Brentford & Turnham Green The Battles of The Battlefields Trust Presents The Battles of Brentford & Turnham Green The battles of Brentford & Turnham Green A PowerPoint introduction for KS2 and 3 children. Please feel free to use and adapt as fits needs

Battle of Turnham Green 13th November 1642 When:- Battle of Brentford 12th November 1642. A narrative of the Battle of Brentford by Simon Marsh BATTLE OF BRENTFORD 1642 Following the outbreak of civil war in the summer of 1642, the King and parliament gathered their field armies respectively at Shrewsbury and Northampton. By mid-September the parliamentary commander, the Earl of Essex, had assembled a force of over 15,000 men and had been ordered by parliament to “..march with such forces as you think fit, towards the Army raised in his Majesties Name against the Parliament and Kingdom. And you shall use your utmost Endeavours, by Battle or otherwise, to rescue his Majesty’s Person…out of the hands of those desperate persons [about him]”. Essex advanced to Worcester, possibly in order to forestall a royalist march down the Severn Valley to Bristol, at that time the second city of the kingdom. On 12 October, having learnt that Essex was no longer between the royal army and London, the King ordered his army to advance on the capital with the intention of ending the war at a stroke. Essex became aware of the King’s departure from Shewsbury by 18 October and, giving chase, marched his army east, arriving in the vicinity of the royalist forces near Banbury on 22 October. Made aware of the proximity of the parliamentary forces, the King ordered his army to draw up on Edgehill in the early morning of 23 October. Both armies fought each other to a standstill during the battle that day, but Essex left the King in possession of the field and fell back to Warwick to rally his broken units. Essex subsequently retreated back to London via Northampton, Woburn and St Albans arriving in the capital on 7 November. The royalists meanwhile occupied Banbury (27 October), Oxford (29 October) and Reading (4 November) as they advanced slowly on London. On 10 November the King marched from Maidenhead to Colnbrook, whilst, according the Venetian Ambassador, parliamentary London was in a “great stir“at the prospect of a royalist attack. With the King’s army deployed in a wide area to the west of London, including at Colnbrook, Egham, Ashford and Windsor, parliament voted to open peace negotiations with the royalists and members of both houses of parliament were sent to treat with the King, meeting him in Colnbrook on 11 November. The King agreed to talks at Windsor and the message was received “by both Houses with a great deal of joy“ on 12 November. Advance on London Parliament believed the King had promised to enter into peace negotiations and not attack London, but by early on the morning of 11 November the royalists had decide to re-supply their troops with match, powder and shot ready to march from Colnbrook toward London the next day. Three royalists regiments at Windsor, which were to be involved in the assault on Brentford, had been similarly re-provisioned on 10 November. During the morning of 12 November the royal army assembled on Hounslow Heath expecting to encounter parliamentary forces. Finding none, Prince Rupert, the King’s nephew who was commanding the royalist horse, apparently intended to lead the royal army for the assault on the parliamentary troops in Brentford which were blocking the Great West Road – the chosen route into London, but General Patrick Ruthven, the Earl of Forth, who would be made Earl of Brentford in 1644, came up and took overall control of royalist forces. Writing after the civil war, the Earl of Clarendon blamed Prince Rupert for advancing to Hounslow with horse and dragoons, presumably prior to 12 November, so necessitating the King to bring up the rest of the army to counter the danger of Rupert’s force being cut off by parliamentary troops at Brentford, Acton and Kingston. But “Prince Rupert’s Diary” makes reference to Rupert moving from Egham to Colnbrook, probably on 10 November, to request the King to draw up the royal army on Hounslow Heath and provide foot to clear the parliamentarians from Brentford. Given that “Rupert’s diary” was not compiled earlier than 1662, it is possible that it represents post-justification of activity. But the evidence in the Royalist Ordnance Papers suggests the decision to advance on London was taken by very early on 11 November 1642, presumably after discussions between the King and Rupert. At the very least this indicates the King had an opportunity to order Rupert to withdraw any cavalry at Hounslow, but chose not to take it. It also means that the King was disingenuous in his subsequent claims to parliament that he only made the decision to advance on Brentford after the departure of the delegation from both houses of parliament on 11 November. Whilst all the royal army, which probably totalled around 12,000 men, appears to have advanced to Hounslow, not all was engaged at Brentford. Working from contemporary accounts and, less reliably, restoration petitions, elements from at least eight royalist foot regiments and three cavalry regiments can be identified as being directly involved in the battle. Estimates based on surviving pay warrants for the foot regiments and the Edgehill order of battle for the cavalry suggest that up to 3,800 royalist foot and up to 800 cavalry might have been engaged at Brentford; only perhaps one third of the forces available to the King. At Colnbrook the royalists also appear to have readied four cannon for the advance on Brentford with the remainder of