Accountability, Deterrence, and Identifiability Aaron D. Jaggard U.S. Naval Research Laboratory.

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Presentation transcript:

Accountability, Deterrence, and Identifiability Aaron D. Jaggard U.S. Naval Research Laboratory

Collaborators Joint with Joan Feigenbaum, Rebecca Wright – Parts also with Jim Hendler, Danny Weitzner, and Hongda Xiao

Overview “Accountability” is used in lots of ways – Complements preventive security – Is generally viewed as good – This space needs formal definitions What are the goals? Formalize accountability and related notions – Facilitate reasoning about this – Enable comparison (and discussion) across sytems What is the role of identity/identifiability?

What Are the End Goals? Deterrence – Focus here Others – Comply with requirements on processes With an eye on these, don’t make things implicit that don’t need to be

Temporal Spectrum [FJWX’12] PreventionDetectionEvidenceJudgmentPunishment Violation Many systems focus on various (different) aspects of evidence/judgment/punishment – E.g., accountable blacklistable credentials, accountable signatures, e-cash, reputation schemes,...

Focus on Punishment Shift focus – At least if end goal is deterrence – Effect on violator instead of information about Reduce the built-in identity assumptions – May still want to use evidence, etc., but don’t want this (and especially identity) implicit in definitions

Comments on Accountability “Accountability is a protean concept, a placeholder for multiple contemporary anxieties.” [Mashaw] “[A]ccountability has not yet had time to accumulate a substantial tradition of academic analysis.... [T]here has been little agreement, or even common ground of disagreement, over the general nature of accountability or its various mechanisms.” [Mulgan]

A CS Definition of Accountability “Accountability is the ability to hold an entity, such as a person or organization, responsible for its actions.” [Lampson]

Working Definition [FJW’11] An entity is accountable with respect to some policy (or accountable for obeying the policy) if, whenever the entity violates the policy, then, with some non-zero probability, it is, or could be, punished.

Working Definition of Accountability Builds on definition of Lampson – Avoids “hold... responsible”---explicitly don’t require external action Shift focus from evidence and judgment to punishment – Reduce need for identity – May want to reserve “accountable” for when violator is identified [Weitzner] Need to be able to distinguish those cases

Punishment Desiderata Unrelated things events shouldn’t affect whether a violator is viewed as being punished – “Luck” shouldn’t affect things – Punishment should be related to violation in question

Automatic and Mediated Punishment Intuitively: – Punishment should be connected to the violation – Punishment could be mediated by the action(s) of some authority responding to the violation (or a conviction) – Punishment could happen without any punishing act being done This might reduce need for identifiability!

Formal Model (Outline) [FJW’11] System behavior as event traces Utility functions for participants – Maybe only know distribution or “typical” utility Principal(s) associated to events What qualifies as “punishment” for a violation?

Mediated Punishment Punishing event must be caused by the fact of the violation Compare outcomes after punishment with those without the punishment – Need to remove other events caused by the violation Punishing event Subtrace Violation

Approach: Automatic Punishment The violation is automatically punished if the violator’s utility is lower in the outcomes extending the violating trace Te than in the outcomes extending T but not Te. Violation e T

Example: Three Strikes Using “typical” utilities, we capture the idea that even sociopaths are punished – Expected utilities might be skewed What is “effective” punishment?

Open/Closed Systems Degree to which a system is “open” or “closed” appears to be important Principals, identities/nyms, and systems – What does system boundary require of mapping between principals and identities Computational or algebraic restrictions Example potential tradeoff – Deterrence may be effective if we punish the nym Contexts where being able to act using that identity is important Wouldn’t need to be able to invert mapping – Other times, may need more (computable) information about mapping

Primitives Temporal spectrum (evidence, judgment, punishment) – What do these need to provide abstractly? E.g., to what extent must evidence be independently verifiable? Blame/violation Causality Identity-related – Binding between principals and identities; linkages between actions

Other Dimensions [FJWX’12] Information – Is identity required to participate in the system? – Are violations disclosed? How broadly? – Is the violator identified? How broadly? Action – Centralized v. decentralized (generally and in response to violations) – Automatic v. mediated – Requires continued access to violator?

Social Aspects Should we reserve “accountability” for approaches that require identification? That might be consistent with common uses of “to hold someone accountable.” – This may not be the fundamental goal; we may really be after deterrence. – One can be deterred even if one will not be identified Possible approach: Allay user concerns by promoting “deterrence” instead of “accountability”

Questions Are these the right notions to formalize? – Will this framework be useful for proving things? – Capturing identity? What about related notions – Compensation, detection/diagnostics, authorization Open/closed systems – Compare with international-relations example of non-accountability Subset/delegated accountability – Don’t (immediately) have individual punishment – Reduce level of identifiability – How to induce participation?