Interlock and Protection Systems for SC Accelerators: Machine Protection System for the LHC l The Risks l The Challenge l The LHC Layout l The Systems.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Jan Uythoven, AB/BTLHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page GeV Commissioning Machine Protection Needs to be commissioned to: Prevent damage with the used, higher.
Advertisements

LHC Machine Protection
CAS June Stored energy and risks Failures Protection systems Beam Instrumentation Case studies Conclusions Machine Protection Rüdiger Schmidt CAS.
Beam commissioning strategy Global machine checkout Essential 450 GeV commissioning System/beam commissioning Machine protection commissioning.
Concept & architecture of the machine protection systems for FCC
Sat 18/6 – Sun 19/6 07:48 Beam dump due to spurious interlock from BIS 08:30 access BIC repair. RF intervention in parallel. 13:00 Intervention on BIC.
Overview of Machine Protection for the LHC
Injection test1 Injection test in 2006 The installation schedule version 1.7 recently approved includes a ‘possible injection test’ - foreseen in April.
Cryogenic Experts Meeting (19 ~ ) Cooling scheme discussion for 300 Tm High Energy Beam Transfer line (HEBT) with large inclination MT/FAIR –
Chamonix Risks due to UPS malfunctioning Impact on the Superconducting Circuit Protection System Hugues Thiesen Acknowledgments:K. Dahlerup-Petersen,
1 Second LHC Splice Review Copper Stabilizer Continuity Measurement possible QC tool for consolidated splices H. Thiesen 28 November 2011 K. Brodzinski,
LER Workshop, CERN, October 11-12, 2006Detector Safety with LER - Henryk Piekarz1 LHC Accelerator Research Program bnl-fnal-lbnl-slac Accelerator & Detector.
CERN Rüdiger Schmidt FCC week 2015 Long Magnet Stringpage 1 Incident September 19 th Architecture of powering and protection systems for high field.
MP Questions for LE eCooling. Why talk about this now? Is there additional equipment needed, not yet considered? (nor costed) Interfaces to systems that.
Nominal intensity bunches ● First ramp with nominal intensity bunches suffered from an instability appearing around 1.8 TeV. ● Nominal intensity bunches.
EPPOG - LHC Machine LHC machine (and some outreach) Mike Lamont.
Training LHC Powering R. Denz Quench Protection System R. Denz AT-MEL.
PostMortem Workshop January LHC “Post Mortem” Workshop: Introduction Initiative by Robin Lauckner, Adriaan Rijllart and myself, helped by many other.
SL Seminar 11 July Machine Protection and Interlock Systems for the LHC SL-Seminar Rüdiger Schmidt on behalf of the MPWG The LHC challenges Powering.
1 CC & MP - CC10 - CERN Crab LHC J. Wenninger CERN Beams Department for the LHC Machine Protection Panel.
Status of ITER collaboration for Machine Protection I. Romera On behalf of the colleagues who contribute to the project Thanks to: Sigrid, Markus, Rüdiger,
LHC-CC Validity Requirements & Tests LHC Crab Cavity Mini Workshop at CERN; 21. August Remarks on using the LHC as a test bed for R&D equipment.
1 Commissioning and Early Operation – View from Machine Protection Jan Uythoven (AB/BT) Thanks to the members of the MPWG.
Chamonix 2006, B.Dehning 1 Commissioning of Beam Loss Monitors B. Dehning CERN AB/BDI.
