Summary of Session 3 Post-Fukushima Operational Safety Improvements 1 Fred Dermarkar IAEA International Conference on Operational Safety Vienna International Centre June 2015

International Atomic Energy Agency 2 Key points - Process Application of insights from Periodic Safety Reviews resulted in several back-fits that addressed, a-priori, lessons learned from Fukushima –Filtered Containment Venting –Severe Accident Management Guidelines –Level 1 and Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessments Collaboration has resulted in a consistent definition of requirements based on of Lessons Learned –Examples: WENRA Stress Test; INPO / WANO SOER; IAEA Expert Meetings; Owner Group Initiatives –Common approach facilitates continued information exchange and sharing of lessons learned through implementation Follow-up Peer Review by ENSREG resulted in the compilation of Best Practices and Common Challenges –Enables raising the standard of implementation of lessons learned

International Atomic Energy Agency 3 Key points - Technology Most member states have implemented enhancements to strengthen Defence-in-Depth: –Modifications to make their plants more robust to extreme natural events –Modifications, as necessary, to ensure plant is able to respond with installed equipment for a period of time that is sufficient to enable the installation of non-permanent equipment to prevent the large and widespread release of contamination –Non-permanent, Commercial Grade equipment to augment the capability to provide emergency water and power supplies –Severe Accident Management Guidelines –Modifications to enhance monitoring capabilities during severe accidents Notable other developments: –Robotics to assist with accident response (eg, INTRA initiative) –Hardening of selected emergency systems to levels well beyond current design basis

International Atomic Energy Agency 4 Key points - People Training Enhanced Emergency Response Facilities: –Strengthened on-site facilities –Diverse, Redundant and Independent off-site facilities –Mobile command and control units Augmented Support: –Rapid Response Force (FARN) –Regional Centres (US) Exercises and Drills: –More realistic –Broader in scope, longer in duration –Expanded involvement of interfacing community, governmental, regulatory industry and international organizations

International Atomic Energy Agency 5 Human and Organisational Aspects under severe conditions –Decision making while confronted with significant uncertainties –Degraded communication –Managing stress of on-site staff, including caring for family members –Command and Control –Enabling organisational and individual resilience Flexibility to adapt to changing, uncertain and stressful conditions Leadership Potential areas for further improvements

International Atomic Energy Agency …Thank you for your attention! 6