1. Understand O’Donnell & Schmitter’s cycle of mobilization model. 2. Distinguish Huntington’s 3 types of transition and identify cases. 3. Understand Przeworski’s hypotheses on balance of power between forces and regime outcomes. 4. Critically assess these models/ hypotheses.

Initial Liberalization “Resurrection of Civil Society” - protests, disorder, demands Demobilization of Civil Society Soft-liners believe they can keep control of transition Hard-liners’ fears of disorder seem confirmed; their allies increase – fear of coup As fear of coup increases, opposition becomes more vocal People become tired and run out of resources; Soft-liners and moderates have become majority; negotiating over details rather than regime type

TransformationRuling elites take lead in democratizing ReplacementOpposition groups take lead TransplacementJoint actions by government and opposition (Source: Huntington, p. 114)

 Spain  Brazil  USSR  Bulgaria  Mexico

 Death of hardline dictator, Franco (1975).  New President Suarez implemented reforms rapidly and dramatically.

 Reformist President Geisel rose through ranks into power.  Strategy of gradual, slow reform ( ).

1. Sequence and scope of changes slower and more stable. 2. Allies of authoritarian regime have better chance of remaining relevant in regime that follows.

1. Emergence of reformers within regime. › Several possible reasons for emergence.

2. Reformers must acquire power within regime. 1. Old leader dies.  E.g. Spain. 2. New reformers rise through ranks of party.  E.g. Mexico. 3. Reformers oust hardliners.  E.g. Nigeria.

3. Failure of liberalization alone – demands for democracy. E.g. USSR.

4. Subdue the hardliners. 1. Centralize decisionmaking so only reformers influence decisions. 2. Purge areas of government, bureaucracy, military where hardliners dominate. 3. In purging hardliners, make argument about “returning to legitimacy.”

5. Coopt the opposition. Get prominent opposition members on side. Often through “pacts.”

 Romania  Argentina  Greece  East Germany Typically personal dictatorships.

1. Regime dominated by hardliners. 2. Opposition gains strength until government collapses or is overthrown. 3. Military support of opposition usually key. 4. Clean break with past. 5. Leaders of old regime often face nasty fates.

 Poland  Czechoslovakia  South Africa

1. Combined actions of government and opposition. 2. Government and opposition both realize they are not powerful enough to determine regime type. 3. Characterized by negotiations, flip- flops. 4. Softliners & moderates come to feel bound together by fate.

 Scenario 1: › Balance of forces is known and uneven  institutional arrangements that ratify this balance. › E.g. Chile 1932.

 Scenario 2: › Balance of forces known to be equal  several potential unstable outcomes:  Civil war (e.g. Russia 1993, Argentina 1800s);  Institutions that don’t work for long (e.g. Poland 1989).

 Scenario 3: › Balance of forces unknown  institutions will include extensive checks and balances and will be durable.

Can they make predictions? How helpful are they?