Office of Aviation Safety Flight Crew Performance: Operational and Human Factors Katherine A. Lemos, Ph.D. Human Performance Group Chairman Operational.

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Presentation transcript:

Office of Aviation Safety Flight Crew Performance: Operational and Human Factors Katherine A. Lemos, Ph.D. Human Performance Group Chairman Operational Factors Group Co-Chairman

Operational-Human Performance Factors ruled out Decision to land – Mixed braking action reports – Performance calculations Inability to stop the aircraft – Use of reverse thrust

Factors Ruled Out Certificated / qualified / trained No accidents or violations Medical and behavioral Fatigue

Mixed Braking Action Reports

SWA policy: – Defer to the “more critical term” – FAIR to POOR POOR SWA policy: – POOR: 5kt tailwind component limit Crew unaware of mixed report policy

Mixed Braking Action Reports Mixed Reports: – Training – Limited guidance Other pilots also were unaware Three previous SWA aircraft landed SWA amended training and guidance Recommendations

Onboard Performance Computer

Output: Stopping margins Crew performed several assessments: – FAIR produced a margin of 560’ – POOR produced a margin of 40’ Crew uncomfortable with 40’ – Expected better than POOR – Expected increased margin with use of reverse thrust

Onboard Performance Computer OPC assumptions: – Reverse thrust use assumed – Tailwind component limit (5kt) Stopping margin based on the actual/presented 8kt tailwind for POOR: -260

Onboard Performance Computer Inconsistent programming Training / guidance / presentation Calculation assumptions are critical to a pilot’s decision to land SWA has updated programming Recommendations

Reverse Thrust Stowed Deployed

Reverse Thrust Required reverse thrust immediately – All landings – Emphasized: Conditions less than GOOD Delay in command of reverse thrust Would have been able to stop Crew and other pilots aware of protocol Other pilots landing at MDW

Reverse Thrust New autobrake procedure Pilot actions upon touchdown in conditions less than GOOD: – Prior: Reverse thrust and manual brakes – New: Reverse thrust only Learning new procedures – Requires practice

Reverse Thrust Automatic Task Sequences – Absence absence – Activation activation Accident Sequence: – Refrained from manual brakes Failed to deploy reverse thrust – Manual brakes applied Thrust reverse within 3 sec

Reverse Thrust Other pilots demonstrated delay during first use of autobrakes – Trials in development of policy – Post-accident familiarization period Captain stated being distracted Crew’s first use of autobrakes accounts for their delay Recommendations