16-17 January 2007 Post-Mortem Workshop Logging data in relation with Post-Mortem and archiving Ronny Billen AB-CO.
Machine Protection Review, R. Denz, 11-APR Introduction to Magnet Powering and Protection R. Denz, AT-MEL-PM.
Robert R. Wilson Prize Talk John Peoples April APS Meeting: February 14,
LHC Machine Protection: an introduction Jörg Wenninger OP training March 2006 Acknowledgments to my colleagues of the MPWG for input and material.
Training LHC Powering - Markus Zerlauth Powering Interlocks Markus Zerlauth AB/CO/MI.
MPP Meeting 07/03/2007 MPP Main Ring Magnet Performance Panel Meeting Wednesday 7th March 2007 Agenda: 1)Matters arising 2)Recommendations for the case.
Progress with Beam Report to LMC, Machine Coordination W10: Mike Lamont – Ralph Assmann Thanks to other machine coordinators, EIC’s, operators,
LHC machine protection close-out 1 Close-out. LHC machine protection close-out 2 Introduction The problem is obvious: –Magnetic field increase only a.
LHC’s Modular Machine ITER – Machine ProtectionB. ToddJuly 2010 Thanks to : TE/MPE/MI, CERN Machine Protection Panel, et al 1v0 Protection System.
Summary of Session 1 - CLIC MP workshop 6-8/6/2012, R.Schmidt 1.
PLCs at CERN for machine protection and access interlocks Session: Machine Protection and interlock systems at different labs I. Romera Ramírez (CERN /
Failure Analysis Tools at DESY. M. Bieler, T. Lensch, M. Werner, DESY ARW 2013, Melbourne,
Machine Protection Review, Markus Zerlauth, 12 th April Magnet powering system and beam dump requests Markus Zerlauth, AB-CO-IN.
R.Schmidt and J.Wenninger - Lumi ‘061 Rüdiger Schmidt Jörg Wenninger CERN LUMI 06 in Valencia / Spain Friday 20 October 2006 Machine protection for PS2,
Introduction; Machine protection, experience and challenges: Review of existing solutions and challenges faced by future installations Purpose of machine.
The TV Beam Observation system - BTV
BEAM LOSS MONITORING SYSTEM
Powering LHC magnets version 30/3/2007.
Minimum Hardware Commissioning – Disclaimer
The HL-LHC Circuits: Global View and Open Questions
Introduction: FCC beam dumping system
Setup beam intensities for FCC-hh
The LHC - Status Is COLD Is almost fully commissioned
Potential failure scenarios that can lead to very fast orbit changes and machine protection requirements for HL-LHC operation Daniel Wollmann with input.
MD2036: UFO dynamics studies and UFO fast detection
Powering the LHC Magnets
Large Booster and Collider Ring
Powering from short circuit tests up to nominal
Status of the BLHC ….work in progress! Mike Lamont CERN/AB 18/01/2008
BEAM LOSS MONITORING SYSTEM
Rüdiger Schmidt and Karl Hubert Mess
Initial Experience with the Machine Protection System for LHC
Intensity Evolution Estimate for LHC
The Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory is a U. S
Mike Lamont 4th HERA and the LHC workshop 26th May 2008
Collimator Control (SEUs & R2E Outlook)
Machine Protection Xu Hongliang.
+ many slides from various colleagues (KH, Rudiger, Paul, …)
Interlocking of CNGS (and other high intensity beams) at the SPS
Protection against accidental beam loss at the LHC
Machine Tolerances in Cleaning Insertions
Warm Magnet Thresholds
The LHC Beam Interlock System
Interlocking strategy
What systems request a beam dump? And when do we need them?
Close-out.
Presentation transcript:

