“Missile Defence Factor in Establishing a New Security Environment” International BMD Conference “Missile Defence Factor in Establishing a New Security Environment” “Russia’s Assessment of NATO- Russia Theatre Missile Defence exercise” Chairman of Military-scientific Committee of the Russian Federation Armed Forces – Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General-Major I. Sheremet Moscow,

NATO-Russia Theatre Missile Defence Command Post Exercise Stages Key Dates & Facts NATO-Russia Theatre Missile Defence Command Post Exercise Stages Key Dates & Facts From 2003 till stages of the exercise were conducted: CPX-1. Stage 1 December NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) (the Hague, the Netherlands); Stage 2 March 2004 Joint National Integration Center at AFB Shriver (Colorado-Springs, USA). CPX-2. March Royal Air Force Base (Venray, the Netherlands). CPX-3. October th Central R&D Institute, MOD, the Russian Federation (Moscow). CPX-4. January 2008 Ottobrunn, Germany. CPX AAR proved that the aim and objectives in planning and conducting operations based on simulated models had been successfully fulfilled. 2

Specific Features of NATO-Russia Theatre BMD Command Post Exercise  Exercise is not linked to any geography or specific existing threats;  Exercise scenarios are not based on possible actual cooperation of the parties;  Complication was achieved by introducing more units and increasing the scale of missile strikes;  Both Russian and NATO AD and BMD assets performances were used as imaginary initial data 3

NATO-Russia Theatre BMD Computer-Assisted Command Post Exercise March 2012 (Ottobrunn, Germany) Aim: development, research and efficiency assessment of various ways to establish a BMD in Europe taking into account the results of previous NATO-Russia Theatre BMD cooperation activities. Objectives:   exploring options for early warning data exchange in the framework of a Joint BMD Centre;   Examining ways of coordination for intercepting ballistic missiles by both Russian and NATO assets;   looking into options for coordination and operation of Russia and NATO BMD command and control forces;   planning, implementing and assessing of joint missile defense options. 4

Format and Framework for Command Post Exercise  Considering the European region as a platform for exploring various ways to establish a joint BMD;  Examining hypothetical missile threats not connected with political views of Russia and NATO;  Using closest to real BMD assets performances to obtain more reliable simulation data;  Studying various ways to build a missile defense and establish cooperation of the parties that reflect NATO and Russia approaches to BMD in Europe. 5

Options for NATO and Russia Groups of Forces Joint Operations  Independent combat operations of Russian and NATO BMD and AD groups (option 1);  Independent combat operations along with joint employment of missile attack early warning systems’ data (option 2);  Independent but coordinated combat operations: decisions to engage targets were made by Russia and NATO independently, but either party could call for support if needed (option 3);  Use of shared early warning data and conduct of combat operations under single centralized command and control from BMD Centre (option 4);  Best streamlined missile defense arrangement and single command and control while jointly protecting hypothetical areas (option 4А). 6

7 Command and Control, Information Support Framework with Single Centralized Arrangement NATO operational level Command Russian operational level Command Automated data integration BMD Centre NATO tactical level Command Shooters NATO tactical level Command Shooters Russian tactical level Command Shooters Russian tactical level Command Shooters

Episode 1 Episode 2 Episode 3 Amount of engaged missiles depending on specific episode and level of cooperation А А

Recommendations for Future Research   Real geography;   Scaling of ballistic missiles strikes by intensity, direction and trajectory types;   Playing with a broader range of ballistic missiles performances, including missiles with over 3000 km range;   Scaling by composition of BMD group in terms of both independent and joint combat operations;   Exploring various options of information support based on joint information processing arrangements;   Adding episodes with complications – e.g. disablement of some BMD assets;   Examining impacts of different killing techniques on the effectiveness of joint groups operations;   Improving performance indicators and criteria of joint operations effectiveness. 9