Physical (Environmental) Security CISSP Review Seminar v7 Physical (Environmental) Security Physical (Environmental) Security From the CISSP® CBK®, the definition of this domain - “The Physical (Environmental) Security Domain addresses the common physical and procedural risks that may exist in the environment in which an information system is managed. This Domain also addresses physical and procedural defense and recovery strategies, and countermeasures, and resources available to the information security professional. These resources include staff, the configuration of the physical environment, security policies, and procedures, and an array of physical security tools.” VA. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Define key concepts of physical security CISSP Review Seminar v7 Domain Objectives Physical (Environmental) Security Define key concepts of physical security Goals and Purpose of Layered Defenses Principles in Site Location Building Entry Points Physical Security Principles for Information System’s Security within a Building Domain Objectives - This slide provides good insight to what the CISSP candidate should understand and be able to do at the end of this domain. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Information Security TRIAD CISSP Review Seminar v7 Information Security TRIAD Physical (Environmental) Security Availability Confidentiality Integrity Information Security Information Security TRIAD - As we have discussed throughout this course, AIC forms the pillars of our security efforts. The Physical (Environmental) Security Domain actually supports all three pillars by considering the physical risks that could happen to our information system, the environment in which our systems operate, and takes action by applying risk-based, cost-effective security countermeasures. Confidentiality - Ensures that no one is allowed to physically remove the equipment or to obtain access to the information through physical access. Availability - Ensures that the system is physically protected from destruction that would affect the users’ ability to access information. Integrity - Ensures that the information system is physically protected so that unauthorized “taps” or equipment (wireless access points, additional routers, etc.) cannot be inserted into the system that would expose information to unauthorized access or modifications. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design CISSP Review Seminar v7 Domain Agenda Physical (Environmental) Security Introduction Layered Defense Model Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Facility and Infrastructure Criteria © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Primary Physical Security Goal CISSP Review Seminar v7 Primary Physical Security Goal Physical (Environmental) Security WARNING The protection of life is our PRIMARY goal Primary Physical Security Goal - Life safety is the primary goal in physical security. In an emergency situation, the organization must ensure the safety of personnel before the safety of the facility or equipment. Nevertheless, the physical security of an organization’s systems is of prime importance for business continuity. Naturally, we are also concerned with the physical security of our systems as we previously discussed. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Goals of Physical Security CISSP Review Seminar v7 Goals of Physical Security Physical (Environmental) Security Deter Delay Detect Assess Respond Goals of Physical Security - Physical security countermeasures use barriers, entry and search controls, intrusion detection systems, and various types of alarms assessment. When properly combined with organizational practices and procedures, they are intended to deter, delay, detect, assess, and appropriately respond to an unauthorized activity. When possible, it is always best to deter threats. However, should deterrence fail, we want to delay them long enough to detect their actions, launch the appropriate response, and respond before they can damage our information systems and the data on them. Notice the layering of security in this photo. Deter - Convince the threat agent not to attack. Delay - If they do decide to attack, we want to delay them long enough to detect the attack and respond to block it before damage to the information system or information occurs. Detect - We need to have the ability to detect the attack. We can’t delay forever so our ability to detect the attack is important and must be timely. Assess - There is an old saying that the first report is almost always wrong. Once detected, we need time to assess the method of the attack, the target, and what should be done. Respond - Take the appropriate actions without overreacting. This is often very difficult and should be covered in the incident response plan. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Threats to Physical Security CISSP Review Seminar v7 Threats to Physical Security Physical (Environmental) Security Natural/Environmental Utility Systems Human-Made/Political Events Threats to Physical Security - Natural/Environmental - Disasters are fairly easy to understand, but often very hard predict and to counter. A careful bit of analysis and check of the history in your area will get you off to a good start. These threats include earthquakes, floods, storms, hurricanes, and fires. Utility Systems - (communication outages, power outages, etc.) Are also easy to understand. Backup sources for power, water, and communications can minimize these potential risks. Don’t forget about possible problems with sewage systems. This can be particularly troublesome to deal with in an operational environment and can quickly endanger workers’ health - which we never want to do. Human-made/Political Events - (explosions, vandalism, theft, terrorist attacks, riots, etc.) Are also difficult to deal with and often we can only respond through a good incident response plan and good preventative planning. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Malicious Threat Sources and Countermeasures CISSP Review Seminar v7 Physical (Environmental) Security Theft Espionage Dumpster Diving Social Engineering and Shoulder Surfing HVAC Access Malicious Threat Sources and Countermeasures - Here are just a few of the internal controls that may be considered to counter these types of threats. Remember, that a single control often provides protection against multiple types of threats. In fact, the more protection we can obtain from a single control, the better. This helps make the control more cost effective and provides us with the ability to simplify our security measures. Naturally, this concept can’t be taken to extremes because at some point we lose our defense in depth and the harm that could potentially occur from the control failing outweighs the benefit of having fewer controls. Typical malicious threat sources and countermeasures: Theft - Countermeasures include strong access controls, IDS, locked doors, key control, and bag checks. Espionage - Countermeasures include good hiring processes, background checks, good internal controls, job rotations. Dumpster Diving - Countermeasures include proper disposal policy and procedures, layered controls with periodic checks. Social Engineering and Shoulder Surfing - Countermeasures include employee awareness program, random spot check/training classes, screen filters to prevent improper observation. HVAC Access - Countermeasures include section lock downs to control access, and smoke or IDS sensors. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design CISSP Review Seminar v7 Domain Agenda Physical (Environmental) Security Introduction Layered Defense Model Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Facility and Infrastructure Criteria © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Security through ‘layers’ of controls Multi-layered CISSP Review Seminar v7 Layered Defense Model Physical (Environmental) Security Security through ‘layers’ of controls Multi-layered Starts with the perimeter, then building grounds, then building entry points, etc. Layered Defense Model - With regard to providing physical security measures, the environment should be considered multi-layered. This starts with the perimeter of the facility, the building grounds, the building entry points, and inside the building. The objective is to deter unauthorized or illegal events from occurring and if they do occur, to detect the event and delay the activity for a pre-determined length of time. It is a well-known axiom that if someone wants to gain access, regardless of any constraints, a method will be found to gain access. Thus, a layered defense can provide better physical security controls.   © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Layered Defense Model Building Floors/ Office Suites Building Grounds CISSP Review Seminar v7 Layered Defense Model Physical (Environmental) Security Building Floors/ Office Suites Building Grounds Perimeter Layered Defense Model - The Layered Defense Model suggests that a group of controls, properly layered, provide better security than a single “impenetrable” control. History is filled with examples that demonstrate that a single defensive barrier will be breached or bypassed if additional controls are not employed to add protection to the barrier. Remember the words deter, delay, detect, assess, and respond that we just discussed? A layered defense provides us time to perform these functions. Offices/ Data Centers/ Equipment, Supplies, Media Building Entrance © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Perimeter and Building Boundary Protection CISSP Review Seminar v7 Perimeter and Building Boundary Protection Physical (Environmental) Security Perimeter security controls are the first line of defense Protective barriers can be either natural or structural Perimeter and Building Boundary Protection - The perimeter security controls are the first line of defense and are usually located as far as possible from the main buildings. They should delay an intruder long enough for security personnel to react appropriately. Sometimes signage will stop individuals who “don’t REALLY want to get inside”. Perimeter security controls - Are the first line of defense. Protective barriers can be either natural or structural - Natural Protective Barriers - Offer terrains that are difficult to cross. Structural Barriers - Are devices such as fences, gates, bollards, and facility walls. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Landscaping Ponds, Hedges Small Spiny Shrubs CISSP Review Seminar v7 Physical (Environmental) Security Ponds, Hedges Small Spiny Shrubs Landscaping - Landscaping can add to our security challenges or be a friend. Spiny shrubs are very good at keeping out the casual thief, but will not stop the committed person who wants into your facility. Ponds, Hedges - Can provide a barrier or an entry point. Many secure facilities do not want hedges too close to the facility that could be used to hide an intruder or malicious device. Ponds and other barriers can provide some access control and funnel all traffic through controlled points. Spiny Shrubs - Make it harder for an intruder to cross the barrier. Small spiny shrubs beneath first floor windows add security, while retaining the emergency window exit. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Federal, state, or local codes may apply CISSP Review Seminar v7 Fences Physical (Environmental) Security Federal, state, or local codes may apply No parking should be allowed near fences Fences - Are used to enclose security areas and designate property boundaries. Should meet specific gauge and fabric specifications. High-security areas may need a “top guard” (barbed wire at the top). This information provides some generally accepted fence heights and the level of protection they provide: 1 Meter/3-4 Feet - Will deter casual trespassers. 2 Meters/6-7 Feet - Too high to climb easily. 2.5 Meters/8 Feet - Will delay the determined intruder.   “Top Guard” is barbed wire or concertina wire at the top of the fence that will add 2-3 feet, and will deter access by severely cutting the intruder. A blanket, or mattress, however, can be used by attackers to alleviate this threat. Federal, state, or local codes may apply - Depending on your location and industry. Many times a fence cannot be used where it may affect the appearance of the area. No Parking should be allowed near fences - Do not allow vehicles to be parked near the fence. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Controlled Access Points CISSP Review Seminar v7 Controlled Access Points Physical (Environmental) Security Gates - minimum necessary Bollards Controlled Access Points - By definition, gates provide access through fences. Fences are barriers. The more access points through our barriers, the more potential places intruders can access our facility. Therefore, gates provide a necessary function, but also add to our security concerns. They must be managed, access controlled, and potentially weaken our overall security. Gates - minimum necessary - The portions of a wall or fence system that control entrance and/or egress by persons or vehicles and complete the perimeter of the defined area. Few products have changed over the past couple years as much as the simple bollard. From a concrete pole stuck in the ground, these security devices have evolved into functional works of art. Although aesthetics are important, the main reason for bollards is to control traffic and protect property. Bollards - Come in a variety of sizes and shapes depending on the use. Retractable bollards are designed for use in traffic control. Provides security against vehicles ramming into, or stopping near buildings. Lighted bollards can be used for lighting controls along parks, paths, and sidewalks. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Perimeter Intrusion Detection Systems CISSP Review Seminar v7 Perimeter Intrusion Detection Systems Physical (Environmental) Security Detects unauthorized access into an area Perimeter Intrusion Detection Systems - Sensors can be installed as perimeter and building ground devices to detect unauthorized access into an area. Perimeter sensors include those that can detect intrusion across or under a land boundary or through a physical barrier, such as a chain link fence. Some of these use sound and pressure to detect motion, and many of them can be used to trigger lighting around your perimeters. The problem with some of these is that they can be triggered by non-adversarial activities, such as animals, wind, etc. Note that these types of perimeter intrusion detection systems can also be used for ‘inside of the perimeter’ protection, and we will see them again later when we talk about inside of the building protection. Perimeter Intrusion Detection Systems - Characteristics of different space protection/intrusion detection devices: Photoelectric - Active Infrared beam that triggers an alarm when the beam is broken. Ultrasonic - Ultrasound energy bounced off the floors, walls, objects. The receiver detects a “foreign” signal change caused by the intruder and sounds the alarm. Microwave - Receiver diode picks up transmitted and “bounced” energy waves in an enclosure. Intruder disrupts the waves and activates the alarm. Passive Infrared - Where objects radiate IR with the heat of their bodies. Detector notes change and triggers an alarm. Pressure Sensitive - Detects pressure on the sensor or surrounding area. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) CISSP Review Seminar v7 Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Physical (Environmental) Security CCTV Capability Requirements Mixing Capabilities Virtual systems Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) - CCTV adds an excellent tool to our security arsenal. However, it should not be seen as the ‘only’ security device. Important considerations for CCTV cameras are blind-spots, motion detection systems, and workplace privacy. A television transmission system that uses cameras to transmit pictures by a transmission medium to connected monitors. The transmission media can use wired or wireless technologies. Many can be monitored from more than one location - including over the internet or corporate network. CCTV Capability Requirements - The CCTV system must meet these three requirements: Detection - The ability to detect the presence of an object. Recognition - The ability to determine the type of object. Identification - The ability to determine the object details. Mixing Capabilities - (such as Infrared and thermal) Can greatly increase capability by allowing the strength of each system to supplement the weaknesses of the other type of camera while minimizing costs. Virtual CCTV Systems - Fake systems that are installed as a deterrent control. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Components must function together CISSP Review Seminar v7 CCTV Main Components Physical (Environmental) Security CCTV - 3 Main Components Camera Lens Transmission Media Display Monitor Components must function together CCTV Main Components - The three main components are the camera, transmission media, and monitor. The camera design and lens capabilities are the key components for successfully capturing movement. The transmission media, such as cabling, is used to transmit the camera images to the display monitor. The camera lens is one of the most important components of the camera. CCTV Camera Lens - Fixed - Provides only one field of view image. Zoom - Allows the user to change the field of view without changing the lens. Field of view change can be done manually or with a motorized remote control. Automatic iris - A device in the lens that self-adjusts optically to light level changes via the video signal from the camera. Fresnel lens - A thin optical lens of many concentric rings having the properties of a much thicker & heavier lens: used in cameras, lighthouse beacons, etc. CCTV Transmission Media - Wired - Coaxial Cable or Fiber Optic Cable Wireless - Microwave, Radio, Optical, Infrared CCTV Display Monitors - Several different standards for monitors are: National Television Systems Committee (NTSC) specifies 525 horizontal lines of interlace scanning at 30 frames per second. NTSC is used in the United States and Japan. Phase Alternative Line (PAL) and Sequential Color and Memory (SECAM) specify 625 horizontal lines of interlace scanning at 25 frames per second. PAL is used in Europe, Australia, parts of Africa, and the Middle East. SECAM is used in Saudi Arabia, Russia, and France. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Additional CCTV System Equipment CISSP Review Seminar v7 Additional CCTV System Equipment Physical (Environmental) Security Pan and Tilt Units Panning Device Mountings Switchers / Multiplexers Remote Camera Controls Infrared Illuminators Time/Date Generators Videotape or Digital Recorders Motion Detectors Computer Controls Additional CCTV System Equipment - Although not part of a basic CCTV system, the items on this slide can be combined into a CCTV system to add functionality. Pan and Tilt Units - Devices that change the direction the camera is pointed in both the horizontal and vertical planes. Panning Device - Devices that change the direction the camera is pointed in the horizontal plane. Mountings - Brackets used to attach the camera to a location (pole, ceiling, etc). CCTV cameras have either the C-mount or the CS-mount. Switchers/Multiplexers - These networking devices are used to control where the CCTV signal is routed and to reduce the amount of physical cabling required. Remote Camera Controls - Allows the cameras to be controlled from a remote location. Infrared Illuminators - Used with infrared cameras for night-time surveillance where normal lighting is too expensive or prohibited. Time/Date Generators - Indexes the CCTV images by date and time. Videotape or Digital Recorders - Records the CCTV images for viewing later. Motion Detectors - Senses motion and is often used to adjust the direction that a camera is pointed. Computer Controls - Normally used in larger CCTV systems to ease the operational workload of the operators. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Size Depth, Height, and Width Lighting Contrast CISSP Review Seminar v7 CCTV Concerns Physical (Environmental) Security Total Surveillance Size Depth, Height, and Width Lighting Contrast CCTV Concerns - As with most areas of security, proper CCTV installations require a complete understanding of the requirements. Important CCTV concerns include: Total Surveillance - Understanding the facilities total surveillance requirements from the beginning is important to developing a cost effective and efficient system. This allows the system to be engineered and installed in a manner that maximizes the coverage with minimum equipment. Size Depth, Height, and Width - The size of the area to be monitored - depth, height, and width makes a major difference in the selection of the lens and other components. The aspect ratio of CCTV cameras is normally 4:3 (horizontal: vertical). The area to be monitored will determine camera selection (camera focal length, angle of view, etc.), placement, and the number of cameras required. Lighting - Is important; different lamps and lighting provide various levels of effectiveness. The location, direction, and intensity of the lighting will directly affect the performance of the CCTV system. A variety of lighting techniques should be employed to provide the most effective CCTV system. Contrast - Between the object and background is another important consideration in selecting the right components. Contrast is the noticeable difference between blacks and whites in a picture. If the two extremes look like gray and off-white the contrast is not good. A gray scale can be used to check the CCTV monitor's ability to reproduce good contrast. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Should be used with other controls Supports crime prevention CISSP Review Seminar v7 Lighting Physical (Environmental) Security Should be used with other controls Supports crime prevention Lighting - Should be used with other controls - For maximum effectiveness, lighting should be used with other controls, such as fences, patrols, or alarms. Lighting should allow security personnel to observe activities around or inside a facility without disclosing their presence. The objectives are to discourage or deter entry attempts by intruders and to make detection likely if unauthorized entry is attempted. It can be used along fence perimeters, building faces, entrances, or other structures, such as docks, parking areas, etc. Supports crime prevention - Good lighting supports the crime prevention efforts of the organization and helps reduce employee fears. Although lighting is a countermeasure in its own right, it is often combined with other controls to provide added confidence and security. Lighting is typically provided by artificial means such as light fixtures or lamps. A consistent level of light supplying reasonably good visibility meets the minimum requirement. As we just discussed, good lighting can be very important to help establish contrast and to support the CCTV systems. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Types of Lighting Continuous Lighting Trip Lighting Standby Lighting CISSP Review Seminar v7 Types of Lighting Physical (Environmental) Security Types of Lighting - Continuous Lighting - Is the most common, consisting of a series of fixed lights arranged to flood a given area continuously during hours of limited visibility. Glare lighting uses the glare of lights to inhibit intruder’s vision across the selected area. Flood lighting directs the light in a particular direction or location. Controlled lighting is also a form of continuous lighting. It is used where the width of the lighted area outside the perimeter must be controlled. Critical areas around buildings - Install lighting at least 8 feet (2.4 meters) high & with illumination of 2 foot candles (lumens). Trip Lighting - Is activated by a sensor that detects some activity such as movement, or heat. If the trigger point is activated, a light will shine. Note that these systems can be prone to nuisance tripping by pranksters and can also be used by intruders to create several false alarms that cause the security team to respond to various entry points. Since not every point could be monitored, an intruder may be able to gain access. Standby Lighting - Is similar to continuous lighting. The difference is that the lights are not always on, but are either automatically or manually turned on when suspicious activity is suspected. Since incandescent lights can go out, standby lighting can provide a backup capability. Emergency Lighting - Is used for limited times of power failures or other emergencies that render the normal system inoperative. Continuous Lighting Trip Lighting Standby Lighting Emergency Lighting © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Building Entry Point Protection CISSP Review Seminar v7 Building Entry Point Protection Physical (Environmental) Security Locks Lock Components Building Entry Point Protection - Locks are the most common and acceptable way to secure areas and property. They keep honest people out, but for unauthorized people who wish to gain access, locks are easily picked and keys can be readily duplicated. For this reason, locks should be combined with other controls to provide reliable security. Locks - Most accepted and used physical security device. Considered delay devices and not foolproof barriers to entry. All lock types are subject to force and special tools that can be used to gain entry. Should be just one aspect of many physical security controls. Lock Components - Most locks have similar components. These parts may be more or less robust than other locks, but they work together to provide protection. The lock body is the metal casing that encloses the cylinder and holds the protruding bolt that actually fastens the door. The strike and strike plate form a separate rectangular metal piece that is inserted into the door jam. The strike plate contains the strike that is the slot to receive the matching bolt attached to the lock body. It’s important to remember that if the door jam is not strong and securely fastened to the door frame, it will easily break/give way under pressure and the door will open - regardless of how strong that actual lock itself is that is installed. The key matches the tumblers in the lock’s cylinder and releases them from the locked position. The cylinder accepts the key and causes the bolt to move in or out of its receptacle in the strike. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Types of Locks Combination Locks Deadbolt Locks Keyless Locks CISSP Review Seminar v7 Types of Locks Physical (Environmental) Security Combination Locks Deadbolt Locks Keyless Locks Smart Locks Types of Locks - Combination Locks - Using a sequence of numbers in a specific order opens a combination lock. The lock contains wheels and a dial-face. The more wheels the better the protection; those with four or more wheels offer higher penetration resistance. Those with three or less wheels can be opened by listening to the sound of the wheels and by the feel of the dial.   Deadbolt Locks - A bolt is inserted into the frame of the door for added security. To be most effective, the bolt of the latch should be applied so the bolt slides into the door-casing frame or into a keeper firmly attached to the doorframe. Keyless Locks - Push button locks have buttons that are pushed in sequence to open the lock. Digital push-button locks are sometimes called cipher locks. The advantage to push-button locks is that there are no key control issues. The disadvantages are that the combination must be remembered, someone may be able to watch the input of the combination, the buttons for the code always show more wear than the unused buttons, and the combination code must be changed periodically. Smart Locks - Smart locks are designed to permit only authorized people into certain doors, at certain times. An example is the key system used in some hotels. The key is a plastic card that is programmed at a central computer to permit the guest access to a specific door. Another type of smart lock is the combination keypad-electronic deadbolt. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Locks are “pick-resistant,” not “pickproof” CISSP Review Seminar v7 Lock Picking Physical (Environmental) Security Lock Picking Locks are “pick-resistant,” not “pickproof” Lock Picking - Lock Picking - Basic picking tools are the tension wrench and the pick. The tension wrench imparts a rotary motion to the key plug of the lock and aids in finding the locking tumblers of the lock. The pick is used to move the binding tumblers, one at a time, to the shear line. When all tumblers are aligned properly with the shear line, the lock opens. Locks are “pick-resistant”, not “pickproof” - Some newer locks are “pick-resistant,” but not pickproof. Complex and automated lock picking tools have been produced along with the newer type locks. Although intended for use by professionals as part of their business, they are found in the hands of those who have no lawful use for them. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Lock Security Measures CISSP Review Seminar v7 Lock Security Measures Physical (Environmental) Security Lock and Key Control System Key Control Procedures Combinations must be changed Fail-soft vs. Fail-secure Lock Security Measures - Lock and Key Control System - Appropriate usage of locks and keys is dependent upon effective controls. A lock and key control system is critical. Key Control Procedures - Proper procedure for key controls should be implemented and documented. Accurate records must be maintained to include: Who has access to keys. Who the keys are issued to. Key inventory (sign out, destruction). Combinations must be changed - At specific time or specific circumstances. Every twelve months When possibly compromised. When a facility member who knows the combination leaves. Fail-soft vs. Fail-secure - When a power failure occurs, an electronic lock must “fail-soft” meaning that the lock is unlocked or “fail-secure” meaning that it is locked. There is a place for both. Fail-soft allows people to get out in an emergency, but it leaves the area unsecured. Fail-secure leaves the area secure, but creates the possibility of locking people out of a building or stuck in an area that is unsafe. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Guards and Guard Stations CISSP Review Seminar v7 Guards and Guard Stations Physical (Environmental) Security Guards Can provide a deterrent Guard Stations Guards and Guard Stations - Guards - Can provide a unique capability to our security efforts - reasoned, discriminating, and measured responses to changing situations. This makes guards an invaluable asset in emergencies and if not properly selected, trained, and motivated - a major liability. Guards must be motivated and attentive. If they are bored or distracted by TVs, computer games, surfing the Internet, etc. they can provide a false sense of security to the organizations. Guards are expensive controls (pay, cost of training, retirement, etc.) and can be the subject of social engineering. Humans, by our very nature, want to trust and help each other. Guards that can be convinced to “make exceptions” are a liability. Can provide a deterrent - Guards, or some type of security force, can provide a deterrence and a flexible security and safety response in the event of an intrusion. Guard Stations - Guard stations are a double-edged sword for many of the reasons mentioned above. Almost every soldier/Marine in the world is trained to determine guards presences, guard patterns, guard station locations and the techniques to bypass them as part of their combat training. This training information is readily available on the Internet for those with less valid reasons for needing these skills. If in a high threat environment, guard stations are constructed with bulletproof walls, doors, or windows. Ensure clear sight lines and access to main doors, etc. Questions to consider when deciding on a security force are: Is hiring or contracting more cost-effective? Are the guards certified or licensed? Should the guards be armed or unarmed? © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Other Electronic Physical Controls CISSP Review Seminar v7 Other Electronic Physical Controls Physical (Environmental) Security Card Access Biometric Access Methods Other Electronic Physical Controls - These are discussed in the Access Control Domain. For our purposes here, these can provide us with physical security means of access control. When combined, they form multi-factor systems that increase reliability and reduce the possibility of errors. Additionally, these can be combined with guards to have the best of all worlds. However, be careful if you provide the guard the ability to bypass these systems and allow someone to enter. Remember that guards can be the victims of social engineering. Card Access - Smart cards, Magnetic Stripe cards, Proximity Cards Biometric Access Methods - Fingerprint, retina scans, signature dynamics, voice recognition, hand geometry © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Compartmentalized Areas CISSP Review Seminar v7 Compartmentalized Areas Physical (Environmental) Security Extremely Sensitive Location Most Stringent Security Controls Multi-layered Physical Access Controls Compartmentalized Areas - Extremely Sensitive Location - A compartmentalized area defines an actual location where sensitive equipment and information is operated and/or stored. It includes establishing restricted zones where only sensitive or classified information may be processed or stored. Often called a specialized compartment information facility (SCIF). Most Stringent Security Controls - Because of the information being protected, these areas use the most stringent physical security controls available. Multi-layered Physical Access Controls - The controls protecting these facilities are layered to provide additional confidence. Intrusion Detection Systems are often required in areas that contain compartmentalized information. Can be installed on: Windows Doors Ceilings Walls Any other entry points such as ventilation openings or air conditioning openings © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Data Center or Server Room Security CISSP Review Seminar v7 Data Center or Server Room Security Physical (Environmental) Security Walls Multi-factor Access Controls Data Center or Server Room Security - When possible, we do not want to place data centers and server rooms on external walls. External walls must absorb the blast of an attack. When located in the internal part of the building, data centers and server room walls provide additional security. Walls - Ideally, our walls on these critical rooms should be made of solid, fire-proof materials and be a permanent part of the floor and ceiling to ensure that it is difficult or nearly impossible for a potential intruder to dig under or climb over the wall and get into these areas. Be particularly sensitive to “drop ceilings” in rooms. In most cases, the walls are not load bearing walls and to reduce cost, they do not go much above the height of the drop ceiling. Besides intrusion deterrence, slab-to-slab walls also provide fire protection by preventing the rapid spread of fire.   Multi-factor Access Controls - Smart cards, biometric devices, locks © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Computer Equipment Protections CISSP Review Seminar v7 Computer Equipment Protections Physical (Environmental) Security Computer equipment security Portable device security Objects placed inside security containers Computer Equipment Protections - Computer Equipment Security - Involves protecting the device, protecting the data on the device, and keeping the security controls easy for the user. Portable Device Security - Includes items such as locking mechanisms for docking stations, tracing software, audible motion alarm, encryption software, constant control procedures, inventory system, and Anti-virus software. Naturally, there are many things that we will do to protect our information objects. In the other domains we talk about the protecting objects at the application layer and in the cryptography domain we talk about encrypting the data. In this domain, we use physical security containers such as safes and lock boxes. A good lock combination is something that is not easy to guess. Objects placed inside security containers - Sensitive and Critical objects should be placed inside security containers, such as safes, vaults, or locking file cabinets. Should be theft-resistant and fire-resistant. Steel containers with a locking device. Create good lock combinations, change them frequently, and monitor the distribution. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design CISSP Review Seminar v7 Domain Agenda Physical (Environmental) Security Introduction Layered Defense Model Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Facility and Infrastructure Criteria © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design CISSP Review Seminar v7 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Physical (Environmental) Security Managing the physical environment to reduce crime Relationships between People and Environments Three Key Strategies of CPTED Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design - This is a topic that is often discussed within the law enforcement and military communities. As a CISSP, you should be familiar with the concepts of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). There is significant evidence that examines human behavior in different types of environments and how this behavior can be modified by changing the environment. Essentially, people respond to factors within the environment, including security controls. The goal is to reduce opportunities for crime that may be inherent in some structural designs. On the next slide we will talk about some examples. Managing the physical environment to reduce crime - The physical environment of a building is changed or managed to produce behavioral effects that will assist in reducing the incidence and fear of crime. Relationships between People and Environments - Focuses on the relationships between the social behavior of people and the environments. Three Key Strategies of CPTED - Territoriality - People protect territory that is their own. Surveillance - High degree of visual control. Access Control - Limit access and control the flow of access. If you look at these strategies closely, you will notice that these are design strategies and are not based on the controls themselves. CPTED focuses on how facilities are designed and how security controls are more effective when integrated into the design, not on the specific controls used. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design CISSP Review Seminar v7 Domain Agenda Physical (Environmental) Security Introduction Layered Defense Model Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Facility and Infrastructure Criteria © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Site Location Considerations CISSP Review Seminar v7 Site Location Considerations Physical (Environmental) Security Site Security Considerations CPTED part of this Process Site Location Considerations - Most security professionals will work for facilities that already exist. However, if the CISSP is involved in the building of a new facility, there are security concerns that need to be addressed from the beginning stages. Site Security Considerations - Where the building is located, how it should be built, what is nearby. Examples include: Airport Highway Military Base Emergency support systems Crime Natural disasters Each of these will have a different affect on our security plans. Although an airport nearby provides easy access for travel, it also adds the risk that a plane could land short of the runway and hit our building or that the noise from the aircraft could cause our employees to be unhappy. CPTED part of this Process - CPTED should be a integral part of this process. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Facility Construction Considerations CISSP Review Seminar v7 Facility Construction Considerations Physical (Environmental) Security Doors Windows Entry Points Facility Construction Considerations - Here is a list of some areas that cause us concern. We should address as many of these as possible during the design and construction of the facility. Doors play a key role in our physical security program. It is important to note that emergency exits include those doors that do not have any outside hardware. Let’s look at some of our concerns. Doors - Hollow-core versus solid-core - Hollow-core doors provide little security to the room behind them. They are easily breached and provide very limited barrier to fire. Isolation of critical areas - Critical areas must be isolated from the general public and employee traffic. Security doors combined with CPTED can help by selecting areas “off the beaten path” for our critical areas such as server rooms. Lighting of doorways - Lighting, especially around doorways, plays a major role in our security efforts. Contact Devices (switches) - Doors can be controlled by contact devices, but as we discussed in the Security Management Domain, it’s best to keep human intervention to a minimum. If doors can be remotely control by computer-controlled switches after the right identification and authentication has occurred, so much the better. A guard with a switch that opens doors can be problematic. Mantraps (double door systems) - Mantraps are a unique implementation of a door. They have the ability to “trap” an individual in the entrance if the individual fails to provide the right identification to the system. This is one of the times that it can be helpful to have a guard with a switch that could use the mantrap as a tool to limited access or possibly contain an unauthorized access. Protection of human life is the top priority - Therefore, we must ensure that our security plans do not result in undue risks to individuals - especially during emergencies. Good security practices are: Door should be solid core door. Door should not open out except as required by building codes. Door locks should provide both daytime locks, such as push-button lock (while the room is occupied), and 24-hour locks, such as deadbolt locks for after business hours. Door hinges should be fixed to the frames with a minimum of three hinges per door. Door frame should be permanently fixed to the adjoining wall studs. Fire-resistant doors should be rated same as walls. Directional opening - Exterior doors, opening out, should have hinge pins sealed (welded) so they can't be removed. Forcible entry (doors & frames). Emergency egress (markings/hardware). Monitored/alarmed. Emergency entry (power outage/fire). Windows - Standard plate glass - The most common type of window is standard plate glass. It is easy to cut for any size window and can shatter into dangerous jagged shards if broken. This is especially a problem during a bomb blast as the flying glass adds to the blast effects and can be just as deadly. Tempered glass - Is five-to-seven times more break-resistant than plate glass and it shatters into small fragments when broken. Because of this shattering, tempered glass must be pre-cut to the exact size of the window. We often see this in automobile windows. Acrylic materials - Windows can also be made from acrylic materials. Standard acrylics are not as strong as polycarbonate acrylics but they are more resistant to breakage than plate glass. The disadvantages to acrylics are that they burn and produce toxic fumes. They also scratch fairly easy and can become hazy over time. Polycarbonate windows - Glass and polycarbonate combinations combine the best quality of glass and acrylics. Polycarbonate windows are made from plastic that is significantly stronger than standard acrylic of the same thickness. Glass-clad polycarbonate combines the best qualities of glass and acrylics. They are used in high security windows that are resistant to abrasion, chemicals, fires, and even anti-ballistic, but are very expensive. Because they are so expensive, they are usually limited to high-security areas. Other window considerations - Shatter-resistant, laminated glass of a minimum thickness (based on the risk assessment) should be used. Windows should be installed in fixed frames so that the windowpanes cannot be removed from the outside. Window frames must be securely anchored to the wall. If the organization has high-security needs, windows could be alarmed, contain steel wire mesh, or be protected by steel bars. Windows that can be opened by employees (other than during emergencies) adds risk to our physical security situation. If this practice is accepted by management, a compensating control (such as a person walking around to ensure an unoccupied office does not have an open window) is appropriate - even during daylight hours. Here are some additional types of glass, treatments, and sensors: Laminated Glass Wired Glass Solar Window Films Window Security Films Glass Breakage Sensors Entry Points - Primary & secondary entrances Windows Roof access Maintenance entrance Emergency exits Loading docks © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Infrastructure Support Systems CISSP Review Seminar v7 Infrastructure Support Systems Physical (Environmental) Security Infrastructure Support Systems Key Threats to Support Systems Infrastructure Support Systems - The common infrastructure support systems such as power and water utilities are out of the direct control of the security professional. Therefore, the security professional must consider the impact to the information systems if one or more of these systems are interrupted. We will discuss this in detail in the BCP Domain, but for now, understand that these can have physical security concerns. For example, if the sewage system backs-up, employees may be forced out of the building. If that is not possible, they may prop doors, emergency doors, and exits open, bypassing those controls. Infrastructure Support Systems - Include: Electrical power Water/plumbing Steam lines Gas lines Heating Ventilation Refrigeration Sewage Key Threats to Support Systems - Fire - Damage & destruction of facilities/equipment Water - Flooding/dripping Power Loss - Disruption/stop in operations Gas Leakage - Explosion HVAC failure - Overheating/overcooling Sewage backup/breakage - Work areas inhabitable Notice that they closely mirror the threats to the infrastructure itself. We need to maintain the optimum operational conditions for our systems - clean air free of contaminants, relative humidity between 40-60% (though some facilities prefer 45-55%). And temperature between 20-22 degrees C or 70-74 degrees F. Temperature is mostly for the comfort of operators and users, but low humidity can cause electrostatic discharge, whereas high humidity causes condensation and corrosion. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Abiding by the Fire Codes CISSP Review Seminar v7 Fire Concerns Physical (Environmental) Security Best Practices Abiding by the Fire Codes Fire Containment System (floors, vents, HVAC) Fire Extinguishing System (permanent & mobile) Fire Prevention Training and Drills Fire Concerns - Fire can be a significant problem for us so we will spend several slides talking about it and the countermeasures available to us. Best Practices - Abiding by the Fire Codes - It’s important that we abide by all applicable fire codes. Often, these are unique to each area and industry. Therefore, proper research must be conducted to ensure adherence. Fire Containment System (floors, vents, HVAC) - Proper building design will include several methods to contain fires. Fire-resistant floors and ceilings make it difficult for fire to move from one area to another. HVAC systems should shut down when a fire is detected so they do not spread smoke. This also limits the amount of oxygen supplied to the fire. Fire Extinguishing System (permanent & mobile) - Once a fire begins, these systems must put the fire out as soon as possible. Therefore, a combination of permanent and portable systems should be employed. Often mobile systems can be employed to extinguish a fire while it is still small. These systems also provide the ability for employees to fight their way out of the building, through the fire if necessary. Fire Prevention Training and Drills - Training and drills provide detailed instructions to employees on procedures to follow in the event of a fire emergency. This ensures that employees understand the priorities and what to do in case of a fire. Fire prevention drills also assist management with personnel accountability during an emergency by ensuring that employees know where to go (evacuation assembly point) and how to account for the safety of all personnel. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Fire Protection Fire Prevention Fire Detection Fire Suppression CISSP Review Seminar v7 Fire Protection Physical (Environmental) Security Fire Prevention Fire Detection Fire Suppression Fire Protection - All of these combined are “fire protection,” which refers to detecting fires, protecting people, and minimizing the damage to equipment if our prevention fails and a fire starts. Life safety issues include communications, alarms, routes of exit, and refuge areas so we must pay close attention to these. We will look at each of these three bullets in more detail on the following slides.   Fire Prevention - Reduces causes of fire by: Using fire resistant materials for walls, doors, and furnishings. Reducing the amount of combustible papers around electrical equipment. Providing fire-prevention training to employees - Remember, life safety is the most important issue. Conducting fire drills on all shifts so that personnel know how to safely exit a building. Fire Detection - Alerts personnel to the presence of a fire before it becomes a more serious problem. Fire detection systems are readily available and effective. Several types of detectors are available: Ionization-type smoke detectors detect charged particles in smoke. Optical (Photoelectric) detectors react to light blockage caused by smoke. Fixed or rate-of-rise temperature sensors - Heat detectors that react to the heat of a fire. Combinations are usually used for the most effective means of detecting a fire. Fire Suppression - Used to extinguish and contain a fire so as to minimize damage. Carbon Dioxide (CO2) extinguishers provide a colorless, odorless chemical that displaces oxygen in the air. Inert gases such as Argon and products such as FM200 are alternatives to Halon. Water Sprinkler Systems - Water could be a conductor of electricity and may compound the problems in computer rooms. “Pre-action” or “dry-pipe” system - Water is held back by a valve and is released when the sensor activates. The pipes then fill with water and the sprinkler system engages. In computer rooms and those areas with electrical equipment, this allows for the systems to be shutdown before the water is released. In fact, many of these systems are wired into the power systems for the computer equipment to ensure this happens. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Fire Types and Suppression CISSP Review Seminar v7 Fire Types and Suppression Physical (Environmental) Security Class Type Suppression Agents Common combustibles Water, foam, dry chemicals Liquid Gas, CO2, foam, dry chemicals Electrical Gas, CO2, dry chemicals Combustible metals Dry powders K Cooking Media (fats) Wet chemicals Fire Types and Suppression - Combustion Elements - Fuel, Oxygen, Temperature Suppression Methods versus Combustion Elements - CO2 & foam reduces access to oxygen. Water reduces temperature. Gas (Halon/Halon substitutes) interfere with chemical reaction between elements. CO2 - Gaseous carbon dioxide is 1.5 times denser than air. Therefore, it will be found in greater concentrations at lower levels. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) warns that high concentrations of CO2 can displace oxygen, and cause death if inhaled. This is especially important as CO2 will remain in lower levels such as open pits and areas below grade, thus necessitating the ventilation of such areas prior to re-entry. Types of Suppression Systems - Flooding or area coverage - The suppression agent is discharged through installed pipes designed to protect personnel and extinguish the fire. Zones of coverage Timed release HVAC off before activation Water and Gas (e.g., Halon substitutes are common choices) Water offers conventional or pre-action (“dry pipe”) options Gas best used in pre-action, time delay mode - Halon concentration of <10% can be breathed Portable extinguishers - Are used to minimize fire damage. Filled with approved/applicable suppression agent, they should be located within 50 feet of any electrical equipment and at exits. Personnel should not attempt to extinguish the fire unless it is safe to do so. It is usually best to get the people out and let the professional firefighters fight the fire. Portable extinguishers are clearly marked, located in an area with an unobstructed view, easily reached, operated by average-sized personnel, and inspected quarterly. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Restricted by1987 Montreal Protocol CISSP Review Seminar v7 Halon Gas Physical (Environmental) Security Restricted by1987 Montreal Protocol Many jurisdictions require removal of Halon Replacement alternatives for Halon Halon Gas - In existing Halon systems, full-discharge testing should be avoided because of the expense to recharge the Halon and the limited availability of replacement Halon. Restricted by 1987 Montreal Protocol - New Halon installation was banned in 1992, by the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Many jurisdictions require removal of Halon - There is a European directive (EU Regulation 2037/2000) requiring most Halon fire extinguishers and suppression systems to be removed. By ‘most’ we mean those that are not military or aerospace driven, although U.S. military is removing all Halon systems. Halon gas - comprised of chlorofluorocarbon compounds (CFC), a factor in the depletion of the ozone layer - reacts with oxygen to prevent combustion. Replacement alternatives for Halon - Include: PFC-410 or CEA-410, PFC-218 or CEA-308, NAF S-III, FE 13, Argon, Argonite, Inergen, FM-200. These Halon replacements do not release ozone depleting substances into the atmosphere. Water - The Fire Protection and Insurance Industries support the use of water as the primary fire extinguishing agent for all business environments, including those dependent on Information Systems. CO2 - Is colorless, odorless, and potentially lethal in that it removes oxygen from the air making it unable to support life. These systems are best for unattended facilities, but if are used in manned areas, a delay should be installed providing time for personnel to exit the area. Gas masks give no protection as there is not enough oxygen. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Other Infrastructure Threats CISSP Review Seminar v7 Other Infrastructure Threats Physical (Environmental) Security Gas Leakage Water Threats Loss of Electrical Power Loss of HVAC Other Infrastructure Threats - Gas Leakage - Gas leaks can create their own set of problems for us. However, in most cases, we sense the danger and with some planning and rehearsals we can shut-off the gas and vent the area before an explosion occurs. However, as with most items in this domain, it requires planning and rehearsals to ensure everyone knows what to do and when. Identify location and test the main Shut-Off valve. Secure the natural gas line (using layered defenses). Communicate natural gas line design to the fire department. Clearly mark shut-off valves. Water Threats - As we already mentioned, water can be a problem for us. Therefore, we must plan our actions to counter its threat. In the case of flooding, our BCP plans must come to the rescue to allow us to continue operations. We can address water threats by using: Water Detection Sensors to detect the presence of water and sound an alarm. Raised Floors provide an opportunity for us to detect and react to water threats before the water can damage equipment. Emergency Shut-off Valves should be clearly labeled and turned periodically to ensure they function properly. Server room above ground level provides some protection against flooding. Water pipes not located above server rooms ensures that an accidental plumbing problem does not cause flooding in the server room. Loss of Electrical Power - A clean and steady electrical power supply is a necessity in order to ensure business continuity. Any outage or malfunction in electrical power can result in serious damage, such as loss of data or money, equipment break down, or work interruptions. In this respect, it is essential to have power generation equipment that can be engaged prior to a planned outage or activated when an actual outage of primary power occurs. This equipment should be sized to carry the maximum load of the facility (including AC). It is also good to have a spare generator available in case one fails. Ensure that critical power feeders and switch facilities are properly protected from physical destruction. Depending on budgets and critical business operations, an organization might choose which equipment and workstations should have a backup power, and which ones are not critical and, therefore, may not seriously impact business operations in the event of a failure. Goal is to have “clean and steady power” Dedicated feeders Alternate power source Access Controls Secure breaker and transformer rooms. Surge Suppressors UPS and UPS Testing Electrical Facilities separated from Data Center. Generators Power Controls Have an Emergency Power Off (EPO) switch that allows someone to shut down the power. Install a power line monitor that detects and records fluctuations in voltage. Ensure there is enough backup battery power to conduct an orderly shutdown to avoid data loss or device damage. Loss of HVAC - HVAC controls for IT equipment must be separate from that of the building at large and protected to ensure that they are not accidentally adjusted for human comfort. HVAC control considerations: Location Independence of the data center air conditioning system from the rest of the building Access controls Appropriate maintenance of: Temperature Humidity levels Air quality Documented maintenance procedures © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Types of Electrical Power Faults CISSP Review Seminar v7 Types of Electrical Power Faults Physical (Environmental) Security Complete Loss of Power Power Degradation Interference (noise) Types of Electrical Power Faults - As CISSPs, it is important to know these and use these terms properly when discussing situations with other professionals and among ourselves. Complete Loss of Power - Blackout - Prolonged loss of commercial power Fault - Momentary loss of power Power Degradation - Brownout - Intentional reduction of voltage by the utility company for a prolonged period of time Sag/Dip - A short period of low voltage Surge - Sudden rise in voltage in the power supply Transients - Line noise that is superimposed on the supply circuit. Line noise can be caused by a fluctuation in power. Inrush Current - The initial surge of current required when there is an increase in power demand. This can cause breakers to trip/fail. Electrostatic Discharge - A power surge generated by a person or device contacting another device and transferring a high voltage shock. Interference (noise) - A natural occurrence that happens when unwanted signals are generated in circuits that are in close proximity. Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) - Caused by motors, lightning, etc. Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) - Created by components of electrical system. Caused by electric cables, fluorescent lighting, truck ignition. Noise is a natural occurrence that happens within circuits. Normally, engineers place filters in their equipment to handle the noise generated internally. However, as we put more and more equipment closer and closer together, noise from one device can affect another. If this happens, the best resolution is to separate the two. EMI and RFI are types of noise that we must deal with as IT professionals. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

Define key concepts of physical security CISSP Review Seminar v7 Domain Summary Physical (Environmental) Security Define key concepts of physical security Goals and purpose of layered defenses Principles in site location Building entry points Physical security principles for information system’s security within a building Domain Summary - Areas covered in this domain. © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances

“Security Transcends Technology” CISSP Review Seminar v7 Physical (Environmental) Security “Security Transcends Technology” © (ISC)2 ® 2006, All Rights Reserved For Personal Use of (ISC)2 Seminar Attendee Only Contents May Not Be Copied or Otherwise Distributed Under Any Circumstances