14 th International Anti-Corruption Conference Strengthening Global Action for an Accountable Corporate World Homer E. Moyer, Jr. Miller & Chevalier Washington, DC Bangkok, Thailand 13 November 2010

2 Incentives for Resisting Official Corruption Commitment to ethical business practices, integrity Compliance with laws Reduce costs Compete on superior quality, service, reliability Refuse to cooperate with kleptocracy Avoid high-risk corrupt markets Appreciate linkages with international crimes Reduce requests for bribes Seek to use integrity as a competitive advantage

3 Enforcement as an Incentive to Compliance Various, complementary anti-corruption initiatives have obvious value Enforcement of anti-corruption laws creates unique incentives to compliance The American experience under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act demonstrates the impact of increased enforcement US enforcement has been characterized by more cases, larger and diverse penalties, self-reporting, publicity, and more sophisticated compliance programs

4 Incentives When Anti-Corruption Laws Are Enforced Avoid cost of independent investigations Avoid the extraterritorial reach of anti-corruption laws Avoid costly corporate fines, disgorgement Avoid debarment, cross-debarment Avoid expensive remediation Avoid period of probation Avoid an independent compliance monitor Avoid loss of shareholder value Avoid individual liability, imprisonment

5 Tipping Points for Corporate Compliance Meaningful, visible enforcement of anti-corruption laws The belief that bribing officials risks harmful commercial or enforcement consequences for you Corporate counsel awareness of international conventions The belief that aggressive corporate self-enforcement will be recognized and credited Simultaneous supply side and demand side enforcement The perception that most competitors are complying

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7 The Continuing Evolution of Compliance “Best Practices” Free-standing anti-corruption compliance programs Practical guidance for employees Greater involvement of Audit, Supervisory Committees Management accountability, discipline Development of a corporate culture of compliance Extension of corporate standards to third parties Monitoring and testing of program effectiveness Belief that an effective compliance program can actually prevent bribery

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