the artillery train following behind. Defence of Brentford For parliament, New Brentford/Brentford End (the western part of modern day Brentford either side of the River Brent) was defended by Denzil Holles’ regiment of foot consisting of probably around 700-800 men with Lord Brooke’s regiment of foot of 480 men seemingly in Old Brentford (the eastern part of modern day Brentford). These regiments had arrived by the morning of 11 November 1642 and had probably been ordered there to act as a defence against any royalist probing along the Great West Road. The parliamentary soldiers were short of arms, match, bullet and powder and ransacked the shops in Brentford for supplies. According to John Lilburne, the political radical - who was then serving as a captain in Brooke’s regiment, although the foot were supported by 10-12 troops of cavalry, most of the parliamentary horse fled on hearing of the royalist attack, leaving, apparently, only a troop commanded by Captain Robert Vivers. The parliamentary forces also seem to have had two or three artillery pieces. The royalist attack appears initially to have been made by cavalry to the west of Brentford, probably along the London Road and along Syon Lane from Isleworth. Given that the royal army had to march from various locations west of London and assemble before commencing the advance on Brentford, it seems unlikely that the attack commenced much before midday, a view supported by contemporary sources. Many accounts of the battle also make reference to the heavy mist over Brentford that day which helped the royalists achieve tactical surprise. Sir Richard Bulstrode, serving in the Prince of Wales’ regiment of horse, noted that his regiment was forced to retreat after being surprised by parliamentary artillery placed behind a great hedge and had to await the arrival of the royalist foot before pressing the attack. Moses Glover’s 1635 map of the Manor of Isleworth around Brentford shows a number of enclosures either side of the London Road to the west of Brentford. The enclosure around Brentford negated the utility of the royalist cavalry and caused the engagement to become an infantry battle primarily, though not exclusively, involving musketeers. John Gwyn, a soldier serving in Sir Thomas Salisbury’s Welsh regiment of royalist foot, indicates that the first parliamentary forces, almost certainly of Denzil Holles’s red coated regiment of “butchers and dyers“, were engaged by the royalists at Sir Richard Wynn’s house, west of Brentford End. By tradition, just before his regiment went into battle, Sir Thomas is said to have told his men “gentlemen, you lost your honour at Edgehill, I hope you will regain it here“. Whilst the mist and the associated stillness might have diminished some of the sights and sounds of this initial engagement, the discharge of cannon must have been heard in Brentford. But no parliamentary reinforcements appear to have been sent from Brentford to support the detachment at Sir Richard Wynn’s house. One possible explanation for this inactivity is provided by Lilburne who claims that on hearing of the royalist attack the remainder of Denzil Holles’s and Lord Brooke’s regiments, which were both lacking senior officers, began retreating to London and only his intervention caused them to return to Brentford to fight. Setting aside the self-serving aspects of Lilburne’s account, such confusion could explain why the initial defence was not reinforced from Brentford. In addition, parliament, in the light of the agreement it judged it had with the King to enter into peace negotiations, had ordered that “…[its] soldiers should exercise no acts of hostility against any of [the king’s] people” and this command alone might explain some of the inaction. The parliamentary pickets at Sir Richard Wynn’s House were cleared and the royalists advanced to find the entrance to New Brentford blocked by a small barricade, probably at the bridge across the River Brent. A further royalist attack, with overwhelming numbers - one royalist account talks of 1,000 musketeers, dislodged the parliamentary troops in under one hour and forced them to retreat from this defensive position to another “work”, probably a barricade between New and Old Brentford, and join Lord Brooke’s regiment of foot. The approaches to this new position were covered by a brick house and by two small pieces of artillery and the barricade is likely to have been at the crest of the rising ground at the western end of Old Brentford. The royalists seem to have had some difficulty in overcoming this obstacle. A royalist soldier writing a few days after the battle noted that “my Colonel’s (Sir Edward Fitton) regiment was the sixth that was brought up to assault, after five others had all discharged, whose happy honour it was (assisted by God, and a new piece of cannon newly come up) to drive them from that worke too“. Gwyn also implies the fighting was hard throughout the battle when describing royalists tactics as “after once firing suddenly to advance up to push of pikes and the butt end of muskets“. Parliamentary troops driven from this position are said to have routed; some through Old Brentford toward London but others into the River Thames with scores drowning. The parliamentary troops forced into the Thames must have been prevented from retreating toward London by royalist forces that had either worked around the right flank of the parliamentary defensive position through the enclosure and houses - making the barricade position untenable, or by a sudden breakthrough, exploited by the royalists with speed, that forced the parliamentarians defending the left flank anchored on the