Echo Chambers Robert Putnam & David Campbell A Shock and Two Aftershocks (Sociology 159)

Backdrop: the 1950s Post-WWII, church attendance spikes, mostly mainline Protestants – 1950: 31% attend church weekly, 1957: 51% (all time high) – College-educated male veterans & famiies Shared values – “Judeo-Christian” label emerges at this time – No partisan divide – Social pressure, civic duty – 1957: 69% say that “religion is increasing its influence on American life” 2

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The Shock of the Long Sixties “Long Sixties”: a lot of the things we call “the Sixties” took place in the 1970s Massive onslaught against existing institutions – Government – Sex 1970: 80% of those who reached adulthood in the ‘60s say premarital sex “only sometimes” or “not at all” wrong, 80% of elder generations Subsequent generations more conservative on political, social, religious matter, but don’t revert to tradition on sex Our class: 27% (21) say immoral, 73% (57) say not – Religion – Drugs – “Question Authority” – Emphasis on individual desires (91-94) 4

Christianity in the ‘60s Vatican II: Latin Mass replaced by vernacular Confession all but disappears Papal recognition of other religions’ legitimacy Change in attire Increased role for the laity – Number of individuals identifying as Catholic, but attendance at Mass, especially among young, drops precipitously. Catholics alone account for much of the decline in church attendance during the long ’60s Non-churchgoing mainline Protestants drop the label – Attendance levels remain stable among those who still identify Evangelicals begin to mobilize – Campus Crusade for Christ: 109 employees in 1960, 6,500 by mid-’70s (96-97) 5

The “Nones” “Spiritual” but not religious “Seekers” “Personalism” “Multiple truths” New religions – Unification Church, Transcendental Meditation, Church of Satan, Children of God, Hare Krishna movement, Jesus Freaks, increased interest in Buddhism, Wicca “Sheilaism” – “I believe in God. I am not a fanatic. I can’t remember the last time that I went to church. My faith has carried me a long way. It’s Sheilaism. Just my own little voice... My own Sheilaism... is just try to love yourself and be gentle with yourself. You know, I guess, take care of each other.” (93) 6

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The First Aftershock “Just as in politics, many Americans of all ages were deeply troubled by the moral and religious developments of the Sixties. – For the next two decades, these people—conservative in both religion and politics—swelled the ranks both of evangelical Protestant denominations and of the rapidly growing evangelical megachurches that disavowed denominations and termed themselves simply “Christian.” (103) Notice: institutional crisis penetrates even the conservative reaction. Does not strengthen the mainline denominations. 8

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The First Aftershock The Sixties were “an age of turmoil that many Americans found deeply repugnant to their fundamental moral and religious views.” – In 2006, ¾ evangelicals agree that “there are absolutely clear guidelines as to what is good and what is evil” “The evangelical stance was perfectly suited to Americans deeply alienated from the culture of the Sixties. Some of these people had evangelical roots and thus were inclined (unlike their counterparts in other tradtions) to renew their religious involvement, while others were drawn into evangelical circles for the first time.” – In 2006, “after a quarter century of rising national prominence and power, more than 2/3” of evangelicals “said that they felt their values were ‘seriously’ or ‘moderately threatened in America today,’ a sense of embattlement greater than any other major religious tradition.” ( ) 10

The First Aftershock “The first aftershock was caused by many things, to be sure, but a central theme was concern over collapsing sexual morality.” (117) – “Religiosity and conservative politics became increasingly aligned, and abortion and gay rights became emblematic of the emergent culture wars.” – “To many religious Americans, this alignment of religion and politics represented a long-sought consummation, an appropriate retort to the excesses of the Sixties. Many other Americans were not so sure.” (120) 11

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The Second Aftershock By 1990, according to one survey, many young Americans “came to view religion... as judgmental, homophobic, hypocritical, and too political.” (121) “Nones”, which had steadily accounted for 5- 7% of the population until ~1990 – Not necessarily atheist 13

