1 The High-Definition TV Game (DN, p. 121) 4,32,4 1,13,2 Low High U.S. effort Japanese Effort Payoffs to: U.S., Japan HighLow.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
1 The Prisoners Dilemma -1,-1 -10,0 -8,-80, -10 Keep Quiet Confess Smith Jones Smith and Jones have engaged in bank fraud together. The evidence against.
Advertisements

Slides available from:
Oligopoly A monopoly is when there is only one firm.
The World of Oligopoly: Preliminaries to Successful Entry
Market Institutions: Oligopoly
Monopoly Standard Profit Maximization is max r(y)-c(y). With Monopoly this is Max p(y)y-c(y) (the difference to competition is price now depends upon output).
1 Predatory Conduct. 2 Predatory conduct is the implementation of a strategy designed specifically to deter rival firms from competing in a market. To.
Stackelberg -leader/follower game 2 firms choose quantities sequentially (1) chooses its output; then (2) chooses it output; then the market clears This.
Sequential Games Game Theory 3. The Advantage of Moving First Firm 2 CrispySweet Firm 1Crispy-5, -510, 20 Sweet20, 10-5, -5.
Economics 101: Principles of Economics 1.Questions? 2.Please hand in Data Assignment #1.
Chapter Twenty-Seven Oligopoly. u A monopoly is an industry consisting a single firm. u A duopoly is an industry consisting of two firms. u An oligopoly.
1 1 Deep Thought BA 210 Lesson II.5 Simultaneous Quantity Competition To me, boxing is like a ballet, except there’s no music, no choreography, and the.
1 Industrial Organization Entry deterrence Univ. Prof. dr. Maarten Janssen University of Vienna Summer semester Week 5.
Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition
Basic Oligopoly Models
Bertrand Model Game Theory Prisoner’s Dilemma Dominant Strategies Repeated Games Oligopoly and Game Theory.
Chapter 11 Dynamic Games and First and Second Movers.
Stackelberg Model Like Cournot, there are 2 firms that set quantity However, game is not simultaneous, it is sequential What does this mean? One firm,
Game Theory Lecture Jan 18. In Bertrand’s model of oligopoly A)Each firm chooses its quantity as the best response to the quantity chosen by the other(s).
CHAPTER 9 Basic Oligopoly Models Copyright © 2014 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written.
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter 9 Basic Oligopoly Models.
1 Duopoly again Here we look at the Stackelberg leader/follower model.
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter 9 Basic Oligopoly Models.
Source: Perloff. Some parts: © 2004 Pearson Addison- Wesley. All rights reserved Oligopoly Perloff Chapter 13.
Static Games of Complete Information: Subgame Perfection
Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton A Second Cournot Example.
© 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 27 Oligopoly.
Dynamic Games and First and Second Movers. Introduction In a wide variety of markets firms compete sequentially –one firm makes a move new product advertising.
1 Oligopoly. 2 By the end of this Section, you should be able to: Describe the characteristics of an oligopoly Describe the characteristics of an oligopoly.
Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton The Cournot Model.
Chapter 9 (skip discussion on “Sweezy Oligopoly”)
STRATEGIC COMPETITION, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE & GAME THEORY We will look at two facets of ‘game theory’
Lecture 8: pricing and Strategy Advanced Micro Theory MSc.EnviNatResEcon. 1/2006 Charit Tingsabadh.
Overcoming Procrastination. Procrastination What is it? What is bad about it? Why do people procrastinate? What techniques are useful in overcoming.
Microeconomics Course E John Hey. Welcome! Professoressa Maria Covadonga de la Iglesia Villasol, Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I,
Extensive Form Games With Perfect Information (Extensions)
Oligopoly. Learning Objectives: What is an oligopoly? What are different types of oligopoly? What is collusion? Are collusions sustainable all the time?
Monopolistic Competition Large number of firms producing differentiated products By differentiating its product from its competitors’ products, the firm.
Oligopoly. Structure Assume Duopoly Firms know information about market demand Perfect Information.
Lecture 12Slide 1 Topics to be Discussed Oligopoly Price Competition Competition Versus Collusion: The Prisoners’ Dilemma.
Chapter Twenty-Seven Oligopoly. u A monopoly is an industry consisting a single firm. u A duopoly is an industry consisting of two firms. u An oligopoly.
Microeconomics 2 John Hey.
INTERACTIVE FIGURES Oligopoly CHAPTER 16. Click on button to go to figure or table Figure 16.1 Table 16.1 Table 16.2 Table 16.3 Table 16.4 Natural Oligopoly.
Chapter 26 Oligopoly, mainly Duopoly. Quantity or price competitions. Sequential games. Backward solution. Identical products: p = p (Y ), Y = y 1 + y.
Chapters 13 & 14: Imperfect Competition & Game Theory
Chapter 28 Oligopoly It is the case that lies between two extremes (pure competition and pure monopoly). Often there are a number of competitors but not.
Chapter 27 Oligopoly. Oligopoly A monopoly is an industry consisting a single firm. A duopoly is an industry consisting of two firms. An oligopoly is.
The analytics of constrained optimal decisions microeco nomics spring 2016 the oligopoly model(II): competition in prices ………….1price competition: introduction.
Chapter Thirteen Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition.
1 Welcome to EC 209: Managerial Economics- Group A By: Dr. Jacqueline Khorassani Study Guide Week Ten (Sorry this week I am a little late.)
Stackelberg and Bertrand Kevin Hinde. The Dominant Firm - Quantity Leadership Heinrich von Stackelberg (1934) F Stackelberg’s duopoly model assumed that.
Games Of Strategy Chapter 9 Dixit, Skeath, and Reiley
ECON 330 Lecture 17 Monday, November 25.
ECON 330 Lecture 11 Tuesday, October 30.
Non-Cooperative Oligopoly
Imperfect Competition
Nash Equilibrium A strategy combination (a,b) is a Nash equilibrium for two players if neither player would unilaterally deviate if he expected the other.
Oligopoly Models.
OPEC Oil Cartel Iraq’s Output 2 4 Iran’s Output 46* / 42** 26* / 44**
Chapter 28 Oligopoly.
Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition
Molly W. Dahl Georgetown University Econ 101 – Spring 2009
Chapter 28 Oligopoly Key Concept: We have the first taste of how to solve a game! Stackelberg, Cournot, Bertrand.
Dynamic games and First and Second Movers (The Stackelberg Model)
Dynamic Games and First and Second Movers
Non-Cooperative Oligopoly
Dynamic Games and First and Second Movers
Dynamic Games and First and Second Movers
Chapter Twenty-Seven Oligopoly.
Flexible Brownie Guiding
Presentation transcript:

