Network Attacks CS432 - Security in Computing

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Module X Session Hijacking
Advertisements

Network Vulnerabilities and Attacks Dr. John Abraham UTPA.
Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006.
Lesson 3-Hacker Techniques
Are you secured in the network ?: a quick look at the TCP/IP protocols Based on: A look back at “Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite” by Steven.
Denial of Service & Session Hijacking.  Rendering a system unusable to those who deserve it  Consume bandwidth or disk space  Overwhelming amount of.
1 Reading Log Files. 2 Segment Format
Sniffing, Spoofing, Hijacking This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by Mark Michael, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added.
Hacking WLAN // BRUTE FORCE CRACKER // TCP/IP. WLAN HACK Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) encryption was designed to protect against casual snooping, but.
Suneeta Chawla Web Security Presentation Topic : IP Spoofing Date : 03/24/04.
Chapter 14 Wireless Attacks, Intrusion Monitoring and Policy
Network Security Network Attacks and Mitigation 張晃崚 CCIE #13673, CCSI #31340 區域銷售事業處 副處長 麟瑞科技.
Hacking Linux Based on Hacking Linux Exposed Hatch, Lee, and Kurtz ISBN
Computer Security Fundamentals by Chuck Easttom Chapter 4 Denial of Service Attacks.
Hacking Presented By :KUMAR ANAND SINGH ,ETC/2008.
1 MD5 Cracking One way hash. Used in online passwords and file verification.
Network Attacks Mark Shtern.
Network-Based Denial of Service Attacks Trends, Descriptions, and How to Protect Your Network Craig A. Huegen Cisco Systems, Inc. NANOG 12 Interprovider.
Firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems
WiFi Security. What is WiFi ? Originally, Wi-Fi was a marketing term. The Wi-Fi certified logo means that the product has passed interoperability tests.
WEP Weaknesses Or “What on Earth does this Protect” Roy Werber.
IP Spoofing, CS2651 IP Spoofing Bao Ho ToanTai Vu CS Security Engineering Spring 2003 San Jose State University.
How To Not Make a Secure Protocol WEP Dan Petro.
Intruder Trends Tom Longstaff CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA Sponsored by.
Security in Wireless LAN Layla Pezeshkmehr CS 265 Fall 2003-SJSU Dr.Mark Stamp.
Vulnerability In Wi-Fi By Angus U CS 265 Section 2 Instructor: Mark Stamp.
Sanjay Goel, School of Business/Center for Information Forensics and Assurance University at Albany Proprietary Information 1 Unit Outline Information.
Analysis of Attack By Matt Kennedy. Different Type of Attacks o Access Attacks o Modification and Repudiation Attacks o DoS Attacks o DDoS Attacks o Attacks.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY. Hackers Ad-hoc networks War Driving Man-in-the-Middle Caffe Latte attack.
Attack Profiles CS-480b Dick Steflik Attack Categories Denial-of-Service Exploitation Attacks Information Gathering Attacks Disinformation Attacks.
COEN 252: Computer Forensics Router Investigation.
Wireless LAN Security Yen-Cheng Chen Department of Information Management National Chi Nan University
1 Chapter 6 Network Security Threats. 2 Objectives In this chapter, you will: Learn how to defend against packet sniffers Understand the TCP, UDP, and.
CN2668 Routers and Switches Kemtis Kunanuraksapong MSIS with Distinction MCTS, MCDST, MCP, A+
Attacks and Malicious Code Chapter 3. Learning Objectives Explain denial-of-service (DoS) attacks Explain and discuss ping-of-death attacks Identify major.
Switch Concepts and Configuration and Configuration Part II Advanced Computer Networks.
Karlstad University Introduction to Vulnerability Assessment Labs Ge Zhang Dvg-C03.
BY MOHAMMED ALQAHTANI (802.11) Security. What is ? IEEE is a set of standards carrying out WLAN computer communication in frequency bands.
This courseware is copyrighted © 2015 gtslearning. No part of this courseware or any training material supplied by gtslearning International Limited to.
Introduction to ITE Chapter 9 Computer Security. Why Study Security?  This is a huge area for computer technicians.  Security isn’t just anti-virus.
Presented by: Dr. Munam Ali Shah
Securing Wired Local Area Networks(LANs)
CHAPTER 10 Session Hijacking. INTRODUCTION The act of taking over a connection of some sort, for examples, network connection, a modem connection or other.
1 CHAPTER 3 CLASSES OF ATTACK. 2 Denial of Service (DoS) Takes place when availability to resource is intentionally blocked or degraded Takes place when.
1 Firewalls G53ACC Chris Greenhalgh. 2 Contents l Attacks l Principles l Simple filters l Full firewall l Books: Comer ch
Lecture 20 Hacking. Over the Internet Over LAN Locally Offline Theft Deception Modes of Hacker Attack.
CHAPTER 3 Classes of Attack. INTRODUCTION Network attacks come from both inside and outside firewall. Kinds of attacks: 1. Denial-of-service 2. Information.
Chapter 9 Networking & Distributed Security. csci5233 computer security & integrity (Chap. 9) 2 Outline Overview of Networking Threats Wiretapping, impersonation,
Scanning & Enumeration Lab 3 Once attacker knows who to attack, and knows some of what is there (e.g. DNS servers, mail servers, etc.) the next step is.
OV Copyright © 2005 Element K Content LLC. All rights reserved. Hardening Internetwork Devices and Services  Harden Internetwork Connection Devices.
Attack and Malicious Code Andrew Anaruk. Security Threats Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks Spoofing Social Engineering Attacks on Encrypted Data Software.
CNIT 124: Advanced Ethical Hacking Ch 7: Capturing Traffic.
1 Security. 2 Linux is not secure No computer system can ever be "completely secure". –make it increasingly difficult for someone to compromise your system.
Network Reconnaissance CS490 - Security in Computing Copyright © 2005 by Scott Orr and the Trustees of Indiana University.
Network Security Threats KAMI VANIEA 18 JANUARY KAMI VANIEA 1.
How To Not Make a Secure Protocol WEP Dan Petro.
Network Basics CS490 - Security in Computing Copyright © 2005 by Scott Orr and the Trustees of Indiana University.
Network-Based Denial of Service Attacks Trends, Descriptions, and How to Protect Your Network Craig A. Huegen Cisco Systems, Inc. SANS ‘98 Conference -
1 © 2004, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Wireless LAN (network) security.
By Billy Ripple.  Security requirements  Authentication  Integrity  Privacy  Security concerns  Security techniques  WEP  WPA/WPA2  Conclusion.
Wireless LAN Security Daniel Reichle Seminar Security Protocols and Applications SS2003.
Comparison of Network Attacks COSC 356 Kyler Rhoades.
Introduction to Vulnerability Assessment Labs Ge Zhang Dvg-C03.
An Introduction To ARP Spoofing & Other Attacks
Introduction to Information Security
Security and Wireless LANs
CSE 4905 Network Security Overview
Wireless Security Ian Bodley.
What Makes a Network Vulnerable?
Threats in Networks Jagdish S. Gangolly School of Business
Presentation transcript:

Network Attacks CS432 - Security in Computing Copyright © 2005, 2010 by Scott Orr and the Trustees of Indiana University

References Security in Computing, 4th Ed. Chapter 7 (pgs. 408-440)

Section Overview Anatomy of an Attack Denial of Service Attacks Packet Sniffing Service Attacks Spoofing Attacks

Why are Networks Vulnerable? Reliance on shared resources System Complexity Unknown perimeter Many points of attack Attacker anonymity Multiple paths to hosts

Anatomy of an Attack Footprinting Scanning Enumeration Gaining Access Denial of Service Escalating Privilege Pilfering Covering Tracks Creating Back Doors Source: Hacking Exposed: Network Security: Secrets and Solutions, by S. McClure, J. Scambray, and G. Kurtz

Denial of Service Attacks ICMP Redirects SYN Flooding Smurf Attacks Service Bombing FTP Finger Mail Bombing Service Bugs Ping o’ Death WinNuke Teardrop Distributed DoS Targets may be Upstream

Server never gets ACKs to its SYN SYN Flood Attack SYN(C, ISNc) SYN(C, ISNc) SYN(C, ISNc) SYN(C, ISNc) SYN(S, ISNs) ACK(C, ISNc) SYN(S, ISNs) ACK(C, ISNc) Client SYN(S, ISNs) ACK(C, ISNc) SYN(S, ISNs) ACK(C, ISNc) Server Server never gets ACKs to its SYN Half Open Connections

IP Address Spoofing Replace actual source address in IP packets Prevent packets from being traced back Exploit IP address-based trust relationships

