Optimal Defaults David Laibson Harvard University July, 2008.

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Presentation transcript:

Optimal Defaults David Laibson Harvard University July, 2008

Outline: Normative Economics Revealed preferences Mechanism Design Optimal policies for procrastinators Active decision empirical implementation

Normative economics Normative preferences are preferences that society (or you) should optimize Normative preferences are philosophical constructs. Normative debates are settled with empirical evidence and philosophical arguments Positive preferences are preferences that predict my choices Positive preferences need not coincide with normative preferences. What I do and what I should do are different things (though they do have some similarities) For example: I have a heroin kit in my room and I shoot up after every dinner. Just because I shoot heroin (and understand the consequences) does not mean that it is necessarily normatively optimal

The limits to “revealed preferences” Behavioral economists are particularly skeptical of the claim that positive and normative preferences are identical. Why? Agents may make cognitive mistakes –I hold all of my retirement wealth in employer stock, but that does not mean that I am risk seeking; rather it really means that I mistakenly believe that employer stock is less risky than a mutual fund (see survey evidence). Agents may have dynamically inconsistent preferences (there is no single set of preferences that can be measured). But in both cases, we can still use behavior to infer something about normative preferences.

Positive Preferences ≠ Normative Preferences But… Positive Preferences ≈ Normative Preferences Identifying normative preferences? (No single answer.) Empirically estimated structural models that include both true preferences and behavioral mistakes (Laibson et al, MSM lifecycle estimation paper, 2005) Asymptotic (empirical) choices (Choi et al, AER, 2003) Active (empirical) choices (Choi et al “Active Decision” 2004) Survey questions about ideal behavior (Choi et al 2002) Expert choice (Kotlikoff’s ESPlanner; Sharpe’s Financial Engines) Educated choice Philosophy, ethics

Example: Normative economics with present-biased preferences Possible welfare criteria: Pareto criterion treating each self as a separate agent (this does not identify a unique optimum) Self 0’s preferences: basically exponential δ discounting Exponential discounting: θ t (θ=δ?) Unit weight on all periods One analytic forward-looking brain and every affective myopic brain Other suggestions?

Mechanism Design How should a good default be chosen when true preferences (and rationality) are heterogeneous? Maximize a social welfare function –Need true preferences (which may be heterogeneous). –Need to model endogenous responses of behavioral actors Often this implies that you should heavily weight the preferences of the most behavioral subpopulations. Assymmetric/cautious paternalism (Camerer et al 2003) Libertarian paternalism (Sunstein and Thaler 2005)

Optimal policies for procrastinators Carroll, Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick (2004). It is costly to opt out of a default Opportunity cost (transaction costs) are time-varying –Creates option value for waiting to opt out Actors may be present-biased –Creates tendency to procrastinate

Preview of model Individual decision problem (game theoretic) Socially optimal mechanism design (enrollment regime) Active decision regime is optimal when consumers are: –Well-informed –Present-biased –Heterogeneous

Model setup Infinite horizon discrete time model Agent decides when to opt out of default s D and move to time-invariant optimum s* Agent pays stochastic (iid) cost of opting out: c Until opt-out, the agent suffers a flow loss L(s D, s*)  0 Agents have quasi-hyperbolic discount function: 1   2,... where  ≤ 1 For tractability, we set δ = 1: 1, , ,...

Model timing s≠s * Lc~uniform Incur cost c and move to personal optimum s* (game over) Do nothing and start over again, so continuation cost function is given by: β[L+Ev(c +1 )]. v(c) w(c) Period begins: delay cost L Draw transaction cost Decision node Cost functions

Agent’s action Equilibrium solves the following system:

Action threshold and loss function Threshold is increasing in b, increasing in L, and decreasing in the support of the cost distribution (holding mean fixed).

Graph of expected loss function: Ev ( c ) Case of  = 1 Ev ( c ) : loss per period of inaction Key point: loss function is monotonic in cost of waiting, L

Graph of loss function: Ev ( c )  = 1  = 0.67 Ev ( c ) : loss per period of inaction Key point: loss function is not monotonic for quasi-hyperbolics.

Why is the loss function non-monotonic when  < 1? Because the cutoff c* is a function of L, we can write the loss function as By the chain rule, Intuition: pushing the current self to act is good for the individual, since the agent has a bias against acting. When acting is very likely, this benefit is not offset by the cost of higher L. -+0

Model predictions In a default regime, early opt-outs will show the largest changes from the default Participation rates under standard enrollment will be lower than participation rates under active decision Participation rates under active decision will be lower than participation rates under automatic enrollment

Model predictions People who move away from defaults sooner are, on average, those whose optima are furthest away from the default

Model predictions People who move away from defaults sooner are, on average, those whose optima are furthest away from the default

The benevolent planner’s problem A benevolent planner picks the default s D to minimize the social loss function: We adopt a quadratic loss function: To illustrate the properties of this problem, we assume s* is distributed uniformly.

Loss function in s*-s D space s*-s D

Lemma: The individual loss at each boundary of the support of s* must be equal at an optimal default.

Proposition: There are three defaults that satisfy Lemma 1 and the second-order condition. CenterOffset Active decision

Proposition: Active decisions are optimal when: Present-bias is large --- small . Average transaction cost is large. Support of transaction cost is small. Support of savings distribution is large. Flow cost of deviating from optimal savings rate is large (for small  ).

10 Beta Active Decision Center Default Offset Default 30% 0% Low Heterogeneity High Heterogeneity

Naives: Proposition: For a given calibration, if the optimal mechanism for sophisticated agents is an active decision rule, then the optimal mechanism for naïve agents is also an active decision rule.

Mechanism Design: Summary Model of standard defaults and active decisions –The cost of opting out is time-varying –Agents may be present-biased Active decision is socially optimal when…   is small –Support of savings distribution is large

Active decisions: empirical implementation Choi, Laibson, Madrian, Metrick (2004) Active decision mechanisms require employees to make an active choice about 401(k) participation. Welcome to the company You are required to submit this form within 30 days of hire, regardless of your 401(k) participation choice If you don’t want to participate, indicate that decision If you want to participate, indicate your contribution rate and asset allocation Being passive is not an option

401(k) participation increases under active decisions

Active decisions Active decision raises 401(k) participation. Active decision raises average savings rate by 50 percent. Active decision doesn’t induce choice clustering. Under active decision, employees choose savings rates that they otherwise would have taken three years to achieve. (Average level as well as the entire multivariate covariance structure.)

Challenge to revealed preferences We should no longer rely on the classical theory of revealed preferences to answer the fundamental question of what is in society's interest. Context determines revealed preferences. Revealed preferences are not (always) normative preferences.

Conclusions It’s easy to dramatically change savings behavior –Defaults, Active Decisions It’s harder to know how to identify socially optimal institutions. –How can we impute people’s true preferences? –What if they are dynamically inconsistent? –What set of preferences are the right ones? –How do we design mechanisms that implement those preferences when agents are psychologically complex. –Who can be trusted to design these mecdhanisms?