river to surrender or swim. The royalists continued their advance through Old Brentford only to encounter fresh parliamentary troops in an open field outside the town, a possible reference to Turnham Green and Chiswick common field. These were the green coats of John Hampden’s regiment of foot which charged the royalist forces five times in order to cover the retreat of what remained of Holles’s and Brooke’s regiments toward Hammersmith, where parliament’s lightly guarded train of artillery was located. By now it was late afternoon and, with the light fading and royalist forces exhausted from around four hours of combat, the opposing forces disengaged. Once captured, Brentford was sacked, according to the Venetian ambassador on Prince Rupert’s orders. Whilst subsequent parliamentary propaganda made much of the royalist sack, the parliamentarian search for provisions in Brentford prior to the attack must have been responsible for some of the spoil. Moreover, only one house was recorded as having been set on fire and, despite the fighting and subsequent looting, there seems to have been few, if any, civilian dead. Casualties Parliament’s forces suffered in the action. According to royalist accounts between six and eleven colours were captured, suggesting at least that many broken companies, and a number of officers, including a lieutenant colonel, some captains and other junior officers, were killed. At least two parliamentary officers were also captured, captains Robert Vivers and John Lilburne. Accounts of casualty and prisoner numbers vary, but it appears that around 50 parliamentary soldiers were killed in the battle, with perhaps more than this drowning during the rout. A contemporary, third hand account, suggests 140 parliamentary soldiers were killed, which appears credible. Others would have succumbed to wounds following the battle. The accounts of the committee for maimed and wounded soldiers for November 1642 show that 21 officers from both regiments, 57 soldiers from Brooke’s and 249 soldiers from Holles’ regiments received payments of £1 each for the officers and 5 shillings each for the soldiers for being captured and ‘strypt’ at Brentford. Royalist losses are poorly recorded. One account details the deaths of sixteen men, including one captain and two lieutenants. The King, in a subsequent letter to parliament, claimed ten royalist dead. One unsubstantiated account suggests the royalist dead were removed to Hounslow Heath. Fighting on the Thames Royalist accounts refer to parliamentary troops and equipment also moving down the Thames by boat from Kingston following the battle. This appears to have been either to reinforce the parliamentarian army in London or to defend the approaches to London from Kent, which at that time was viewed as a potential source of royalist threat. The most contemporary, royalist, account indicates that fourteen barges with 600 troops and thirteen pieces of artillery passed by Brentford in the early hours of 13 November. These were spotted by royalist musketeers in Syon House and engaged. The action reportedly sank four or five vessels with the remainder being captured, with eight pieces of artillery, by the royalists. But the likelihood of musketeers alone sinking any vessel is remote. A separate parliamentary account is more credible and indicates that eight barges were laden with cannon, powder, match, bullets and ammunition at Kingston and rowed down the Thames on the night of 12 November. The barges came under musket fire from Syon House injuring three or four crew members. But between Old Brentford and the modern day Kew bridge the royalists had deployed cannon covering the river and, judging they had no chance of escape from this threat, the parliamentarian sailors scuttled the barges. Separately on the afternoon of 13 November two parliamentary vessels on the Thames attacked Syon House with cannon, damaging the house. Royalist counter-fire, from cannon located on the top of Syon House and “lower”, appears to have sunk one of the vessels. This artillery duel is in part corroborated by the 1643 Household accounts for Syon House which detail the expenditure of £26 10s for repairs where the house had been shot through with ordnance, for damage to the battlements and to “the three ovals in the middle gallery at Syon which were shot through by the King's forces”. Conclusion On 13 November 1642 at Turnham Green, the King’s forces were faced by the Essex’s field army and the London militia. Neither side appeared willing to commit to battle and, with his army outnumbered two to one, the King ordered a retreat covered by dragoons at Brentford. The Royal army recovered to Hounslow Heath and then went on to Kingston and Reading before retiring to winter quarters in and around Oxford. Whilst Brentford had been a tactical victory for the royalists, the campaign had not been a strategic success. The ease of the royalist advance on London and Rupert’s probable encouragement appears to have persuaded the King to press his advantage with the attack on Brentford and subsequent confrontation at Turnham Green. But the attack and sack of Brentford, when in the midst of peace negotiations, hardened parliamentarian sentiment against accommodation and rallied opinion in parliament and the City in favour of a stand against the King. Turnham Green was seen in some royalist quarters as a lost opportunity for the King to win the war. However, in reality, the King’s best chance had been the day before at Brentford. Had the royal army not been held-up by the parliamentary delaying action there, more progress could have been made against London. The parliamentary field army