TO COOPERATE OR NOT TO COOOPERATE REGIONAL ACADEMY FOR DEMOCRACY, 30.6.2013.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Factorise means put into brackets Solve means Find the values of x which make the equation true.
Advertisements

Developmentally Appropriate Practice
Crime, Punishment, and Forgiveness
Yale Women Faculty Forum, 11 June 2014 Kathleen L. McGinn Cahners-Rabb Professor of Business Administration Harvard Business School.
Cooperation and Reciprocal Altruism
Game Theory “Доверяй, Но Проверяй” - Russian Proverb (Trust, but Verify) - Ronald Reagan Mike Shor Lecture 6.
Game Theory “Доверяй, Но Проверяй” (“Trust, but Verify”) - Russian Proverb (Ronald Reagan) Topic 5 Repeated Games.
Evolution of Cooperation The importance of being suspicious.
Public Goods Public goods are extreme cases of externalities, where all consumers can enjoy the good even if they don’t pay for it. A pure public good,
Prisoner’s dilemma TEMPTATION>REWARD>PUNISHMENT>SUCKER.
Modified Monopoly. Version I All players start with $1500. All players receive $200 when passing GO (Salary). Normal rules apply.
Institutions and the Evolution of Collective Action Mark Lubell UC Davis.
The Identity and Inverse Properties
Evolving New Strategies The Evolution of Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 01 / 25.
Tragedy of Commons Private & Public Property Rights.
Game Theory: Key Concepts Zero Sum Games Zero Sum Games Non – Zero Sum Games Non – Zero Sum Games Strategic Form Games  Lay out strategies Strategic Form.
1 Agency Game in the Long Run In the context here the long run means more than one transaction between two parties.
UNIT IV: GAMES & INFORMATION
GAME This game involves food and fun. BUT, we don’t play unless we can cooperate and FOLLOW THE RULES. Groups of four people. Read handout. DON’T TALK!
Choose level of difficulty
©John Wiley & Sons, Inc Huffman: Psychology in Action (8e) Evolution of cooperation: Why make friends? Why be nice, making friends must have offered.
CAN WE DO IT ??? TENNIS BALL EXERCISE. Tennis Ball Exercise  Play 4 Rounds  3 or 4 equal groups (a good size is 7 to 10 people)  Each group will use.
Commutative, Associative, Distributive, Identity, and Zero Properties
 Cooperation among non-kin evolved as a result of cooperators giving honest signals.  One such signal is involuntary facial expressions displaying positive.
Agenda, Day 2  Questions about syllabus? About myths?  Prisoner’s dilemma  Prisoner’s dilemma vs negotiation  Play a single round  Play multiple rounds.
©Rory Stewart & Associates 2010 Known to ME Known to YOU Unknown to ME Unknown to YOU BLIND HIDDENNOT YET KNOWN Johari Window Feedback Disclosure Insight.
Genocide Simulation Achieve your group goal to win.
Genocide Simulation Achieve your group goal to win.
Dynamic Games of complete information: Backward Induction and Subgame perfection - Repeated Games -
UUCF Summer RE 2011 Brain Glitches Session 8: Ultimatum Game and The Volunteer’s Dilemma.
Reputational advantages and disadvantages of punishment toward norm-violators Yutaka Horita Toshio Yamagishi Hokkaido University 13th international conference.
Tragedy of Commons Private & Public Property Rights.
By: Isaiah Magpali-Isaac, Tatianna Smith, Viris Colmenero Farrelly, Daniel, Lazarus, John, & Roberts, Gilbert (2007). Altruists Attract. Evolutionary Psychology.
Example Department of Computer Science University of Bologna Italy ( Decentralised, Evolving, Large-scale Information Systems (DELIS)
Take out a blank piece of paper. Pick one partner to work with you on these activities. Put both names on one paper. The person whose birthday is closest.
SES SECONDARY 3. 2 PERSPECTIVES: 1. CLASSICAL ECONOMISTS Stigler: “when self-interest and ethical values with wide verbal allegiances are in conflict,
Properties of Multiplication The properties for multiplying whole numbers are also true for multiplying fractions and whole numbers. (only 1 new property)
Ethical Rules, Games, and Evolution Ted Bergstrom, Economics Dept, UCSB.
Announcements For Tuesday, Oct. 21 st : Problem Set 6 For Tuesday, Oct. 21 st : Problem Set 6 For Thursday, Oct. 23 rd : Dating Survey (link to be sent.
THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS Happy Fishing Lab. GARRETT HARDIN Tragedy of the Commons- is a problem that occurs when a resource (ocean, water, air) is open.
1 University of Auckland Winter Week Lectures Second Lecture 3 July 2007 Associate Professor Ananish Chaudhuri Department of Economics University of Auckland.
GLOBAL ECONOMICS (International Trade) Dr. Andrew L. H. Parkes “A Macroeconomic Understanding for use in Business” Day 18 卜安吉.
Section 2 – Ec1818 Jeremy Barofsky
Robert Axelrod’s Tournaments Robert Axelrod’s Tournaments, as reported in Axelrod, Robert. 1980a. “Effective Choice in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.” Journal.
Functional Question Foundation (Statistics 4) For the week beginning ….
Game Theory by James Crissey Luis Mendez James Reid.
Comparing Numbers Greater than Less than Equal to.
UUCF Summer RE 2011 Brain Glitches Session 4: Prisoner’s Dilemma.
How to Develop Leadership Qualities to Build a Better Business Fitz & Mary Mensah.
1 Social Dilemmas. 2 The Anatomy of Cooperation How does cooperation develop and how is it sustained in an environment where individuals are rewarded.
The evolution of cooperation. Altruism and the selfish gene n Altruism: benefit b to recipient at cost -c to the donor.
Module 1: Evolution and Economics An Analysis of You: Prisoner’s Dilemma.
TODAY WE ARE GOING TO PLAY….. “NAME THAT PROPERTY!”

