Airpower Through The Post Cold War Cognitive Samples of Behavior: State the U.S. objectives of the Gulf War. (L) List the objectives of the Air Campaign used in the Gulf War. (L) Outline the key elements of Colonel Warden’s “INSTANT THUNDER” plan. (L) Identify the four phases of the Air Campaign. (L) Describe the significance of air and space power in the Gulf War. (L) List key lessons learned from Operation PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN WATCH, Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, the crisis in Somalia, and Operation DENY FLIGHT. (L) Identify the three vital interests the United States and its NATO allies had at stake during the Kosovo crisis. (L) State the five NATO objectives established in April 1999. (L) State the three key strategic objectives of Operation ALLIED FORCE. (L) Identify the key lessons learned by the U.S. military in Operation ALLIED FORCE. (L)

Overview Background to the Conflict The Plan of Attack Iraqi threats Concept of Operations Five Strategic Rings Targets Campaign Overview SOBs for Part 1 of 3: State the U.S. objectives of the Gulf War. (L) List the objectives of the Air Campaign used in the Gulf War. (L) Outline the key elements of Colonel Warden’s “INSTANT THUNDER” plan. (L) Identify the four phases of the Air Campaign. (L)

Overview Video Clip/Beyond the Wild Blue Operation PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN WATCH Operation SOUTHERN WATCH Operation PROVIDE RELIEF/RESTORE HOPE SOBs for Part 2 of 3: Describe the significance of air and space power in the Gulf War. (L) List key lessons learned from Operation PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN WATCH, Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, the crisis in Somalia, and Operation DENY FLIGHT. (L)

Overview History of the Balkans Operation DENY FLIGHT Operation ALLIED FORCE Background NATO Actions Operation ALLIED FORCE Begins Lessons learned by U.S. Military Political Lessons Learned Impact of Lessons Learned on Future DOD Budget CFD Review

“Beyond the Wild Blue” Video

“Beyond the Wild Blue”

The Crisis in Iraq UN Security Council established a “no-fly zone” over northern Iraq to protect the Kurdish people from attacks by Saddam Hussein Operation Provide Comfort began on 5 Apr 91 as a humanitarian relief effort to deliver food, clothing, and supplies to Iraq’s Kurdish refugees C-130s began airdropping supplies on 7 Apr 91 Lasted approximately eight years and was then replaced by Operation Northern Watch Operation DESERT STORM is over and was very successful, but the troubles with Iraq continued. We’ll now discuss operations PROVIDE COMFORT and NORTHERN WATCH. J. Operations “PROVIDE COMFORT” and “NORTHERN WATCH” 1. Background to the Conflicts. a. After the Gulf War in 1991, the UN Security Council established no-fly zones banning Iraqi flights over northern (and southern) Iraq after President Saddam Hussein's forces attacked Kurds in the north (and Shiite Muslims in the south.) b. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT officially began 5 April 1991, with C-130 cargo airplanes airdropping relief supplies to Kurdish refugees in the mountainous Iraqi northern border on 7 April 1991. c. Operation NORTHERN WATCH (ONW) began in January 1997 on the heels of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. d. Operation NORTHERN WATCH (ONW) was a Combined Task Force (CTF) charged with enforcing the no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel in Iraq and monitoring Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council resolutions 678, 687, and 688. e. The northern no-fly zone was not an aggression against Iraq or a violation of its sovereignty; it is a necessary and legitimate measure to limit Iraq's aggressive air activities. f. ONW was headquartered at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. g. The ONW coalition partners--the United States, United Kingdom, and Turkey--provided approximately 45 aircraft and more than 1,400 personnel to support Operation NORTHERN WATCH. The joint U.S. force includes soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines from the Navy, Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, all operating as part of the United States European Command. h. About 1,300 Americans, as well as about 200 British and 100 Turkish troops, deployed to conduct NORTHERN WATCH under the co-command of the United States and Turkey. i. Iraqi ground forces, hundreds of aircraft, and highly mobile antiaircraft weapon systems were scattered throughout the region. j. From 28 December 1998, Saddam Hussein opted to challenge this enforcement numerous times by firing at coalition aircraft with surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and antiaircraft artillery and by targeting them with radar. Operation NORTHERN WATCH aircraft responded in self-defense to these threats, while continuing to enforce the No-fly Zone. k. Lt Col Maury Forsyth, 55th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron Commander estimated that Hussein had about 300 mostly clear weather, day fighters with limited night capability, but the mere fact that they had 300 made them a legitimate threat. l. ONW also called on American reservists and national guardsmen, particularly in the combat search and rescue function.

