“Essence of Decision” Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis February 14 th, 2006

Rational-Unitary Actor Approach Cuban Missile Crisis as “Hard Case” Cuban Missile Crisis as “Hard Case” Rational-Unitary Actor Rational-Unitary Actor – identifies interests – considers options Do Nothing Do Nothing Diplomatic Pressure on Khruschev Diplomatic Pressure on Khruschev Secret Approach to Castro Secret Approach to Castro Invasion Invasion Air Strike Air Strike Blockade Blockade – chooses optimal option

Organizational Outputs Date of Discovery -- October 14 th Date of Discovery -- October 14 th – SOPs explain why not earlier or later USIB – “September estimate” USIB – “September estimate” –CIA SOP re: transmission time –SOP re: processing intelligence information –U-2 flight directive issued on Oct.4

Organizational Outputs Range of Options Range of Options – preferred option was airstrike surgical airstrike not option surgical airstrike not option –MRBM classified as “mobile” Tactical Air Forces could only guarantee 90% effectivenessTactical Air Forces could only guarantee 90% effectiveness –MRBM reclassified as “moveable” only after first week (e.g. October 20/21)

The Bureaucratic Politics Model Date of Discovery Date of Discovery 10 day delay before October 14 th U-2 flight 10 day delay before October 14 th U-2 flight –Air Force vs. CIA failed Air Force mission on Oct.9failed Air Force mission on Oct.9 co-operative mission – Oct. 14co-operative mission – Oct. 14

The Bureaucratic Politics Model Range of Options Range of Options the President the President –RFK the Armed Forces the Armed Forces –Air Force –Navy the Secretary of Defense the Secretary of Defense

The Bureaucratic Politics Model the Outcome the Outcome blockade -- not the first choice of any one of the relevant actors blockade -- not the first choice of any one of the relevant actors – Implementation of blockade Navy vs. Presidential preferences for blockade Navy vs. Presidential preferences for blockade –based on Navy SOPs –inititial public account that President preferences prevailed –reality – blockade operated from Navy-specified distance result – one (possibly several) Soviet ships passed through blockade after it was operationalresult – one (possibly several) Soviet ships passed through blockade after it was operational crisis peak (October 27) crisis peak (October 27) –U-2 shot down over Cuba US Air Force neglects to enforce Presidential order banning any further overflightsUS Air Force neglects to enforce Presidential order banning any further overflights

The Denouement... blockade effective on October 22 (through November 20) blockade effective on October 22 (through November 20) Kruschev response (Oct. 26, Oct.27) Kruschev response (Oct. 26, Oct.27) – demand the US agree not to invade Cuba accepted publicly by JFK accepted publicly by JFK – demand that Jupiter missiles removed from Turkey accepted secretly by RFK accepted secretly by RFK

Three Conceptual Lenses and the Cuban Missile Crisis applying the lenses to the Soviet government applying the lenses to the Soviet government – was the USSR acting as a rational-unitary actor? – organizational structure model the Arkhipov incident – Russian naval SOPs the Arkhipov incident – Russian naval SOPs – bureaucratic politics model