Smurf Attacks 10.1.1.0/24 Network Attacker Ping 10.1.1.255 172.21.0.35 Spoof source: 192.168.1.7 10.1.1.0/24 Network 192.168.1.7

Distributed DoS Attacks Intruder Master Master Master Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Victim Source: Results of the Distributed Intruder Tools Workshop

Impersonation Attacks Social Engineering Cracked Passwords Stolen Passwords Sniffed Phishing Berkeley R-Commands

Packet Sniffing Promiscuous mode Capture account passwords Read email See every packet as it crossed the network Transparent Capture account passwords Read email Analyze network traffic

Network Hubs vs. Switches Everyone can see traffic Virtual circuit between pair

Switch Attacks MAC Flooding – switch will act like hub ARP Spoofing Who is 10.0.0.1? 10.0.0.1 10.0.0.2 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.4 I am (1:2:3:7:8:9)

Wireless Networking Bandwidth (shared) Modes 802.11b – 11Mbps 802.11g – 54Mbps 802.11n – 600Mbps (coming soon!) Modes Ad Hoc (Hosts talk directly to each other) Infrastructure (uses Access Points) Identified by Set Server ID (SSID) names

Infrastructure Model Internet

SSID Broadcasts SSID: Cisco SSID: belkin54g SSID: linksys

Default SSIDs

Wireless Network Access Control Only allow known systems to connect Every wireless NIC has a unique address Known as the MAC address Assigned by vendor BSSID: MAC address of Access Point Access Control List MAC Spoofing?

Wardriving

High Power Mode 450ft = 40 houses, 4 streets

Low Power Mode 150ft = 6 Houses, 1 street

WEP Authentication Request to Connect Challenge Plaintext  Plaintext Access Granted WEP Key WEP Key

WEP Frame Message CRC  Keystream = RC4 (IV, ) IV ID Ciphertext

WEP Attacks Initial connection sniffing IV Reuse Look for IV collisions Some APs reset IV to 0 each time system is (re)initialized IV Dictionary Attacks Injection attacks with known plaintext Wi-fi Protected Access / 802.11i

IV Reuse Occurrences 1% after 582 encrypted frames Jesse R. Walker IEEE P802.11 Wireless LANS: Unsafe at any key size

Replay Attacks ARP Request ARP Request

FMS Attack Scott Fluhrer, Itsik Mantin, Adi Shamir RC4 Matrix Initialization Weakness If a key is weak, keystream will contain some portions of key more than other combinations Statistical Analysis to find

Temporal Key Integrity Protocol TA TSC Base Key Hash() Message CRC  Keystream = RC4 (IV,PK) Ciphertext Dictionary Attacks?

Token-based Login Race Attack scott Password: 4 2 3 5 6 Login: Guesses last number and enters it before Scott can finish. scott Password: 4 2 3 5 6 9

Resource Sharing May not need account to access files Microsoft Shares Guest Shares Accounts NFS Exports Samba

Service Exploits Banner Grabbing/Vulnerability Scanners Stack/Buffer Overflow Backdoors File Transfer Programs Anonymous FTP TFTP FTP Bounces

Trusted Hosts increase threat!!! FTP Bounces PORT address, port Upload Commands File RETR file Attacker Anonymous FTP Server with upload area Target Host Trusted Hosts increase threat!!!

CGI / Server Side Includes Extends capabilities of web server External programs loaded by server Form processing Dynamically created pages Runs with same access as web server Susceptible to bugs and access exploits User script dangers

DNS Spoofing DNS/ARP Cache Poisoning Pharming Trust-based access to other machines Berkeley R Commands Remote File systems (NFS/SMB) Web Site Phishing DNSSEC

Man in the Middle Attack Buy New CD

Source Routing Attacks DoS Trusted Host Address set to Trusted Host (IP Spoofing) Trusted Host Source routed connection request R R R R Attacker R R R R Source routed response Trusted Host

Session Hijacking Destination Host User Host Attacker Attacker watches live sessions to record sequence numbers Attacker DoS’s User Host and IP spoofs packets to Destination using User Host’s sequence numbers Destination continues session as if nothing happened

TCP Sequence Guessing Attacker DoS’s Trusted Host Attacker attempts to connect to target many times and records sequence numbers Trusted Host Target Attacker calculates sequence numbers which will be assigned for next connection. Router Attacker spoofs address of trusted host and uses calculated sequence numbers (router passes trusted internal address Target runs command from spoofed trusted host Attacker