42: (2004)

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center “Pox in the News” © Marshfield Clinic

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center Preparedness for Monkeypox in NYS In place:In place: –Collection protocols & kits for vaccination- associated adverse event testing distributed through-out state –Collection protocols have been validated by real-world positives –LRN real-time PCR (rtPCR) assays for VZV & pan-Orthopox available and validated. –In-house rtPCR assays specific for variola (smallpox), vaccinia, pan-orthopox & VZV viruses available and ‘validated’.

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center Prairie Dogs in NYS 13 euthanized13 euthanized Necropsies done at NYS Wadsworth LaboratoryNecropsies done at NYS Wadsworth Laboratory Organs collected:Organs collected: Spleen, Heart, Liver Salivary glands, Cervical lymph nodes & Epiglottis Organs from each prairie dog pooled & ground with a mortar and pestleOrgans from each prairie dog pooled & ground with a mortar and pestle DNA extraction using BioRad Aquapure tissue extraction kitDNA extraction using BioRad Aquapure tissue extraction kit Result: Negative for Orthopoxviruses

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center Human Monkeypox (July 2003) Two patients suspected of contact with infected prairie dogs:Two patients suspected of contact with infected prairie dogs: –Patient 1: Blood only –Patient 2: Blood, roof of lesion & touch prep Negative Result for both patients

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center Conclusions BT Preparedness does work to enhance public health for non-BT events!BT Preparedness does work to enhance public health for non-BT events! Critical to have collaboration of lab andCritical to have collaboration of lab and epidemiology personnel! Having carefully thought-out and proven algorithms and protocols yield higher quality specimens and aids in confirmation of epidemiological findingsHaving carefully thought-out and proven algorithms and protocols yield higher quality specimens and aids in confirmation of epidemiological findings Can use past preparedness plans for responding to unanticipated events IF flexibility built into algorithms and SOPs.Can use past preparedness plans for responding to unanticipated events IF flexibility built into algorithms and SOPs.

BiodefenseLaboratoryN Y S D O H New York State Department of Health Wadsworth Center Acknowledgements NYS LRNNYS LRN NYSDOH Division of EpidemiologyNYSDOH Division of Epidemiology Wadsworth Center Clinical Virology LaboratoryWadsworth Center Clinical Virology Laboratory Wadsworth Center Rabies LaboratoryWadsworth Center Rabies Laboratory NYS Biodefense LaboratoryNYS Biodefense Laboratory Electron Microscopy Core (Bill Samsonoff)Electron Microscopy Core (Bill Samsonoff)