was dispersed, the trained bands were not mustered together and the parliamentary artillery train at Hammersmith might well have been captured. Nonetheless the extent of enclosure on the western side of London, the defensive works built rapidly to protect the capital after Edgehill and the threat from parliamentary forces in the royalists’ rear would still have made such an advance risky and the outcome unpredictable. A Narrative of the Battle of Turnham Green, 1642 by Stephen Porter The raising of the Royal Standard at Nottingham on 22 August 1642 signalled the formal beginning of the Civil War. Over the following weeks both sides were busy recruiting and preparing their armies for a conflict which, it was expected, would soon be over, probably decided by one major battle. Charles I had left London in January and the city had then been secured for Parliament. Its recapture would have given the royalists a huge advantage and was their primary objective. On 12 October the King left Shrewsbury to try to get ahead of the parliamentarian army under its commander, the Earl of Essex, which was then at Worcester. This he succeeded in doing, but was pursued by the parliamentarians and forced to offer battle at Edgehill in Warwickshire on 23 October. The outcome was inconclusive, but the royalists were able to continue their march, first occupying Banbury before moving on to Oxford, a much more significant acquisition that was to serve as their headquarters thereafter. After a short delay they pushed on down the Thames valley and took Reading. An attempt to seize Windsor Castle failed, but the King was prepared to leave it in his rear and continue the advance on London. At Colnbrook he received a delegation from Parliament as a preliminary move towards attempting to achieve a negotiated settlement. The delegation were hopeful and reported their progress to Parliament, which decided to offer the royalists a cease fire pending negotiations. Before this proposal reached the King, the royalists, under the command of the recently appointed Patrick Ruthven, Earl of Forth, launched an attack on Brentford on 12 November, defeated the two regiments that were posted to defend it and then sacked the town. The Armies Assemble The defeat of the parliamentarian regiments at Brentford came as a surprise in London. News of the attack arrived while the House of Commons was sitting and the response was prompt and effective. Earlier reports questioning the commitment of members of the militia and stressing the extent of royalist support within the capital proved to have been misleading, and the city’s forces were mobilised without difficulty. That Saturday night in the City was ‘a troublossom Night the Carts carying magazen all night & morning’. Essex’s army, too, responded promptly. Although morale was said to have been low in the return to London after Edgehill - some soldiers had abandoned their weapons during the march - he had kept his army intact and placed it to the west of the city to meet any royalist threat. The army was now reinforced by the London trained bands and auxiliaries under the command of Philip Skippon. The army’s nominal strength may have been around 12,000, augmented by the 8,000 men of the trained bands, a force of 3,500 men recruited by the Earl of Warwick, sailors from the fleet and an unknown number of volunteers. The presence of a hostile army so close to the capital also put the Members of both Houses and Parliament’s prominent supporters on their mettle. They could not be seen to be unwilling to appear in arms in the face of such an imminent danger and so Essex was joined by many gentlemen volunteers and leading citizens. The army also had support and encouragement from Londoners, fearful that a victorious cavalier army would sack the city. Their resolve had been stiffened by an effective campaign from the pulpits and in the newsbooks and pamphlets over the previous few weeks, vilifying the royalists as cruel plunderers and papists. Their accusations were directed particularly at the King’s nephew, Prince Rupert of the Rhine, whose service in the Thirty Years War in Germany provided a link which they could use to connect the royalists with the notorious brutalities of those campaigns. News of the sack of Brentford, the first such atrocity of the war, confirmed their worst fears and, urged on by the preachers on the Sunday morning, they gave so many provisions for the troops that almost a hundred cart-loads were taken to the army, including ‘great store’ of beer and wine. By eight o’clock on Sunday morning Essex’s army of about 24,000 men was concentrated at Turnham Green. The royalist statesman the Earl of Clarendon later described it as ‘a full army of horse and foot, fit to have decided the title of a crown’. The regiments of the trained bands were alternated with those of the army. Some foot regiments formed a reserve and Sir Phillip Stapleton’s and Colonel Goodwin’s regiments of horse were in the van, with the other horse regiments on the flanks. The horse probably numbered no more than 3,000 men, plus an unknown number of dragoons. The addition to the army of the City forces, sailors and other volunteers produced the unusually high proportion of foot. Both Essex and Skippon were conspicuous in going from regiment to regiment, encouraging the troops. A detachment of 3,000 men under Sir James Ramsay was withdrawn from Kingston, where they were posted to defend the bridge, but because of the royalists’ control of the left bank at Brentford, they had to march on the south side of the Thames, cross London Bridge and then out of London. Not until the following week was a bridge of boats