Chapter 9 Prosocial Behavior: Doing What’s Best for Others © 2014 Wadsworth Cengage Learning Oskar Schindler’s grave. The Hebrew inscription reads: “A.
Punishment, Detection, and Forgiveness in Repeated Games.
Terrorism Simulation Achieve your group goal to win.
Ch 2.5 Objective: To multiply integers.. Properties Commutative Property: a * b = b * a Two numbers can be multiplied in either order and the result is.
“Group consumption, free-riding, & informal reciprocity agreements”. Why do people use informal reciprocity agreements? Most analysis answers this question.
The Good News about The Bad News Gospel. The BAD News Gospel: Humans are “fallen”, “depraved” and incapable of doing the right thing “Human Nature” is.
Anonymity and Altruistic Punishment Kaytlyn McBride, Maiya Guillory & Steve Zigtema Piazza, J., & Bering, M.J. (2008). The effects of perceived anonymity.
N-RN.2 Division Properties of Exponents. Division Property of Exponents Quotient of Powers Property If the bases are the same, subtract the exponents.
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY to help or not to help others.
Evolving New Strategies
Multiplayer Games By: Miss Dinnella.
Sports Psychology.
Unit 4 SOCIAL INTERACTIONS.
Presenter: Nipun Agarwal
Presentation transcript:

TO COOPERATE OR NOT TO COOOPERATE REGIONAL ACADEMY FOR DEMOCRACY,

UNDERSTANDING COOPERATION? Who we are? Why we behave the way we do? How to be more efficient in our cooperative efforts?

(EVOLUTION OF) COOPERATION

?

A cooperator is someone who pays a cost, for another individual to receive a benefit

(EVOLUTION OF) COOPERATION

Cooperation is the process by which the components of a system work together to achieve the global properties. In other words, individual components that appear to be “selfish” and independent work together o create a highly complex, greater-than-the-sum-of-its-parts system

(EVOLUTION OF) COOPERATION

‘‘No hint of genuine charity ameliorates our vision of society, once sentimentalism has been laid aside. What passes for cooperation turns out to be a mixture of opportunism and exploitation...Scratch an altruist, and watch a hypocrite bleed.’’ Ghiselin (1974, p. 247)

(EVOLUTION OF) COOPERATION

Mistake? Heart in a sleeve? Manipulation? Moralistic reciprocity? Cultural group selection?

TASK 1

DICTATOR GAME

TASK 2

ULTIMATUM GAME

TASK 2

Homo economicus?

TASK 3

PRISONERS DILEMMA

HAWK DOVE

FISHPOND In this role-playing game, players are asked to fish in a pond.  At the beginning of the game, the pond contains four fish per player (e.g. 20 players = 80 fish).  The game is played in rounds. In each round, every player may catch between zero and three fish.  The remaining fish multiply between rounds.  The game lasts for a maximum of ten rounds.

TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS

COOPERATION RULES AND GUIDELINES In summary, success in an evolutionary "game" correlated with the following characteristics: Be nice: cooperate, never be the first to defect. Be provocable: return defection for defection, cooperation for cooperation. Don't be envious:: be fair with your partner Don't be too clever: or, don't try to be tricky

COOPERATION RULES AND GUIDELINES [T]here must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant.... (Hobbes 1651, p. 120

COOPERATION RULES AND GUIDELINES Credibility enhancing display – credible commitment “actions speak louder than words?”

COOPERATION RULES AND GUIDELINES Group identity and Identiy fusion

COOPERATION RULES AND GUIDELINES Group identity and Identiy fusion

COOPERATION RULES AND GUIDELINES Group identiy and Identiy fusion

AND SOME GOOD NEWS FOR THE END