The Crisis in Iraq Lessons Learned - ONW The need to avoid “Fratricide” The limitations of airdrops Host-country tensions The need for alternate bases Lack of an “exit strategy” 2. Lessons learned. a. The need to avoid “Fratricide.” Other than authorized UN flights, no aircraft is allowed to fly in the zone. UN flights go in and out quite regularly, but they give lots of advance notice. We know the day prior, what kind of airplane is going to fly, its heading and altitude. Coalition fighters are particularly careful since two USAF F-15s accidentally shot down two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the zone in April 1994. Visual recognition drills are conducted before each flight. Intelligence officers have pictures of all different kinds of airplanes, and pilots have to identify them before they go fly just as a reminder and a refresher. b. The limitations of airdrops. Because of inaccurate intelligence assessments, planners didn’t realize the cargo they dropped wasn’t appropriate for the Kurdish culture, so many refugees refused to eat the food or wear the clothing being supplied to help them. There were also problems with timing of the airdrops; some refugees were actually injured by falling cargo. c. Host-country tensions between Turkey and Kurds. (1) The Turkish government was distrustful of the Kurds in their own country so were reluctant to support an operation to help Kurds in Iraq. (2) Turkey also waged a war against its own Kurds, which complicated issues when Kurdish separatists in Turkey mistook American aircraft for those of the Turks. d. Lack of an “exit strategy.” Washington strategists failed to define a desired end state that would justify termination of the operation. No one knew exactly how long the “no-fly zone” would have to be enforced and eventually Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was replaced by another operation with a different name but with the same basic mission.

The Crisis in Iraq Operation Southern Watch (OSW) was a Combined Task Force enforcing the “no-fly zone” below the 36th parallel in southern Iraq Not an aggression against Iraq – executed as a self-defense measure Coalition partners included the U.S., UK, France, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait More than 850 Iraqi SAM and AAA fire directed at coalition aircraft Iraq violated the “no-fly zone” more than 160 times More than 150,000 USAF sorties by 1998 K. Operation “SOUTHERN WATCH”--Protecting the Box. 1. Background to the conflict. a. Coalition strikes in the No-Fly Zones were executed as a self-defense measure in response to Iraqi hostile threats and acts against Coalition forces and their aircraft. If Iraq were to cease its threatening actions, Coalition strikes would cease as well. Coalition aircraft never targeted civilian populations or infrastructure and go to painstaking lengths to avoid injury to civilians and damage to civilian facilities. b. There were more than 850 separate incidents of Iraqi surface-to-air missile and antiaircraft artillery fire directed against Coalition aircraft between December 1998 and 18 May 2001. Iraqi aircraft violated the Southern No-Fly Zone more than 160 times during the same period. A quick look at some actual statistics verifing the high “Operations-Tempo” (Ops-Tempo) for OSW. (1) Total Sorties: more than 175,000 (As of May 1998). (2) Total USAF Sorties: more than 70 percent. (3) Calendar year 1997: 36,309 OSW sorties. (4) 1997 U.S. Contribution: 33,558 OSW sorties. (5) 1997 USAF Contribution: 26,631 OSW sorties.

“What we’ve effectively done since 1992 is conduct an air occupation of a country…” d. In July 1995, then Air Force Chief of Staff General Fogleman, pointed out the significance of OSW when he said, “What we’ve effectively done since 1992 is conduct an air occupation of a country…” Gen Fogleman, Jul 1995

The Crisis in Iraq Lessons Learned - OSW Became a test for USAF AEF concept in Oct 1995 Quality of life changes needed due to high “Ops-Tempo” Reorganized Security Forces 2. Lessons learned. a. OSW became the USAF test for the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept in October 1995. b. Because of the high deployment rates, the Air Force assessed its overall “OpsTempo” and took several measures that enhanced training and the quality of life for their members. These included limiting the number of days deployed from their home base and cutting back on higher HQ inspection visits, peacetime training exercises, and competitions. c. In the aftermath of the 1996 bombing at Khobar Towers, Dhahran AB, the Air Force reorganized existing security police units to specialize in all aspects of force protection.