Interlock and Protection Systems for SC Accelerators: Machine Protection System for the LHC l The Risks l The Challenge l The LHC Layout l The Systems for Protection l The Glue The impact of LHC Machine Protection has been recently discussed at the LHC Workshop in Chamonix January, and I will use some of the material that has been presented (contributions from O.Brüning, H.Burkhardt, E.Carlier, H.Mess, R.Lauckner, M.Lomperski, F.Rodriguez-Mateos) R.Schmidt - Villars 30/01/2001

p. 230/01/2001 R.Schmidt, Villars Energy in two LHC Beams: 700 MJ – Two systems, one for each beam Energy in dipole magnets (one sector): 1.3 GJ –Eight systems in the LHC Energy in quadrupole magnets (one sector): 40 MJ –Sixteen systems in the LHC Energy in 600 A circuits (i.e. chromaticity correction): kJ –Some 100 systems In total about 11 GJ 50 tons at 600 km/h = heating + melting of 950 kg copper 180 kg at km/h 3 * kg at 200 km/h The Risks: Energy in Magnets and Beams

p. 330/01/2001 R.Schmidt, Villars LHC magnets operate at 1.9 K - Little enthalpy - Temperature margin about 1.4 K Nominal beam intensity : 3 * Protons / beam Energy at 7 TeV to quench a dipole magnet corresponds to about 10 7 Protons Energy at 450 GeV to quench a dipole magnet corresponds to about 10 9 Protons Energy to quench a superconducting dipole magnet is small First beam tests with one bunch, very low intensity, below quench threshold Beam Monitors must work for such parameters

p. 430/01/2001 R.Schmidt, Villars The beam can leave in a very short time…. -Published in Chamonix Workshop - (O.Brüning) Power trip of power converter for D1 warm separation magnet –in collision the beam would start to suffer after 5 turns (2 mm orbit displacement) Wrong functioning of the damper for injection oscillations and instabilities –at injection energy the beam would start to suffer after 6 turns Power trip of power converter for one of the warm quadrupoles in the collimation section –in collision the beam would start to suffer after 18 turns Quench of one main dipole magnet –in collision the beam would start to suffer after 280 turns

The energy in the LHC magnet system corresponds to about tons of snow, sliding down by about about 600 m …….the bad news: an energy release can be easily triggered by some innocent (ski)-operator …… the good news: LHC operators are far away from the LHC tunnel

The LHC machine need protection systems, but…. Machine Protection is not an objective in itself, it is to l maximise operational availability by minimising down-time (quench, repairs) l avoid expensive repair of equipment and irreparable damage Side effects from LHC Machine Protection System compromising operational efficiency must be minimised Downtime dominated by too complex Protection Systems Downtime for repairs due to insufficient protection systems

p. 730/01/2001 R.Schmidt, Villars LHC Machine Protection is to... Prevent an uncontrolled release of stored energy, thus avoiding: l damage of equipment l unnecessary down-time - example: BEAM DUMP to avoid quenches and will include: l tools for consistent error and fault tracing ……. POST MORTEM Related topic: –access and interlock system to protect people is separate system, however, there are links between the access system and the machine protection

Sector Continuous Cryostat/Cryoline Superconducting bus-bars run through cryostatconnecting magnets. Current feeds at extreme ends. Other central insertion elements eg. Low Betas, separator dipoles, matching COLD (<2K) 2.9km WARM 500m 1 5 DC Power feed 3 Octant DC Power Main Arc FODO cells containing; main dipoles and quadrupoles, chromaticity sextupoles, octupoles, tuning and skew quadrupoles, spool pieces, orbit correctors End of Continuous Cryostat containing; dispersion suppressors, Some of the matching section, and the electrical feedbox LHC 27 km Circumference LHC is divided into 8 Sectors Slide from P.Proudlock

p. 930/01/2001 R.Schmidt, Villars LHC Machine Protection = Integration of systems The interlocks deal with the integration of systems into the LHC MACHINE PROTECTION SYSTEM,……, with the glue that links systems such as: l BEAM DUMP SYSTEM l BEAM LOSS MONITOR SYSTEM l QUENCH PROTECTION and POWERING SYSTEM l BEAM CLEANING SYSTEM (two long straight section for collimators) Access, RF, Vacuum, Collimators, Warm magnets, Experiments, …. and an architecture of the MACHINE INTERLOCK SYSTEM is required

p. 1030/01/2001 R.Schmidt, Villars They “lazy” approach …can we copy another system ? l FERMILAB - TEVATRON operates since more than 15 years l DESY - HERA operates since more than10 years l BNL - RHIC operates since less than 2 years (evolution of FERMILAB system) => No major accidents during operation LHC is specific: l energy much larger l many more components l powering of the machine in sectors very different from other machines l time constants involved together with energy require different solutions After visits to FERMILAB, BNL, and DESY (…+ K.H.Mess - associate from DESY here for one year) a systems is proposed with an different architecture, but with using some ideas from BNL and HERA

