V. Kain AB/OP1Sep 12, 2007 Summary of Discussion on Injection Protection Issues Injection Protection Issues – meeting 22 nd of June V. Kain, A. McPherson,

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Presentation transcript:

V. Kain AB/OP1Sep 12, 2007 Summary of Discussion on Injection Protection Issues Injection Protection Issues – meeting 22 nd of June V. Kain, A. McPherson, B. Puccio, R. Schmidt, B. Todd, J. Wenninger Safe Beam Flags Toggle Safe Beam Flag Update of Master Tables Plans for testing

V. Kain AB/OP2Sep 12, 2007 Flags LHC Safe Beam Flag: –hardware not redundant: only one DC BCT used –proposed solution: SIS for redundant check IF SBF == TRUE: SIS would calculate the “safe beam flag” in an independent way from intensity (here using the FBCT) and energy (using the same algorithm) and compare it with the flag distributed by the timing system  discrepancy: beam dump LHC Beam Presence Flag –direct link to SPS Master (not via timing) –not problem for availability: we propose to have a redundant system (not there yet): one beam presence for A and one for B New flags: –Low Intensity SPS Extraction Flag for SPS Master: ~ e+11 based on SPS intensity (LHC experiment protection) –LHC No Safe Beam Flag High Intensity Injection Flag: = LHC Beam Presence Flag && LHC No Safe Beam Flag needed at the SPS Master: only SPS timing at the SPS Master, generator box internal cooking, no LHC timing needed at the SPS Master BIC

V. Kain AB/OP3Sep 12, 2007

V. Kain AB/OP4Sep 12, 2007 Toggle Safe Beam Flag Before high intensity injection into the LHC –Safe beam flag in the LHC must be FALSE (+ beam presence TRUE), even with safe beam circulating (*) Solution: –Toggle …done via software by the LHC sequencer Safe because of (*) –Requirement for “Safe Beam Parameter Generator Box” safe beam flag forceable FALSE: measurement overwritten can be forced or unforced via software (unforced = measurement taken into account) –To increase availability: sequencer check for masks {LHC && [(TT40 TED in && TT40 BICs)||(TT40 TED out && [(TI8 TED in && TT40 BICs && TI8 BICs)||(TI8 TED out && TT40 BICs && TI8 BICs && Inj Permit && F)])]} = {LHC && TT40 BICs && [TT40 TED in || (non(TT40 TED in) && TI8 BICs && [TI8 TED in || (non(TI8 TED in) && Inj Permit && F)])]}

V. Kain AB/OP5Sep 12, 2007 Final SPS Master Tables (1) LSS4: extraction permit = (non(LHC) && case 1) || (non(CNGS) && case 2) LSS6: extraction permit ~ case 2 –no decision for CNGS/LHC –TI8→TI2, TT40→TT60 case 1 = {CNGS && TT40 BICs && [TT40 TED in || (non(TT40 TED in) && TT41 BICs)]} {LHC && [(TT40 TED in && TT40 BICs)||(TT40 TED out && [(TI8 TED in && TT40 BICs && TI8 BICs)||(TI8 TED out && TT40 BICs && TI8 BICs && Inj Permit && F)])]} = {LHC && TT40 BICs && [TT40 TED in || (non(TT40 TED in) && TI8 BICs && [TI8 TED in || (non(TI8 TED in) && Inj Permit && F)])]} {LHC && [(TT40 TED in && TT40 BICs)||(TT40 TED out && [(TI8 TED in && TT40 BICs && TI8 BICs)||(TI8 TED out && TT40 BICs && TI8 BICs && Inj Permit && F)])]} = {LHC && TT40 BICs && [TT40 TED in || (non(TT40 TED in) && TI8 BICs && [TI8 TED in || (non(TI8 TED in) && Inj Permit && F)])]} {LHC && [(TT40 TED in && TT40 BICs)||(TT40 TED out && [(TI8 TED in && TT40 BICs && TI8 BICs)||(TI8 TED out && TT40 BICs && TI8 BICs && Inj Permit && F)])]} = {LHC && TT40 BICs && [TT40 TED in || (non(TT40 TED in) && TI8 BICs && [TI8 TED in || (non(TI8 TED in) && Inj Permit && F)])]} {LHC && [(TT40 TED in && TT40 BICs)||(TT40 TED out && [(TI8 TED in && TT40 BICs && TI8 BICs)||(TI8 TED out && TT40 BICs && TI8 BICs && Inj Permit && F)])]} = {LHC && TT40 BICs && [TT40 TED in || (non(TT40 TED in) && TI8 BICs && [TI8 TED in || (non(TI8 TED in) && Inj Permit && F)])]} {LHC && [(TT40 TED in && TT40 BICs)||(TT40 TED out && [(TI8 TED in && TT40 BICs && TI8 BICs)||(TI8 TED out && TT40 BICs && TI8 BICs && Inj Permit && F)])]} = {LHC && TT40 BICs && [TT40 TED in || (non(TT40 TED in) && TI8 BICs && [TI8 TED in || (non(TI8 TED in) && Inj Permit && F)])]} {LHC && [(TT40 TED in && TT40 BICs)||(TT40 TED out && [(TI8 TED in && TT40 BICs && TI8 BICs)||(TI8 TED out && TT40 BICs && TI8 BICs && Inj Permit && F)])]} = {LHC && TT40 BICs && [TT40 TED in || (non(TT40 TED in) && TI8 BICs && [TI8 TED in || (non(TI8 TED in) && Inj Permit && F)])]} case 2 = {LHC && TT40 BICs && [TT40 TED in || (non(TT40 TED in) && TI8 BICs && [TI8 TED in || (non(TI8 TED in) && Inj Permit && F)])]} F = Low Intensity SPS Extraction Flag || [LHC No Safe Beam Flag && Beam Presence] = Low Intensity SPS Extraction Flag || High Intensity Injection Flag

V. Kain AB/OP6Sep 12, 2007 Final SPS Master Tables (2)

V. Kain AB/OP7Sep 12, 2007 Plans for Testing Test of Master BICs week 46 Requirements: –Safe beam parameter generator boxes: SPS safe beam parameter, LHC safe beam parameter, Low Intensity SPS Extraction –Additional box: to distinguish between LHC and CNGS based on BETS –Injection BICs –Faked High Intensity Injection Flag –All TL BICs commissioned, all TEDs moveable –SPS supercycle with CNGS and LHC