The Crisis in Somalia In-mid 1992, drought and civil war devastated Somalia Food supplies became a weapon of war Operation Provide Relief began on 22 Aug 1992 by the U.S. to deliver food to Somali refugees Military and civilian aircraft used Over 2,000 sorties, carrying 48,162 metric tons of food L. Operations “PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE”--Preventing Starvation and Protecting Troops. 1. Background to the conflict. a. In mid-1992, humanitarian conditions in Somalia had deteriorated horrifically. The effects of the drought of the early 1990s were exacerbated by the outbreak of civil war between warlords fighting for control of Somalia after the fall of Dictator Siad Barre. b. Food supplies became a weapon of war. Food stocks were destroyed, markets disrupted and shipments hijacked. Farmers abandoned the few productive fields, and herdsmen fled to safer areas with their remaining livestock. The resulting famine led to over 300,000 deaths, including almost half of all Somali children. Relief agencies were severely hampered by the lack of security. c. On 28 August 1992, the United States launched a military airlift, known as Operation PROVIDE RELIEF, from Mombassa, Kenya, to deliver food to Somali refugees. Before ceasing humanitarian operations in March 1993, U.S. military aircraft had flown over 2,000 sorties, including 875 cargo sorties carrying 28,727 metric tons of food. d. U.S. government-funded civilian aircraft carried another 19,435 metric tons to Somalia and northern Kenya. The U.S. also delivered another 338,000 metric tons of relief supplies by 15 common-use ships and two fast sealift ships.

The Crisis in Somalia Although a humanitarian effort: 44 American soldiers lost their lives 175 were injured or wounded Danger of failure due to warlord interference Operation Restore Hope Coalition peacekeeping operation from 9 Dec 92 – 4 May 93 First test of Rapid Global Mobility from the CONUS e. American involvement, however, was not without other costs. Perhaps the most visible was the death of 18 U.S. Army Rangers. In total, 44 American soldiers lost their lives and 175 were injured or wounded in the humanitarian effort in Somalia. f. Early on, the humanitarian effort was clearly in danger of failing due to interference from the warlords at ports and on the highways, which prevented food from getting through in large quantities. g. Operation RESTORE HOPE was the humanitarian and peacemaking operation conducted in Somalia by the U.S.-led coalition from 9 December 1992 through 4 May 1993. It was the first test of the new post-Cold War U.S. defense strategy of rapidly deploying long distances directly from the CONUS. Within only a few weeks, Mogadishu port was open, as were major highways. Food and medicines began to flow. h. General Fogleman described Somalia as "the first time our air mobility forces have been engaged in a major exercise in their post-Cold War configuration." [Overall, it carried about 5 percent of the cargo transported during the Gulf War.]

The Crisis in Somalia Lessons Learned First large scale test of newly formed AMC and the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) Difficulties evolved in the planning, coordinating and managing of the operation Austere infrastructure of Somalia added to the lack of adequate bases for strategic airlift aircraft 2. Lessons learned. a. RESTORE HOPE was also significant in that it was the first large scale test of AMC and of the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC). AMC was activated on 1 June 1992, from the remains of the MAC and most of the aerial refueling tankers from the Strategic Air Command (SAC). The TACC is an enormous C2 center within HQ AMC that directs all strategic air mobility missions. Air mobility taskings flow directly from the TACC to units worldwide. b. The airlift went smoothly and quickly, but many participants complained about difficulties in planning, coordinating, and managing the operation. These problems, combined with obstacles in base availability and an extremely austere infrastructure in Somalia, tested AMC’s ability at learning from its mistakes during DESERT SHIELD/STORM. RESTORE HOPE was a success, because it stopped the starvation in Somalia, but closer analysis reveals concerns with the strategic airlift.

Overview Questions??? Video Clip/Beyond the Wild Blue Operation PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN WATCH Operation SOUTHERN WATCH Operation PROVIDE RELIEF/RESTORE HOPE Describe the significance of air and space power in the Gulf War. (L) List key lessons learned from Operation PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN WATCH, Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, the crisis in Somalia, and Operation DENY FLIGHT. (L) Questions???

Airpower Through The Post Cold War Cognitive Samples of Behavior: State the U.S. objectives of the Gulf War. (L) List the objectives of the Air Campaign used in the Gulf War. (L) Outline the key elements of Colonel Warden’s “INSTANT THUNDER” plan. (L) Identify the four phases of the Air Campaign. (L) Describe the significance of air and space power in the Gulf War. (L) List key lessons learned from Operation PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN WATCH, Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, the crisis in Somalia, and Operation DENY FLIGHT. (L) Identify the three vital interests the United States and its NATO allies had at stake during the Kosovo crisis. (L) State the five NATO objectives established in April 1999. (L) State the three key strategic objectives of Operation ALLIED FORCE. (L) Identify the key lessons learned by the U.S. military in Operation ALLIED FORCE. (L)