EPC Power Converters and the Linac4/PSB Beam Interlock System B. Mikulec, B. Puccio & J-L. Sanchez

PS ring BIC PS ring BIC ( not yet defined ) Source RF Master BIC Source RF Master BIC Choppers Master BIC Choppers Master BIC EJECTION Master BIC EJECTION Master BIC L4 & L4T BIC L4 & L4T BIC PSB OK (2) BIC PSB OK (2) BIC LINAC 4 TRANSFER LINE PSB 12 RF Ctrl RF Ctrl Pre Chop. Pre Chop. Chop per Chop per RF Ctrl RF Ctrl Kicker Disable ramping of PSB RF PSB OK (1) BIC PSB OK (1) BIC 7 BT line Simplified layout (Version 1) Previous BIS Proposal BCC2

PS ring BIC PS ring BIC ( not yet defined ) Source RF Master BIC Source RF Master BIC Choppers BIC Choppers BIC EJECTION Master BIC EJECTION Master BIC PSB Master BIC PSB Master BIC L4 Tr.(2) Master BIC L4 Tr.(2) Master BIC L4 Tr.(1) Master BIC L4 Tr.(1) Master BIC PSB Injection BIC PSB Injection BIC LINAC 4 TRANSFER LINE PSB 12 RF Ctrl RF Ctrl Pre Chop. Pre Chop. Chop per Chop per RF Ctrl RF Ctrl Kicker Disable ramping of PSB RF BT line New draft BIS Proposal Simplified layout (Version 2) BCC3

Previous vs. New version Version 1: 58 Channels & 3+3 Controllers (Master/Slave BICs) Version 2: 82 Channels & 5+2 Controllers (Master/Slave BICs) BCC4

EPC Power Converters for ‘Master BIC Source RF’ 3 central chopper quadrupoles critical for correct chopper action; now 3 individual user permits BCC

EPC Power Converters for ‘Master BIC Linac4 Transfer (1)’ All main bendings of transfer line; dependence on destination now through BIC truth table BCC

EPC Power Converters for ‘BIC PSB OK (1)’ For PSB injection beam permit need to combine individual ring user permits of power converters for BI.SMV and for BI.BSW BCC

EPC Power Converters for ‘Master BIC PSB OK (2)’ Status information of MPS, BE.BSW and BE.SMH BCC

EPC Power Converters for ‘Master BIC PSB Ejection’ Destination dependence through BIC truth table BCC

Conclusions Modified BIS design will comply with EPC wish to avoid dealing with destinations at the power converter level. If the limit on the current acquisition is relaxed to a level where equipment damage can occur, the beam interlock system can obviously no longer guarantee equipment safety. (concerns TL(1) BIC and PSB injection BIC) o A decision has then to be taken if the risk is considered acceptable for example in combination with survey via software interlocks (SIS) BCC