Presented at: Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia 13 December 2011 Demography & Liberal Democracy The Age-structural Maturity Thesis (or “How Political Demography Foretold the Arab Spring”) Richard Cincotta The Stimson Center

Cincotta & Hummel, 2009 The Demographic Transition

Age structural Classes: Japan 1935 to Class Median age range Intermediate 25 – 35 yrs Post-mature 45 – 55 yrs Youthful 15 – 25 yrs Mature 35 – 45 yrs Cincotta, in press (69.2 million)(104.4 million) (Population) (123.2 million)(120.8 million)

DATA SOURCE: UN Population Division, 2011 Four categories: four individual countries, 2010

Transitional Population age structures 2010 Data: UN Population Division, 2009

Median Age (Years) Likelihood YouthfulIntermediateMaturePost-Mature Liberal Democracy Political Violence The Empirical Narrative

Median Age (Years) Net Benefits YouthfulIntermediateMaturePost-Mature Unconstrained executive power Civil liberties & political rights The Theoretical Narrative

Y: Youthful (<25.0 yrs) I : Intermediate ( ) M: Mature (35.1 to 45.0) *P: Post-mature (>45.1) *(no states yet within this category as of 2010) Age structure (median age) Proportion “FREE” no states Age structure & Freedom Scores 1975 to 2005

50-50 chance of “Free” Proportion (%) “Free”

Youthfulness and the path to liberal democracy: 8 selected states Cincotta, 2009 Some anecdotal evidence of rises in democracy scores as age-structural youthfulness declines.

Why does this model work? No. of States <0.42 >.42 Youth Proportion* 1980s Fate of States rising to liberal democracy during the decade Durability of Regime <29 years>29 years Median Age

Youthful states Data: UN 2010 Rev.

from Barnett, 2004

Youthful states Data: UN 2010 Rev.

Youthful states Data: UN 2010 Rev.

Youthful states

Data: UN 2010 Rev.

Youthful states

Presented at: Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia 13 December 2011 The Intelligence Value of “Age Structure” Richard Cincotta Demographer-in-residence The Stimson Center

Year (5-yr period)

Data: UN Population Div., 2010 Rev.

Model results & forecasts: Cincotta, unpublished Population data: UN Population Division, 2010 Rev. Age structure and the “naïve probability” of liberal democracy

Proportion of states experiencing civil conflict * Conflict involves a more youthful minority

“The first (and perhaps most surprising) region that promises a shift to liberal democracy is a cluster along Africa’s Mediterranean coast: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, none of which has experienced liberal democracy in the recent past. The other is in South America: Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela, each of which attained liberal democracy demographically “early” but was unable to sustain it. Interpreting these forecasts conservatively, we can expect there will be one, maybe two, in each group that will become stable liberal democracies by 2020.” Cincotta, R.P “How Democracies Grow Up.” Foreign Policy: March/April, (plus supplementary map and graph online). Cincotta, R.P. 2008/09. “Half a Chance: Youth Bulges and Transitions to Liberal Democracy,” Environmental Change and Security Project Report, 13: Available at: These predictions are the subject of the presentation on C-Span: Forecast

4.Rapid democratization in North Africa and the Rise of Islamic Parties. One component of “youth-bulge theory” is a model that suggests that the probability of attaining a stable liberal democracy increases as a state’s age structure matures. North African countries are rapidly maturing toward the break-even point (a half a chance for a liberal democracy). In this scenario, a North African state, probably Tunisia, undergoes a “color revolution”—a swift and non-violent transition to liberal democracy. This may bring Islamists into power—or maybe not. However, the possibilities for spreading democracy through the region and for new political dynamics to play out in an age-structurally mature Arab state could produce both risks and opportunities for the US. Rationale: Age-structural maturation & liberal democracy. Declines in the proportion of young adults in the working age population tends to make youth recruitment to political violence more difficult and promote a more manageable political environment. As politics lose their volatility, commercial and military elites see opportunities under democratic rule and a marketplace free of the patron-client relationships supported by the autocrat. Low probability, High Impact Analysis, LRAU, Oct Product of political demographic research. Submitted by R.P. Cincotta, Oct. 2010