John List Enterprises Have I got a deal for you! Commitment Costs and the Basic Independence Assumption: Evidence from the Field.

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Presentation transcript:

John List Enterprises Have I got a deal for you! Commitment Costs and the Basic Independence Assumption: Evidence from the Field

Commitment Costs and the Basic Independence Assumption: Evidence from the Field Or Have We Been Observing Dynamic WTP & WTA’s, But Interpreting Them as Static?

Non neoclassical explanations for WTP-WTA disparity pose significant challenge to welfare analysis Standard neoclassical derivation of WTP and WTA static, but consumers live and act in a dynamic world Is there a dynamic explanation for the disparity? Is it present in a real transactions? Our Story

Story: Jojo considers buying a sports card. Jojo would like to impress his economist friends at a party in 3 weeks with a sports card, but the dealer looks pretty shady…. A Static WTP Story Jojo assesses: 50% chance of bragging rights = $G, 50% chance that List is ripping him off, value= $0 Simple expected value is $G/2 = Jojo’s max WTP for the card

A Dynamic WTP Story Suppose In 2 weeks, can get advice on value from his expert friend Knows the dealer will still be here in 2 weeks with same or equivalent card Can’t easily resell the card if he buys it today What is his max WTP today? $0 WTP does not equal expected surplus!

New Story: Jojo finds a card in his attic. Jojo’s neighbor (John List) offers to buy it for $G/2, standing offer. Scenario: 50% chance the card is worth $G to a dealer 50% chance the card is junk In 2 weeks he can attend a card show and find out for sure. What is Jojo’s WTA to sell today? $G A Dynamic WTA Story

Be uncertain about value, but have some ability to learn in future If so, clear predictions from theory 1. WTP increases in perceived difficulty of delay intuition: if costly to wait and buy later, WTP more now 2. WTP decreases in perceived difficulty of reversal intuition: if costly to sell if made mistake, WTP less now Can this Story Explain Experimental and CVM Disparities?

1. WTA decreases in perceived difficulty of delay intuition: if costly to wait and sell later, WTA less now 2. WTA increases in perceived difficulty of reversal intuition: if costly to buy if made mistake, WTA higher Comparative Statics for WTA

Specifically 1.WTA >> WTP if costly to reverse, but easy to delay both 2.WTP>>WTA if hard to delay, but easy to reverse both 3.WTA=WTP if symmetric transaction costs (delay cost in WTP= reversal cost WTA and delay cost in WTA= reversal cost WTP) Could compute these costs or simply ask participants their perception of how the ease of reversal and delay WTP and WTA depend critically on costs of delaying and reversing transactions

Question:Have we been observing dynamic WTP & WTA’s, but interpreting them as static? Can we find evidence of dynamic behavior in formation of WTP and WTA values? Is this dynamic behavior consistent with WTP/WTA “anomaly”?

Empirical Investigation Market: Sportscard show in Baltimore, Oct 2001 Good: Cal Ripken, Jr 1983 Topps baseball card BDM: Nth Price Auction 1. Each participant submits bid (offer) 2. Each bid/offer ranked from low to high 3. Monitor randomly draws n [2, T] 4. WTP: monitor sells 1 unit of good to each of n-1 highest bidders at nth price WTA: monitor buys from each of n-1 lowest offers and paths nth lowest price