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Who are the Nones? Except for being disproportionately young, not much different from national population More likely men, whites, and non-Southerners Mostly not atheists or agnostics. Disproportionately raised in nonreligious households (but 16% of Americans in 2007 were nones, but only 7% from nonreligious backgrounds) Because the rise of the nones was so abrupt, unlikely due to historical process of secularization Heavily drawn from the center and left of the political spectrum – Change of opinion on homosexuality almost exactly simultaneous with rise of nones ( ) 16

The Nones While no strong claims made about causation, “The dramatic contrast between a young generation increasingly liberal on certain moral and lifestyle issues (though still potentially open to religious feelings and ideals) and an older generation of religious leaders who seemed to them consumed by the political fight against gay marriage was one important source of the second aftershock.” – “This group of young people came of age when ‘religion’ was identified with the Religious Right” and the fight against homosexuality and gay marriage, exactly the issues on which this group was most tolerant (130) 17

The Nones “The new nones reported that ‘they became unaffiliated, at least in part, because they think of religious people as hypocritical, judgmental, or insincere.” Many also “because they think that religious organizations focus too much on rules and not enough on spirituality.” Growing gap between evangelicals and the rest of America on sexual morality (131) 18

Fluidity & Continuity Though there has been much change, “in important ways the landscape of American religion has remained remarkably stable through this turbulent half century.” – What has changed in the decline in religious moderates, and numbers have shifted to a religious right and a secular left But importantly: “History never ends.” ( ) 19

The correlation between religiosity and conservative politics ha primarily to do with two topics: – Abortion – Homosexuality Pre- ~1980, support for or opposition to abortion rights was not uniform within political parties. – Abortion initially seen as a Catholic issue Attitudes toward these two subjects are shifting among both religious and nonreligious Americans – More accepting of homosexuality, more skeptical of abortion rights If the religious association were to disappear, we would expect to see religion be less correlated to conservative politics ( , ) 20

Association between the highly religious and the Republican party not uniform across groups 70% highly religious evangelicals & Mormons identify as Republicans 65% highly religious mainline Protestants 35% highly religious Catholics 14% highly religious Black Protestants A tendency is not a certainty ( ) 21

Generation Gap 11.3 REMEMBER TO EXPLAIN R VALUE. The interest is in the increase, NOT in its predictive power 22

Enthusiasm Gap Most Americans have views somewhere in the space between advocating the right to abortion in all cases and banning it absolutely – “Pro-choice, but...” But those who oppose it absolutely tend to feel more strongly than those who support access to abortion as an absolute right The same is true of same-sex marriage (394) 25

This has led to the Republican Party placing much more visible emphasis on their opposition to these issues than the Democrats do any support Take the case presented as a not-necessarily representative example. It’s for an election in Ohio – The Republicans have thus been able to frame themselves as a party representing traditional morality & religion – Democrats tend to be perceived as neutral to religion If the trend among the young to turn away from religion and the unpopularity of the religious right continue, it is not clear that being the party of religion will continue to be an electoral strength ( ) 28

Same-Sex Marriage Opinions on gay marriage have been shifting rapidly Both the most religious post-boomer and the least religious pre-boomer are 32% likely to support gay marriage – As younger generations, who are more accepting of gay marriage, come to dominate a greater share of the electorate, opposition to same-sex marriage will become a less attractive electoral wedge Nonetheless, pockets of intense resistence are expected to remain ( ) 30

Though both significantly less likely to be religious and much more sexually permissive than their elders, young are more ambivalent about abortion than are baby boomers General Social Survey: in how many of the following circumstances would you approve of an abortion? – If there is a strong chance of serious defects in the baby – If the woman is married and does not want any more children – If the woman’s own health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy – If the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children – If the woman became pregnant as a result of rape – If the woman is not married and does not want to marry the man ( ) Note: “approve of” is conceptually different from “should it be legal”. 32

What explains the ups & downs? Possibilities – Political framing by leadership Achievement of women’s liberation, possibility of overturning Roe V. Wade, popularity of parental consent laws, etc. – Availability of birth control Unwanted pregnancy seen as lapse of responsibility – No knowledge of world without abortion rights – Ultrasounds ( ) “The Juno Generation” – Ugh! 34

Electoral politics is partly a matter of finding issues that mobilize enough voters to show up on election day As different issues become politically salient, different coalitions emerge 35