1 The High-Definition TV Game (DN, p. 121) 4,32,4 1,13,2 Low High U.S. effort Japanese Effort Payoffs to: U.S., Japan HighLow

2 If the U.S. Moves First Payoffs to: (U.S., Japan)

3 If Japan Moves First Dixit and Nalebuff, p. 122.

4 The Disadvantage of Flexibility Not in Dixit and Nalebuff.

5 A Clever Aphorism: “Any carpenter can turn a tree into a table, but a strategist can turn a table into a tree.”

6 Threats and Warnings THREAT: A response rule that punishes others who fail to act as I wish them to. (I will fire you if you are a minute late for work.) WARNING: A statement telling others what bad things it will be in my self-interest to do to them if they fail to act as I wish them to. (I will fire you if you become an alcoholic and can't perform like you used to.) PROMISE: A response rule that rewards others who act as I wish them to. (I will give you a ten dollar tip if you provide good service in this restaurant.) ASSURANCE: A statement telling others what good things it will be in my self-interest to do for them if they act as I wish them to. (I like initiative, and will promote you even if your innovative idea turns out to be a failure.) This classification is from Dixit and Nalebuff, p. 126.

7 Cournot Competition How Apex reacts Putting them together How Brydox reacts Apex is a monopoly if Q b = 0 Brydox is a monopoly if Q a = 0 If Q b = 120, Apex lets Brydox take the market If Q a = 120, Brydox lets Apex take the market

8 Stackelberg Competition The Stackelberg equilibrium is the point on Brydox’s reaction curve that Apex likes best. Apex moves first, choosing output of 60, and Brydox responds with output of 30.

9 Bertrand Competition (see p. 76 of Dixit and Nalebuff)