p. 1130/01/2001 R.Schmidt, Villars With respect to BEAM OPERATION: Energy stored in beams Fault detected => BEAM ABORT, beam is directed into BEAM DUMP BLOCK Two systems - one BEAM DUMP SYSTEM for each beam With respect to POWERING: Energy stored in magnets of one cryostat: Fault detected => POWER ABORT, and most of the magnetic energy is dumped into ENERGY EXTRACATION RESISTORS four large such systems for each sector - 2 for MB, 1 for QF, 1 for QD (in total 32) some hundred smaller (600 A) systems around the LHC Electrical circuits in one continuous cryostat independent from circuits in other cryostats String II - Commissioning of Power and Magnet Interlock System soon Separation of POWER ABORT and BEAM ABORT

p. 1230/01/2001 R.Schmidt, Villars Architecture of Power Permit in one LHC sector LHC-B T Q4D2 Q5 Arc Q4D2 T Atlas DFBX DFBM DFBM DFBA DFBA DFBM DFBX QP PPC PC QP 1 8 Slide from K.H.Mess

Architecture of BEAM PERMIT in the LHC

BEAM PERMIT CONTROLLER p. 14

p. 1530/01/2001 R.Schmidt, Villars With respect to POWERING CIRCUITS connecting magnets with LARGE amount of stored energy Quenches propagate to magnets in other circuits => All power in continuous cryostat will be switched off after detecting a quench CIRCUITS connecting magnets with SMALL amount of stored energy => In the (unlikely) case of a quench, only the corresponding circuit is de-excited With respect to BEAM OPERATION CIRCUITS that are very critical for operation with beam Fault always causes total beam loss => In case of a fault - always BEAM DUMP CIRCUITS that are less critical for operation with beam Fault might cause beam losses, depending on machine status: energy, beam intensity.. => In case of fault - BEAM DUMP IF ……other conditions are met / not met Classification of electrical circuits

BEAM PERMIT / ABORT for the entire LHC accelerator –Fast system - the beam can be dumped in a few turns –BEAM PERMIT CONTROLLERS (BPC) linked via optical fibres with 10 MHz signal (fast data transmission) –Absence of BEAM PERMIT triggers BEAM DUMP –16 BEAM PERMIT CONTROLLERS are required –Input from variety of systems, such as powering and protection, access, BLM, vacuum, and others POWER PERMIT / ABORT for each continuous cryostat –System is less fast, the power is extracted in several seconds –Impact beams after some 10 ms - therefore more time to react –About 48 POWER PERMIT CONTROLLERS (PPC) are required, one per cryostat (two for long arc cryostat) –Links in tunnel could be via current loop and non-critical communication between controllers via control system Some Parameters of the Protection Systems

p. 1730/01/2001 R.Schmidt, Villarsp. 17 Information links for Machine Protection System

p. 1830/01/2001 R.Schmidt, Villars Post Mortem Diagnostics MUST be a part of the system - Artist view of the requirement

p. 1930/01/2001 R.Schmidt, Villars Summary of architecture for the machine protection General Separation of BEAM PERMIT and POWER PERMIT Separation of POWER PERMITS for cryostats - one (two for arcs) PPC per cryostat Diagnostics after fault is integral part of the system Classification of Electrical Circuits Powering: Main circuits (CRYOSTAT POWER ABORT) and auxiliary circuits (CRYOSTAT POWER FAULT) Beam Operation: CRITICAL CIRCUITS and LESS CRITICAL CIRCUITS Inventory About 60 electronics crates Two fast links for BEAM ABORT with optical fibres (plus some reserve fibres) Several slower links for POWER ABORT, possibly using current loops Fail-safe links, and input signals to electronics

p. 2030/01/2001 R.Schmidt, Villars Outlook Require POWER PERMIT CONTROLLER for first sector (octant) test in 2004 –Functional Specification for Summer 2001 –Start development of hardware by this Summer Require full functionality of BEAM PERMIT CONTROLLER for 2006 –Functional Specification for End of 2001 –Possibly reduced functionality for 2004 (injection test) POST MORTEM Facilities to be defined –Some definitions BEFORE electronics development starts –Unique CLOCK required How to use beam loss monitor systems to request BEAM DUMP? –Studies continuing...

