Computer Science 1 TinySeRSync: Secure and Resilient Time Synchronization in Wireless Sensor Networks Speaker: Sangwon Hyun Acknowledgement: Slides were.

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Presentation transcript:

Computer Science 1 TinySeRSync: Secure and Resilient Time Synchronization in Wireless Sensor Networks Speaker: Sangwon Hyun Acknowledgement: Slides were provided by Dr. Kun Sun

Computer Science 2 Outline Introduction Related Work TinySeRSync: Secure and Resilient Time Synchronization Conclusion and Future Work

Computer Science 3 Introduction Accurate and synchronized time is crucial in many sensor network applications. –the need for consistent distributed sensing and coordination An adversary may certainly attack the time synchronization protocol due to such importance. Traditional time synchronization protocols (e.g., NTP) cannot be directly applied in sensor networks.

Computer Science 4 Related Work Recent time synchronization techniques. –Single-hop Pair-wise Time Synchronization. Receiver-Receiver based schemes. – Elson et al., ACM SIGOPS’02; Sender-Receiver based schemes. –Ganeriwal et al., SenSys’03; –Global Time Synchronization. Clock distribution schemes, –Maroti et al., SenSys’04; Clock agreement schemes. –Li and Rus, INFOCOM’04;

Computer Science 5 Threats Single-hop Pair-wise Time Synchronization. –No message authentication. Manzo et al., SASN’05; Ganeriwal et al., Wise’05 –Time sensitive. Jam and Replay attacks: Ganeriwal et al., Wise’05 Global Time Synchronization. –Insider attacks

Computer Science 6 Our Contributions TinySeRSync: –Phase I Secure single-hop pair-wise time synchronization –Phase II Secure and resilient global time synchronization

Computer Science 7 Phase I: Secure Single-hop Pair-wise Time Synchronization

Computer Science 8 Secure TPSN Ganeriwal et al., Wise’05 Estimate time difference and transmission delay. –Security condition: d < maximum expected delay. –K AB : secret key shared between A and B. –MIC: message integrity code

Computer Science 9 Problems in Secure TPSN Authenticated MAC layer timestamp. –MIC must be available when radio sends the MIC field. Software solution in Secure TPSN –Calculate MIC using TinySec (Karlof et al. SenSys’04) –Works for low data rate radio (e.g., 38.4 kbps in CC1000 used by MICA2). –Does not work for high data rate radio (e.g., 250kbps in CC2420 used by MICAz).

Computer Science 10 Prediction-based MAC Layer Timestamp Sender side: –When channel is clear, it add sending time = current time + constant delay △. △ = us. Receiver side: –When the SFD field is received, it records the time as receiving time.

Computer Science 11 Delay Uncertainty

Computer Science 12 Hardware-assisted, Authenticated MAC Layer Timestamp Hardware security support in CC2420 –Two modes stand-alone mode: 128 bit AES encryption on message in stand-alone buffer. in-line mode: –begin encryption when message are being sent out; –begin decryption after the whole message is received. Using in-line mode, CC2420 can generate a 12-byte MIC on 98-byte message in 99 us

Computer Science 13 Distribution of Secure Single-hop Pair-wise Synchronization Error Experimental result (1 tick = 8.68us)

Computer Science 14 Phase II: Secure and Resilient Global Time Synchronization

Computer Science 15 Secure and Resilient Global Time Synchronization Algorithm  Each node i maintains a local clock time C i.

Computer Science 16 Secure and Resilient Global Time Synchronization Algorithm  Each node i maintains a local clock time C i.  For each neighbor node j, node i maintains a single-hop pair-wise time difference  i,j.

Computer Science 17 Secure and Resilient Global Time Synchronization Algorithm  Each node i maintains a local clock time C i.  For each neighbor node j, node i maintains a single-hop pair-wise time difference  i,j.  A source node S broadcasts its local time C S periodically.

Computer Science 18 Secure and Resilient Global Time Synchronization Algorithm  Each node i maintains a local clock time C i.  For each neighbor node j, node i maintains a single-hop pair-wise time difference  i,j.  A source node S broadcasts its local time C S periodically.  Each direct neighbor node i of node S can obtain a source clock difference  i,S from node S directly. Then, it broadcasts  i,S.

