Universals: conceptualism Michael Lacewing

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Presentation transcript:

Universals: conceptualism Michael Lacewing

Ontology What exists? –Particular things –These are classified: whale, animal, living thing, physical object These classifications are not arbitrary – all whales have something in common, all animals do, etc. –‘Being a whale’/’whaleness’ – does this property exist?

Alternatives What do all honest people have in common? Realism: Honesty – this is a noun, and nouns pick out a ‘something’ Nominalism (predicate): the term ‘honest’ applies to them –In virtue of similarities between them Nominalism (conceptualism): they all fall under the concept HONEST

Conceptualism Nominalism: only particular things exist We classify particular things using general concepts ‘Honest’ doesn’t mean the concept HONEST (properties aren’t concepts) –But something has the property honesty in virtue of falling under the concept HONEST

Advantage Not all concepts/general terms have reference, e.g. WITCH Over predicate nominalism: ‘witch’ can’t refer to the resemblances between particulars Over realism: ‘witch’ can’t refer to a universal But ‘witch’ has meaning – derived from the concept WITCH

Objections Where do our concepts/classifications come from? –Must be similarities or resemblance between particulars –But then ‘resemblance’ is itself what is fundamental, not the concept Russell: ‘resemblance’ is a relation, and relations are universals! –What’s the origin of the concept ‘resemblance’? Real similarities

Objections Without universals, we can’t explain our abilities to recognise, categorise or generalise about particulars –But concepts aren’t all-or-nothing, as universals are, e.g. prototype analysis Without universals, explanations fail –E.g. why did the scales move? Because of the weight –The weight of a particular is independent of us, even if the system of weight is not

Discussion General terms may derive their meaning from our concepts, but the story can’t stop their – our concepts must derive from reality Concepts that correspond to reality pick out universals; for concepts that do not, e.g. WITCH, there are no universals Alternative: reality is mind-dependent ?