Stein-65 Slide 1 PW security measures PWE3 – 65 th IETF 10 November 2005 Yaakov (J) Stein.

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Presentation transcript:

Stein-65 Slide 1 PW security measures PWE3 – 65 th IETF 10 November 2005 Yaakov (J) Stein

Stein-65 Slide 2 Reminder At IETF64 security threats were presented: PWs have special features that may be exploited by hackers PW control plane does not mandate authentication PW user packets have no authentication/encryption options draft-stein-pwe3-sec-req-00.txt reviews security requirements here we will mention a few solution ideas …

Stein-65 Slide 3 Control Protocol Authentication Problem many of the attacks in draft-stein-pwe3-sec-req-00.txt can be avoided if it is not possible to impersonate a PE thus PWE control protocol needs a strong authentication mechanism Solution 1 – MD5 use MD5 signature option (shared key per peer) per RFC3036 every LDP message (even hellos) is authenticated MD5 may be replaced by SHA-1 or any other message digest Solution 2 – authentication TLV for initialization new optional TLV in the initialization message use public key mechanism reject if no authentication TLV or if authentication fails

Stein-65 Slide 4 PW Packet Authentication Problems PW label is the only identifier in packet CW sequence number can be used for DoS attack Solution add optional authentication field between control word and payload (becomes a control word extension) lightweight option 32 bit CW extension (must be negotiated via a new LDP TLV) computed based on limited-size input, for example: –sequence number + salt –sequence number + checksum of payload heavyweight option 64 or 128 bit CW extension (must be negotiated via a new LDP TLV) hash of sequence number + payload WARNING: if performed in SW enables DoS attack

Stein-65 Slide 5 PW Packet Encryption at IETF-64 we discussed encrypting the PW payload Problem PW is not reliable – may lose packets (don’t even know how many bytes lost) so, can’t use stream cipher, CBC, CFB, etc. modes Solution 1 use ECB mode on sequence number + payload (including sequence number blocks replay attacks) Solution 2 generate per-packet key based on secret key and sequence number use ECB mode on payload