Computer Science 19 Secure and Resilient Global Time Synchronization Algorithm  Each node i maintains a local clock time C i.  For each neighbor node j, node i maintains a single-hop pair-wise time difference  i,j.  A source node S broadcasts its local time C S periodically.  Each direct neighbor node i of node S can obtain a source time difference  i,S from node S directly. Then, it broadcasts  i,S.  For other nodes, to tolerate up to t malicious neighbor nodes, each node i needs to obtain at least 2t+1 source time differences through different neighbor nodes. Node i chooses the median one as  i,S. Then it broadcasts  i,S.

Computer Science 20 Secure and Resilient Global Time Synchronization Algorithm  Each node i maintains a local clock time C i.  For each neighbor node j, node i maintains a single-hop pair-wise time difference  i,j.  A source node S broadcasts its local time C S periodically.  Each direct neighbor node i of node S can obtain a source time difference  i,S from node S directly. Then, it broadcasts  i,S.  For other nodes, to tolerate up to t malicious neighbor nodes, each node i needs to obtain at least 2t+1 source time differences through different neighbor nodes. Node i chooses the median one as  i,S. Then it broadcasts  i,S.  Each node i can estimate the global clock C S by C S = C i +  i,S.

Computer Science 21 How to Distribute Global Synchronization Messages? Unicast –Messages authenticated by secure pair-wise key. –Conclusion: too heavy communication overhead and substantial message collisions. Scalability problem Broadcast –Can reduce the communication overhead. –Require local broadcast authentication. Digital signature is too expensive for sensor nodes. uTESLA

Computer Science 22 Overview of uTESLA Perrig et al., IEEE S&P’01 Sender: –Generate one-way key chain, K i =F(K i+1 ), 0  i  n-1 –Release the commitment K 0 –Use key K i for all messages sent in time interval I i, and disclose K i in I i+d Receiver: –Security condition: the key has not been disclosed by the sender when the messages are received. –Verify K i =F(K i+1 )

Computer Science 23 Using uTESLA in Time Synchronization? Problems: 1.uTESLA itself requires loose pair-wise time synchronization. 2.Delayed authentication causes clocks drift away again.

Computer Science 24 Short Delayed uTESLA Tight single-hop pair-wise time synchronization. Too short time intervals waste a lot of keys in a key chain. Interleaved short and long intervals. –Short interval (r) : A sender broadcasts authenticated synchronization message. –Long interval (R) : A sender discloses the key used in last short interval.

Computer Science 25 Short Delayed uTESLA (Cont.) Receiver: –Security condition: the message is sent in the sender’s last short interval. (t i -T 0 + △ +  max ) < i*(r+R)+r. △ : single-hop pair-wise time difference  max : maximum synchronization error –Verify K i =F(K i+1 )

Computer Science 26 Experimental Evaluation Software package –TinySeRSync MICAz motes running TinyOS 35 files Providing 8 interfaces Code size in MICAz Parameters # of MICAz nodes60 pair-wise synchronization interval 4 seconds global synchronization interval 10 seconds Tolerance (t)0, 1, 2, 3, 4 uTESLA short interval10 ms uTESLA long interval1 second key chain length100 MemoryBytes RAM1961 Program memory24814

Computer Science 27 Network Deployment

Computer Science 28 Data Collection Sink node –Broadcast reference messages to all the nodes. –Query each node one by one at different time. All the nodes –When receiving a reference message Records the current global time when the message is received at MAC layer. –When receiving a query message Send the buffered global time information to the sink node.

Computer Science 29 Synchronization Error Precision achieved: tens of microseconds 1 tick = 8.68 us

Computer Science 30 Synchronization Rate When t=4, 95% in 3 rounds

Computer Science 31 Communication Overhead Number of message each node sends per hour.

Computer Science 32 Incremental Deployment Average synchronization error (left Y-axis) Synchronization rate when t=2 (right Y-axis)

Computer Science 33 Conclusion TinySeRSync: –Secure single-hop pair-wise time synchronization Between two nodes The building block of global time synchronization. –Secure and resilient global time synchronization In the whole network Future work –Adapting the linear regression technique to compensate the constant clock drifts.

Computer Science 34 Comments and Questions? Thank you!