Lessons Learned: Incomplete FEL Lab Sweep LL2007-TJNAF-0001 Kelly Mahoney Presented at the DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop August 7, 2007.

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Presentation transcript:

Lessons Learned: Incomplete FEL Lab Sweep LL2007-TJNAF-0001 Kelly Mahoney Presented at the DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop August 7, 2007

During laser operations in the Jefferson Lab Free Electron Laser (FEL) Laboratory #1, control room staff unexpectedly discovered the presence of a worker in the laboratory. This discovery was made after a sweep to remove all workers was performed and laser operations were underway.

JLab Accelerators 6 GeV CW Recirculating Linac –Basic Research THz-UV 10kw CW Free Electron Laser –Basic Research –Applied Research

JLab FEL Energy Recovery Linac

The JLab FEL User Facility General Purpose TBD Micro fab THz Lab Dyna- mics Nano/ NASA Optics/ Navy Current User Facility has 7 Labs Lab1 General set-ups and prototypes Lab 2 Initial propagation studies Lab 3 THz dynamics and imaging Lab 3b NASA nanofab Lab 4 Aerospace LMES Lab 6 FEL + lasers for dynamics studies Control Room

Lab 1 and Control Room

Event Operations underway Dropped sweep for adjustment by laser personnel User followed in to access his PC After laser personnel left, operator entered and performed minimal sweep User did not hear sweep alert Lab armed, User heard pre-ops alert Exit button on door bypassed, would not unlock Laser operations started User flicked lights on/off to get operator attention Operator saw lights and pushed crash Crash released door lock and User exited.

View from door

View from workspace

Circumstances JLab did not require User to have lab specific training for open access. Multiple roles and responsibilities – no one person responsible for oversight. LSS designed and installed when lab was empty. Exit switch was designed for sweep procedure exit, not emergency exit.

Lessons Learned Training for special hazard environments, such as laser labs, needs to ensure people understand the consequence and significance of alarms. Emergency egress scenarios need to be considered in lab interlock design. In this event, laser lab door signage and hardware were inconsistent with function and did not allow prompt egress. Sweep techniques must adapt to the changing room configuration. There was an obstruction created after the experimental setup was first approved. A persistent problem with administrative controls in safety systems is that their effectiveness depends on the diligence of the person enforcing the control.

Lessons Learned Some people do not like to hit a crash switch if that action is not included in their training. “Success” oriented planning may lead one to omit or even preclude consideration of plausible accident scenarios

Actions Taken LSS redesigned Audible sweep tone and recorded announcement Sweep stations and programmed sweep pattern added Exit button after sweep crashes lab Pre-sweep added to procedure Two person sweep required Personnel training, to include lab specific training, keyed to badge reader One person responsible for all laser operations