constructed at Putney to speed up troop movements between the two sides of the river. The royalists brought up the remainder of the army behind the advance guard which had captured Brentford. Nevertheless, the King had only about 12,000 men, probably matching the parliamentarians in the number of horse, but with far fewer infantry. Unlike the parliamentarians, they were operating in a largely hostile area and were short of ammunition and supplies. The horse, in particular, were forced to live off the land, alienating the country people by taking food and fodder, and also seizing wagon-loads of cloth being taken to London from the West Country. The Battlefield In the 1640s 100 acres of Turnham Green lay within the parish of Chiswick and perhaps a further 30 acres in Acton. The modern open spaces of Turnham Green, Chiswick Back Common, Acton Common and Acton Green are the remnants of Turnham Green, which then extended as far east as Stamford Brook. On the north side were hedged fields on the rising ground towards Acton’s common fields, and there were also enclosures on the west side of the green, separating it from the riverside village of Strand on the Green. On the south side of the green was Chiswick common field, extending almost to the village of Chiswick and St Nicholas’s church, and the walled gardens of the Jacobean Chiswick House. In 1662 the Dutch artist William Schellinks described Chiswick as lying ‘in a great plain’. This was the open space formed by Turnham and Acton greens and Chiswick common field; the site of the battlefield. The green alone was far too small to contain the two armies. Even so, the parliamentarian front must have been tightly packed. The royalists had the opposite problem; they could not match the parliamentarians’ frontage, so much so that Essex’s horse extended beyond their left wing, which was in danger of being outflanked and revealed the extent of their numerical weakness. The two armies numbered roughly 36,000 men, making it one of the largest engagements in British history. Not since the battle of Towton in 1461 (for which the figures are much more uncertain) had so many troops been assembled on a British battlefield, and only at Marston Moor in 1644, where the rival armies mustered up to 46,000 men, were more troops engaged during the Civil War. Since Marston Moor, no British battle has seen so many men deployed. And, although precise figures are difficult to achieve, it seems likely that the three parliamentarian armies which were combined at Marston Moor contained only a few thousand more men than did the force under Essex’s command at Turnham Green. The parliamentarians occupied the east side of the battlefield, with their front probably extending from the modern South Parade, on the fringe of Bedford Park, to the garden walls of Chiswick House. Musketeers placed in the gardens would have secured their left flank. Beyond the house was an expanse of meadows that was unsuitable for troop movements, especially so late in the year, and any attempt to cross them would have been countered relatively easily. The royalist front probably ran from Acton Green across Turnham Green and close to the line of the modern Sutton Court Road, as far south as the branch of the Bollo Brook in the vicinity of the modern Elmwood Road. The gardens of Sutton Court, slightly further south, would have given cover for troops protecting their right flank. The parliamentarian front probably extended for 1,200 yards; the royalists’ line for rather less. This notional disposition of the fronts places them roughly 550 yards apart; a contemporary account describes them as being separated by about half a mile. The Battle Royalist troops advanced on to the higher ground between Turnham Green and Acton, to secure the army’s left flank. Essex countered this by sending two regiments of horse and four of foot, including that of Colonel John Hampden, around the north side of the battlefield to drive off the royalists and probably also with the intention of them getting behind the King’s army. The royalists were too short of men to prevent the manoeuvre, although their infantry lining the hedges inflicted casualties on the parliamentarians before they had to withdraw. Having occupied the spur of ground between the shallow valleys of the Bollo Brook and Stamford Brook, which commanded the royalists’ left, Hampden sent to Essex for two pieces of artillery. Essex despatched them, but before they reached Hampden he changed his initial plan and recalled not only the guns but the whole detachment, which had covered about a mile, to rejoin the main army. Had they continued their march they would have had the opportunity to turn south towards the Thames in the vicinity of the modern Kew Bridge, trapping the royalist army between it and Essex’s force. But attacks launched simultaneously on the royalist front and rear would have been difficult to co-ordinate and Essex’s commanders may have thought them to be too hazardous to risk. After the withdrawal of the parliamentarian detachment the two sides continued to face each other until mid-afternoon, with some skirmishing, with parties of troops advancing towards the enemy, but whether getting close enough to exchange musket fire is unclear. It was a confined battlefield, bounded by enclosures and gardens, giving little scope for the effective use of cavalry. One account describes troops of royalist horse riding towards the parliamentarian foot, probably as feints, to test their resolution; trying to draw-out the inexperienced soldiers and break their ranks sufficiently for the horse to burst in. An attack on unbroken lines of pikemen and musketeers