Office of Force Transformation Transforming National Security “A Future Worth Creating” Vision: Broad and Sustained Competitive Advantage Strategy Capabilities Cost/Metrics

Office of Force Transformation Dinosaurs Source: Walking with Dinosaurs, © 1999 Courtesy: British Broadcasting Corporation

Office of Force Transformation Transforming Defense The Role of Defense in National Security The Management of Defense The Force As National Strategy As Corporate Strategy As Risk Management Strategy Vision: Broad and Sustained Competitive Advantage

Office of Force Transformation Security Environment … Four Challenges No hard boundaries distinguishing one category from another Lower Higher LIKELIHOOD VULNERABILITY Catastrophic Those seeking to paralyze American leadership & power by employing WMD or WMD-like effects in unwarned attacks on symbolic, critical or other high-value targets (e.g., 9/11, terrorist use of WMD, rogue missile attack) Likelihood: moderate and increasing Vulnerability: unacceptable; single event could alter American way of life Irregular Those seeking to erode American influence and power by employing unconventional or irregular methods (e.g., terrorism, insurgency, civil war and emerging concepts like “unrestricted warfare”) Likelihood: very high; strategy of the weak Vulnerability: moderate, if not effectively checked Disruptive Those seeking to usurp American power and influence by acquiring breakthrough capabilities (e.g., sensors, information, biotechnology, miniaturization on the molecular level, cyber-operations, space, directed-energy and other emerging fields) Likelihood: Low, but time works against U.S. Vulnerability: unknown; strategic surprise puts American security at risk ? ? ? Traditional Those seeking to challenge American power by instigating traditional military operations with legacy and advanced military capabilities (e.g., conventional air, sea and land forces and nuclear forces of established nuclear powers) Likelihood: decreasing (absent preemption) due to historic capability-overmatch and expanding qualitative lead Vulnerability: low, only if transformation is balanced

Office of Force Transformation Concept Development, Planning, Programming and Budgeting Process Service / Joint Transformation Roadmaps 2004 Transformation Planning Guidance December 2004 Strategic Transformation Appraisal November 2004 Fiscal Guidance (in lieu of JPG) FY FY2011 Joint Operations Concepts November 2003 President’s Budget FY2007 National Military Strategy 2004 Service Budget / Program Change Proposals FY FY2011 Joint Operating Concepts Joint Functional Concepts Joint Integrating Concepts Capabilities Based Assessment 2004

Office of Force Transformation Translates an Information Advantage into a decisive Warfighting Advantage Characterized by: Information sharing Shared situational awareness Knowledge of commander’s intent Warfighting Advantage - exploits behavioral change and new doctrine to enable: Self-synchronization Speed of command Increased combat power Information Advantage - enabled by the robust networking of well informed geographically dispersed forces Military Response to Information Age: Network Centric Warfare Information Sharing is a New Source of Power

Office of Force Transformation High Speed at Sea

Office of Force Transformation High Speed at Sea

Office of Force Transformation Operationally Responsive Space …TACSAT 1 Responsive < 2 Yr concept to on-orbit capability Low Cost Total cost of experiment less than $15M including launch Experiment UAV Components in Space Space/Air Horizontal Integration Designer Payloads TCP/IP Based: SIPR Net Accessed New commercial launch vehicle Operationally relevant capability Integrated into Combatant Commanders Exercises/Experiments Time / Capability Trade Off Falcon A capability on orbit within the planning time constraints of a major contingency

Office of Force Transformation Project “Sheriff” …Controlling the engagement timelines The Capabilities “Speed-of-light Sensing Networked Lethal/Non-Lethal Options Active/Passive Options Kinetic/Non-Kinetic Options Survivability The Technology Compact Active-Denial Technology Phraselator High-Power Direction Hailer Vector-Beam High-Power White/IR Spot Light Counter Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Active Protection Counter Sniper Rapid-Fire Kinetic Weapon Multi-Spectral Sensor Suite Armor Protection Integrated Electronic Warfare Suite Net-Centric Technology

Office of Force Transformation Rebalance focus from “Traditional” to “Irregular,” “Catastrophic” and “Disruptive” challenges Adopt cost as a strategy Both cost of war and program costs –Create cost-suppressing strategies –Transform non-discretionary areas –Address cost imposing strategies against our adversaries Transform management of key functions –Realign information activities management under CIO –Achieve demand-centered joint intelligence –Organize joint logistics around the battlefield, not around the supplier –Make generational S&T integral to the defense strategy Strategic Transformation Appraisal …Recommendations

Office of Force Transformation Fuel Prices The standard Defense Energy Supply Center fuel price in FY02 was $1.337 per gallon (average price of fuels sold) But the true cost of these fuels when delivered to weapons platforms is much higher A gallon of fuel delivered through a tanker in-flight costs $17.50 To deliver a gallon of fuel to the front line costs about $15; to deliver a gallon of fuel far beyond the front line (e.g. to SOF positions) costs hundreds of dollars per gallon The delivery cost to land forces in IRAQ was $130/gal Source: The DSB TF on Improving Fuel Efficiency of Weapons Platforms, January 2001 These delivered fuel costs are not used in the military investment decisions; this produces a sub-optimal force

Office of Force Transformation Fuel Logistics Burden Fuel comprises 70% of Army tonnage shipped –Armored division requires approximately 600,000 gallons per day –Air assault division requires approximately 300,000 gallons per day It costs the Army about 16 times as much to deliver fuel as to purchase it –$200M per year of fuel –$3.2B per year to maintain 20,000 active duty and 40,000 reserve personnel to move it Required frequent fuel deliveries increase complexity of military operations and hamper battlefield effectiveness 55% of fuel delivered to the battlefield is for support, not combat vehicles Source: The DSB TF on Improving Fuel Efficiency of Weapons Platforms, January 2001

Office of Force Transformation Conclusions Roadmap Analysis Identified an Unmet Need for … Horizontally integrating across federal agencies and vertically integrating federal, state and local governments & agencies Matching strategic, operational and tactical reach of U.S. forces with the ability to sustain it with materiel and intelligence Denying the enemy the use of sensors against our land-based or sea-based forces, and air forces when they are on the ground Addressing defensive measures for the directed energy battlespace, where broad range of directed energy devices can be used against U.S. forces

Office of Force Transformation OFT Transformation Goals Make force transformation an integral element of national defense strategy and DoD corporate strategy effectively supporting the four strategic pillars of national military strategy. Change the force and its culture from the bottom up through the use of experimentation, transformational articles (operational prototyping), and the creation and sharing of new knowledge and experiences. Implement Network Centric Warfare (NCW) as the theory of war for the information age and the organizing principle for national military planning and joint concepts, capabilities and systems. Get the decision rules and metrics right and cause them to be applied enterprise wide. Discover, create or cause to be created new military capabilities to broaden the capabilities base and to mitigate risk.