IG International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation Andrew Minister, Project Manager Soviet-Designed Reactor Safety Program “Fire Safety Analysis Methods at Russian Nuclear Power Plants” December 2000 U.S. Department of Energy International Nuclear Safety Program

IG International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation Soviet-Designed Reactor Safety Program Problems: Inadequate operating procedures and trainingInadequate operating procedures and training Design deficienciesDesign deficiencies Lack of infrastructure to sustain safe operationLack of infrastructure to sustain safe operation Weak regulatory authorityWeak regulatory authority Percent of Electricity from Nuclear Power (1999) RussiaCzech Republic UkraineBulgariaHungarySlovakiaLithuania Armenia Kazakhstan

IG International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation Soviet-Designed-Reactor Safety ApproachApproach –Provide training, technology, and physical improvements at selected lead plants –Conduct projects in a fashion that enables host countries to extend improvements independently –Seek to establish a strong, indigenous nuclear safety culture in each host country by example and by exposure to International nuclear safety practices –To help develop strong, independent regulatory bodies with the capabilities to regulate nuclear activities.

IG International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation Engineering and Technology Reduce risks by physically upgrading the safety systems of nuclear power plantsReduce risks by physically upgrading the safety systems of nuclear power plants Projects organized intoProjects organized into –Safety parameter display systems –Safety system equipment –Fire safety

IG International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation Engineering and Technology Fire SafetyFire Safety –Transfer tools, equipment, and training to reduce fire risks –Equipment provided includes Fire rated doors and framesFire rated doors and frames Fire Barrier penetration sealsFire Barrier penetration seals Non-flammable floor coating and sealantNon-flammable floor coating and sealant Fire detection and alarm systemsFire detection and alarm systems Protective gear for fire fightersProtective gear for fire fighters Hose nozzlesHose nozzles –Projects under way in Armenia, Ukraine, Russia, and Bulgaria Desnagorsk Fire Station fireman

IG International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation Engineering and Technology Fire-retardant material "Promatec" coats cables and seals floor penetration Fire door manufactured at the Atomremmash plant

IG International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation Engineering and Technology Fire-resistant floors in the reactor building

IG International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation Engineering and Technology Fire Safety – Fire Hazards Analysis Identify the most dangerous fire risks that could damage safety systems needed to safely shut down the reactorIdentify the most dangerous fire risks that could damage safety systems needed to safely shut down the reactor –Safe-shutdown analysis methodology meeting international standards developed for Soviet-designed reactors. –Reactor Core Protection Evaluation Methodology for Fires at RBMK and VVER Nuclear Power Plants –Russian and Ukrainian specialists trained on safe-shutdown analysis methods –Safe-shutdown analyses in progress Smolensk Unit 3, RussiaSmolensk Unit 3, Russia Zaporizhzhya Unit 5, UkraineZaporizhzhya Unit 5, Ukraine

IG International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation

IG International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation Fire Hazards Analysis Methodology ObjectivesObjectives –Systematically Evaluate the Safety Significance of Fires –Identify and prioritize the areas for Safety Upgrades –Identify and Evaluate Alternative Fixes

IG International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation Fire Hazards Analysis Methodology Screening EvaluationScreening Evaluation –Based on “Reactor Core Protection Evaluation Methodology” RCPEM (DOE/NE Rev-1) –Detailed Evaluation Based on Room Specific Fire Impact Evaluation on Safe Shutdown SystemsBased on Room Specific Fire Impact Evaluation on Safe Shutdown Systems

IG International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation Deterministic Evaluation (RCPEM) Define Safe Shutdown SystemsDefine Safe Shutdown Systems Identify Safety Related Equipment/CablesIdentify Safety Related Equipment/Cables Identify Fire Compartment/Cells and Fire Protection FeaturesIdentify Fire Compartment/Cells and Fire Protection Features Collect Cable Routing and Equipment Location DataCollect Cable Routing and Equipment Location Data Develop Computerized Data Base (Access)Develop Computerized Data Base (Access) Identify Fire Compartment/Cells Impacting More Than One Shutdown PathIdentify Fire Compartment/Cells Impacting More Than One Shutdown Path

IG International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation Determine Fire-Caused Initiating Events Determine Fire Caused Initiating EventsDetermine Fire Caused Initiating Events Determine Impact of Fire Compartment/Cell on Individual Safe Shutdown EquipmentDetermine Impact of Fire Compartment/Cell on Individual Safe Shutdown Equipment Develop Dependency Matrices Illustrating System DependenciesDevelop Dependency Matrices Illustrating System Dependencies Develop/Modify the System models to account for Fire Impact including the related Human ActionsDevelop/Modify the System models to account for Fire Impact including the related Human Actions Identify the Success paths to Safe Shutdown and the associated Success ProbabilitiesIdentify the Success paths to Safe Shutdown and the associated Success Probabilities

IG International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation Smolensk Unit-3 RBMK-1000RBMK-1000 VNIIAES - Primary ContractorVNIIAES - Primary Contractor Fire Hazards Analysis Completed – December 2000Fire Hazards Analysis Completed – December 2000 Potential Vulnerabilities IdentifiedPotential Vulnerabilities Identified Corrective Action Plans Being DevelopedCorrective Action Plans Being Developed

IG International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation Zaporizhzhya Unit-5 VVER-1000VVER-1000 Ukraine: Kiev-ENERGOPROJECTUkraine: Kiev-ENERGOPROJECT Have finished Data Collection, Cable Routing, and Fire Compartment/Cell EvaluationHave finished Data Collection, Cable Routing, and Fire Compartment/Cell Evaluation Currently entering plant data into computerized database (ACCESS)Currently entering plant data into computerized database (ACCESS) Deterministic Analysis will be Completed by June 2001Deterministic Analysis will be Completed by June 2001

IG International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation U.S. Participants in Smolensk Safe Shutdown Analysis Grigory Trosman (DOE)Grigory Trosman (DOE) Rich Denning (PNNL)Rich Denning (PNNL) Andy Minister (PNNL)Andy Minister (PNNL) Ali Azarm (BNL)Ali Azarm (BNL) Bob Kalantari (EPM)Bob Kalantari (EPM) Mike Archdeacon (Bechtel)Mike Archdeacon (Bechtel)

IG International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation Conclusions Where do we go from here?Where do we go from here? – –Implement improvements identified by the fire hazards analysis – –Apply fire hazards analysis techniques to other RBMK and VVER reactors How can you work to improve the safety of your reactors?How can you work to improve the safety of your reactors? – –Openly interact with the workshop participants to discuss fire safety issues at your NPPs – –Identify fire safety issues to your management and regulators to get them addressed