would have been bound to fail, but it would have been out of character for Prince Rupert, who commanded the cavalry, not to have attempted something of this kind, to end the deadlock. Essex’s objective of simply blocking the royalist advance was made easier because he was operating very close to his base, which could provide supplies and recruits throughout the day. This had two disadvantages, however. One was that a number of Members of both Houses of Parliament who came from Westminster attached themselves to his entourage, observing his decisions and willing to give advice, while the Earl Holland was actively involved in the deployment of the army. Essex had to take into account their views and those of his senior officers who were professional soldiers. This may explain the change of tactics, in sending the sizeable detachment around the royalist left flank and later withdrawing it. The professional soldiers were later accused of acting selfishly by urging a cautious approach rather than an attack on the royalist position, because they did not want the war to end so soon, bringing their employment to a premature end. The Members of Parliament, on the other hand, were said to have favoured an attack. Some of the senior figures with Essex reportedly hoped that, under a flag of truce, members of the King’s entourage would have been prepared to negotiate his return and a resumption of talks. This was based upon the notion that the King was badly advised and that this provided the best opportunity, being ‘so neare to his Parliament . . . to have rescued himselfe from those that have thus misled him’. This would have been the hope of the ‘doves’, who preferred to explore the possibility of a negotiated settlement before pursuing further military activity. No such approach was made from the royalist side, however, nor did the parliamentarians themselves take the initiative and offer negotiations. A second problem was caused by the hundreds of onlookers in the rear of the army, who had come out of London either out of curiosity to witness such a major event, or to get the earliest possible warning should the battle go against Essex. They took alarm when parties of soldiers advanced towards the enemy, or the soldiers gave a loud shout, and rode quickly off towards London, unsettling the troops to such an extent as to cause some desertions. But this did not cause any major problems and parliamentarian accounts stress the high morale of their forces, who were ‘full of corage and sange psalmes all day’, and nothing occurred to encourage royalist hopes of a numerous fifth-column in the ranks of Essex’s army. The battle of Turnham Green became a stalemate, with the armies continuing to face each other for ‘many hours’. Essex was content to block the royalists’ further progress towards London and they were too weak to risk a frontal assault on, or to outflank, the parliamentarian positions. If the royalist cavalry had driven back their opponents they would have been exposed to musket fire from the hedgerows around the battlefield, where the parliamentarian troops were so numerous that they could form a continuous line behind the hedges. The artillery, protected by earthworks, was placed to cover the roads running across the battlefield. Essex was in a strong position. During the afternoon there was an exchange of artillery fire. This seems to have been ineffective on both sides. The royalist guns were sited on relatively high ground and so their shot carried over the enemy lines, and the parliamentarian bombardment was said to have killed just a few horses, although the London pamphlets claimed greater success. The royalists then drew off their army, with Rupert skilfully using his cavalry to cover the removal of the artillery and the foot. Essex and his senior officers considered attacking the royalist rearguard, but they were afraid of being drawn into confused fighting among the enclosures in the growing darkness. Their objective had been achieved and they did not need to risk their troops. There seem to have been few casualties on either side and most accounts do not give the numbers. A parliamentarian report referred to more than 800 royalist dead on the battlefield and 120 of Essex’s army being killed, but there is no other evidence for casualties on such a scale and the figures are implausibly high, given the extent of the action. Another parliamentarian account mentions that no more than twenty persons had been killed. No special arrangements were made for the care of the parliamentarian wounded, suggesting that the numbers were small, and the number of royalist casualties is unlikely to have been higher. That evening a party of royalist horse occupied Kingston, threatening the possibility of an attack on London from the south or a movement to link up with the King’s supporters in Kent. They were too weak to attempt either manoeuvre, although their incursions into Surrey over the following few days were alarming and gave further justification for the parliamentarian writers’ accusations of plundering. Perspectives Parliament’s supporters had the greater reason to be disappointed with the outcome, given the numerical superiority of its army and the prospect that the aborted enveloping manoeuvre could have resulted in the complete defeat of the royalist army and the end of the war almost at its outset. Unlike the aftermath of Edgehill, with conflicting accounts and interpretations, the events at Turnham Green were quickly known. Initially blame was directed at the professional soldiers, but the parliamentarian commanders’ conduct of the battle subsequently merged into the growing resentment of