p. 2130/01/2001 R.Schmidt, Villars With respect to BEAM OPERATION Energy stored in beams to be safely deposited with BEAM DUMP SYSTEM BEAM ABORT - POWER ABORT With respect to POWERING Energy stored in magnets to be safely deposited with POWER DUMP SYSTEM Both systems are largely independent No signals from BEAM DUMP SYSTEM to POWER DUMP SYSTEM Signal from POWER DUMP SYSTEM to BEAM DUMP SYSTEM in case of power fault

p. 22

p. 23

p. 2430/01/2001 R.Schmidt, Villars Interfaces between BPC and PPC to other systems POWER PERMIT CONTROLLERS Interfaces for Interlocks Power Converters Quench Protection System Cryogenic System Access System Beam Permit System Interfaces for Services Control System Timing System Power Supply for electronics Post Mortem System BEAM PERMIT CONTROLLERS Interfaces for Interlocks POWER PERMIT CONTROLLERS Beam Loss Monitors and other BI Beam Dump System Collimators RF System Vacuum System Experiments Injection System Access System Interfaces for Services Control System Timing System Power Supply for electronics Machine Status (Energy, Current,..) Post Mortem System

p. 2530/01/2001 R.Schmidt, Villars ….and what concerns the interface between Machine Protection and LHC Experiments Next Milestone the Experiments will not be concerned, however, since time passes…. Risk analysis for the experiments –How could large fraction of the beam hit the experiments? –What would be the consequence? –How to avoid such accidents? BEAM ABORT signals from the experiments –One BEAM ABORT stops the LHC for at least 2 hours Hardware interfaces - what signals should be exchanged? Initially one representative for all 4 experiments could follow discussions on Machine Protection. For specific topics, other representatives from the experiments could attend. To be re-considered at a later date.

p. 26

BEAM PERMIT CONTROLLER p. 27

p. 2830/01/2001 R.Schmidt, Villars How fast does the beam has to be dumped? Quench in one MB magnet at top current –massive quench in a dipole magnet due to beam loss would lead to an orbit change of 2 mm in 20 ms (see EXCEL calculation), assuming beta = 100 m - beam dump in the order of 10 ms. Quench in other magnets –quadrupole quenches lead to betratron tune change –sextupole quenches lead to change of chromaticity - beam loss and instabilities Loss of RF - de-bunching of the beam –action in some hundred milliseconds Access door forced or emergency button pushed –less than one second Beam loss monitor indicates too large losses –assuming integration time of 5 ms, activation of the beam dump should be in the order of 1 ms Experiments dump the beam - to be discussed with the experiments Main Power converter failure –depends on the power converter, but a fast action before the current decays substantially would always make sure that the beam is lost in a controlled way Other systems (cryogenics, vacuum, …) - to be discussed

p. 2930/01/2001 R.Schmidt, Villars Example for Classification All main circuits are considered to be critical The final list of critical circuits will be established (much) later, and could be modified during LHC beam operation

–Enable: A system that allows to switch on (equipment interlock system) -power converters -beam injection enable -other systems and test modes - to be defined this is in general not time critical and includes many systems (eg. Cryogenics) –A system that stops beam - BEAM ABORT -beam dumps (as fast as technical possible - see Oliver) this is VERY time critical and must be fail safe, and includes less systems –A system that stops power - POWER ABORT -fire quench protection heaters (local action) -act on power converter (10ms - 1s) -open energy extraction switches (10ms - 1s) -discharge circuits (time constants between 1 and 104 seconds) this is time critical and must be fail-safe (failure could lead to heavy equipment damage) –A system recording the data for post-mortem analysis of any ABORT -Clear diagnostics (example - get info MB 112 in sector 5 quenched) Three-Fold Functionality p. 30