Odds and ends Tweakable encryption

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Odds and ends Tweakable encryption Online Cryptography Course Dan Boneh Odds and ends Tweakable encryption

Disk encryption: no expansion Sectors on disk are fixed size (e.g. 4KB) ⇒ encryption cannot expand plaintext (i.e. M = C) ⇒ must use deterministic encryption, no integrity Lemma: if (E, D) is a det. CPA secure cipher with M=C then (E, D) is a PRP. ⇒ every sector will need to be encrypted with a PRP

sector 1 sector 2 sector 3 PRP(k, ⋅) PRP(k, ⋅) PRP(k, ⋅) sector 1 Problem: sector 1 and sector 3 may have same content Leaks same information as ECB mode Can we do better? Violates det. CPA assumption

sector 1 sector 2 sector 3 PRP(k1, ⋅) PRP(k2, ⋅) PRP(k3, ⋅) sector 1 sector 2 sector 3 Avoids previous leakage problem … but attacker can tell if a sector is changed and then reverted Managing keys: the trivial construction kt = PRF(k, t) , t=1,…,L Can we do better?

Tweakable block ciphers Goal: construct many PRPs from a key k∈K . Syntax: E , D : K × T × X ⟶ X for every t∈T and k⟵K: E(k, t, ⋅) is an invertible func. on X, indist. from random Application: use sector number as the tweak ⇒ every sector gets its own independent PRP

Secure tweakable block ciphers E , D : K × T × X ⟶ X . For b=0,1 define experiment EXP(b) as: Def: E is a secure tweakable PRP if for all efficient A: AdvtPRP[A,E] = |Pr[EXP(0)=1] – Pr[EXP(1)=1] | is negligible. b b=1: π(Perms[X])|T| b=0: kK, π[t] E(k,t,) Chal. Adv. A t1, x1 t2, x2 … tq, xq π π[t1](x1) π[t2](x2) … π[tq](xq) b’  {0,1}

Example 1: the trivial construction Let (E,D) be a secure PRP, E: K × X ⟶ X . The trivial tweakable construction: (suppose K = X) Etweak(k, t, x) = E( E(k, t), x) ⇒ to encrypt n blocks need 2n evals of E(.,.)

2. the XTS tweakable block cipher [R’04] Let (E,D) be a secure PRP, E: K × {0,1}n ⟶ {0,1}n . XTS: Etweak( (k1,k2), (t,i), x) = N ⟵E(k2, t) x c = P(N,i) xor E(k1, m xor P(N,i) ) ⇒ to encrypt n blocks need n+1 evals of E(.,.)

Is it necessary to encrypt the tweak before using it? That is, is the following a secure tweakable PRP? x c Yes, it is secure No: E(k, (t,1), P(t,2)) ⨁ E(k, (t,2), P(t,1)) = P(t,1) ⨁ P(t,2) No: E(k, (t,1), P(t,1)) ⨁ E(k, (t,2), P(t,2)) = P(t,1) ⨁ P(t,2) No: E(k, (t,1), P(t,1)) ⨁ E(k, (t,2), P(t,2)) = 0

Disk encryption using XTS sector # t: block 1 block 2 block n tweak: (t,1) tweak: (t,2) tweak: (t,n) note: block-level PRP, not sector-level PRP. Popular in disk encryption products: Mac OS X-Lion, TrueCrypt, BestCrypt, …

Summary Use tweakable encryption when you need many independent PRPs from one key XTS is more efficient than the trivial construction Both are narrow block: 16 bytes for AES EME (previous segment) is a tweakable mode for wide block 2x slower than XTS

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