Essex and his adherents and their alleged reluctance to defeat the King, leading to the Self Denying Ordinance and the foundation of the New Model Army in 1645. On the royalist side, some thought that at Turnham Green they had missed their best opportunity to win the war, by not attacking an inexperienced army containing many soldiers of doubtful loyalty. The defeat of Essex’s army would have been followed by the return of the King to his capital in triumph, able to impose a settlement of his choosing on his political opponents and quell the rebellion among its citizens. John Gwyn, who was with the King’s army at Turnham Green, later wrote that this was unrealistic, given the royalists’ numerical inferiority and the shrewd placement of the parliamentarian troops and artillery. Clarendon, too, thought that a royalist attack would have been ‘a madness’, and Thomas Hobbes justified the King’s withdrawal by explaining that he was opposed by ‘a most complete and numerous army’. Even had they driven Essex’s troops from their positions at Turnham Green, they would have faced a running fight through enclosed country towards the city, which was protected by newly erected strong points mounting artillery, with the streets behind them blocked by barricades. Only the total defeat of his army could have offered them the prospect of capturing London and, given the disparity in numbers, that was improbable. Although the first Civil War continued until 1646, the royalists never again approached London, which had firmly displayed its loyalty to the parliamentarian cause, and their attempts to capture or demoralise it were channelled into futile plots to stage coups and economic warfare, through the disruption of internal trade and the depredations of naval privateers. None of their strategies were successful and the battle of Turnham Green proved to have been decisive, marking the high water mark of their campaign against London. Battle of Turnham Green 13th November 1642

So...... Who fought whom?

V Parliamentarians Royalists Top row, left to right: King Charles I, General Sir PatrickRuthven, and Prince Rupert. Bottom row, left to right:Major General Philip Skippon, Colonel John Hampdenand The Earl of Essex. General Sir Patrick Ruthven, then aged 69, was a very experienced soldier who commanded the royalist troops with Prince Rupert. He was made Earl of Brentford in 1644. Prince Rupert was Charles I’s nephew. A gifted child, skilled in languages and mathematics, he was involved in military actions from the age of 14. Major General Philip Skippon, a professional soldier who had fought in Europe during the Thirty Years’ War, commanded the London militia at Turnham Green. Colonel John Hampden was one of the five MPs Charles I tried to arrest in January 1642, and led a regiment of foot at the battles. The Earl of Essex was one of the highest ranking nobleman to support Parliament. He became Captain General of the Parliamentarian armies at the start of the English Civil War.

The Battle of Brentford The parliamentarians made a run for it! Some towards London but others tried to swim across the Thames. Many were drowned. The royalists again advance but are faced with a second barricade. They are met by the red coated parliamentary regiment of Denzil Holles who are hiding in hedges around Sir Richard Wynn’s House. barricade is defended by troops from Lord Brooke's parliamentary regiment of foot The royalists advance to Brentford Bridge The parliamentarians, still outnumbered keep the royalists back for over an hour, having built a barricade across the bridge The royalists were again delayed, this time for 2 or 3 hours until they had Lord Brooke’s regiment almost surrounded. The royalists have many more men and easily clear them from the hedges. Wynn’s House The Royalists advanced from Hounslow Heath on the morning of 12 November. Their cavalry first encountered the red-coated soldiers of Denzil Holles’ parliamentary regiment at Sir Richard Wynns’s house, west of Brentford. They had to wait until foot soldiers came up to clear Holles’ men from behind a hedge. Brentford Bridge Pursuing the retreating parliamentarians, the royalists next met a barricade at Brentford bridge defended by more ofHolles’ soldiers. This position took around one hour for the royalists to overcome. Second Barricade Pressing on, the royalists were faced with a second barricade, defended by troops from Lord Brooke’s parliamentaryregiment of foot. The royalists were delayed for two or three hours until parliament’s soldiers, who had become almost surrounded, were routed. Some ran back toward London, but others tried to swim the River Thames; many drowned. Aftermath John Hampden’s parliamentarian regiment covered the retreat of their fleeing comrades, probably on Turnham Green. Around 50 parliamentarian soldiers, including many officers, were killed, more drowning during the rout. A further 327 were captured. Royalist losses were less than 20. After the battle, Brentford was severely looted by the royalists. Syon House On the night of 12/13 November, parliament tried to move cannon and ammunition from Kingston-upon-Thames to London by barge down the Thames. But these vessels were scuttled after being fired upon from Syon House and threatened by royalist cannon located near to the modern day Kew Bridge. The Battle of Brentford Royalist s advance from Hounslow Heath

An artist’s impression of the Barricade at Brentford Bridge Painted by John Hassell in 1928

What happened after the battle? The parliamentarians fled at least 50 were killed 327 were captured and many drowned Royalist losses were less than 20. The royalists then looted Brentford.

By 8am, after calling-up reinforcements from London overnight, 24,000 parliamentarians formed up on Turnham Green to prevent the royalists marching on London The royalists army of 12,000 which had taken part in the previous days battle at Brentford, formed up to attack.

The Battle of Turnham Green A number were killed and wounded on both sides, as the Parliamentarians succeeded in driving the Royalists back to their lines. To protect their left flank, the royalists sent troops into the hedgerows on the rising ground towards Acton. But he quickly changed his mind as he didn’t want to split his army. He soon called them back By late afternoon, the royalists, realising that they couldn’t win withdrew through Brentford back to where they started at Hounslow Heath the day before. The parliamentarians sent a larger force to counter this move. The battle had become a stalemate – both sides swapped cannon fire but neither side had the upper hand The Earl of Essex ordered 4 regiments of foot soldiers and 2 of horsemen to march to Acton to outflank the royalists. Battle of Turnham Green Parliament’s Army By 8am on 13 November an army of 24,000 parliamentarians had formed up on the open land of Turnham Green and Chiswick common field. It consisted of regiments of the field army commanded by the Earl of Essex, the London militia under Major General Philip Skippon, sailors and volunteers, some of whom came from both houses of parliament. Skippon and Essex arranged the army so that the inexperienced militia foot regiments were with Essex’s more seasoned foot troops in the centre. This bolstered the militia and showed the royalists that London’s soldiers supported parliament. The Royal Army The royalist army of about 12,000 men had taken part in the previous day’s battle at Brentford. To protect their left flank, the royalists sent troops into the hedgerows on the rising ground towards Acton. Outflanking Move The parliamentarians drove the royalists out of the hedges, leaving a few killed and wounded on both sides. Essex then ordered four regiments of foot soldiers and two of horsemen to march to Acton to outflank the royalists. But, fearful of splitting his army, he soon recalled these regiments. Stalemate The battle settled into a stalemate, punctuated by exchanges of artillery fire and failed royalist attempts to provoke the inexperienced parliamentarian troops to break ranks. Aftermath Late in the afternoon, the royalists withdrew skilfully through Brentford to Hounslow Heath, Essex’s men pursued half-heartedly. Afterwards Essex was criticised for failing to take advantage of his strong position. For both sides Turnham Green ended prospects of either a negotiated settlement or a swift victory, and so the Civil War dragged on for a further four years. During the early part of the battle the experienced royalists sent skirmish parties to attack the inexperienced parliamentarians in attempts to break their lines. The Battle of Turnham Green

What were they fighting about? The Constitution Control of the army Taxes Beliefs

Who should rule the country The King or Parliament? The Constitution Who should rule the country The King or Parliament? Royalists Everyone must obey the King. I am loyal to my Lord and I will fight if he asks me. The king is divine and takes his orders from God. Parliamentarians It is possible that Kings could be wrong. I will only fight if I agree with the reasons. The King must listen to parliament.

Control of the army Or Parliament The King

Taxation The King Parliament Is lord of everybody and can tax people as much as he likes for whatever reason he likes. Parliament Should set how much tax people pay and say how that money should be spent

Beliefs The King Parliament Everyone should worship God in the same way. Parliament There is more than one way to worship God.

What happened at the end of the civil war? Eventually the Parliamentarians won King Charles was captured, tried and his head cut off. Britain became a republic under Oliver Cromwell. In 1660 the monarchy was restored.