© Institute for Fiscal Studies Dynamic scoring: attractions, challenges and trade-offs Stuart Adam Antoine Bozio HMRC/ESRC International Conference on.

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Presentation transcript:

© Institute for Fiscal Studies Dynamic scoring: attractions, challenges and trade-offs Stuart Adam Antoine Bozio HMRC/ESRC International Conference on Institutional Taxation Analysis London, 21 September 2009

Outline What is dynamic scoring? Requirements and challenges for dynamic scoring Should we use dynamic scoring? Options and trade-offs © Institute for Fiscal Studies

What is dynamic scoring? Government policies have many effects on individual behaviour and the economy as a whole These economic effects have budgetary consequences ‘Dynamic scoring’ means including all these budgetary consequences in the costing of proposals Applies to taxes, spending and other laws Focus today mainly on official scoring of government policies  No doubt that desirable if could be done perfectly and easily  No doubt either that perfect measure currently unattainable © Institute for Fiscal Studies

Challenges for full dynamic scoring 1)Defining the reform –Includes an implicit change in borrowing 2)The ‘mechanical’ effects of policies –Data sometimes unavailable 3)First-round behavioural responses –Huge number of response parameters to estimate Many aspects of behaviour, policy parameters, types of people; short- vs long-run;... Some well established; some disputed; many never estimated –Applicability of past estimates to different times and places 4)General equilibrium and macroeconomic effects –General equilibrium requires specifying structure of entire economy –Demand effects (crowding out, multipliers) depend on state of economy –Expectations are crucial, but difficult to model –How are other policy-makers assumed to react? © Institute for Fiscal Studies

Choosing assumptions and models Effect of ARRA 2009 on US output gap © Institute for Fiscal Studies

Should dynamic scoring be used? Reliably accurate dynamic scoring is out of reach But this does not imply it should not be attempted More interesting questions are often harder to answer! Goal is to provide clear and credible information about policy choices within time and cost constraints © Institute for Fiscal Studies

Clarifying the question Scoring versus forecasting –Forecasting the budgetary position is not the same as estimating the effect of reforms on the budgetary position –UK forecasting is ‘dynamic’ (in principle) while scoring is not –In this case the issue is whether to attribute revision of forecasts to reforms Scoring whole packages (e.g. Budgets) versus individual measures What effects should be incorporated? –Not just two options: ‘static’ vs ‘dynamic’ is misleading terminology –Exactly what effects incorporated, and what assumed unchanged? What results should be presented? –Not necessarily just one number: how deal with uncertainty? –Dynamic scoring versus dynamic analysis © Institute for Fiscal Studies

Credibility Accuracy –Ignoring important effects is a problem here –But so is spurious precision –A role for acknowledging uncertainty? Neutrality –Dynamic scoring often called for where there is no political consensus –Actual and perceived neutrality are both important –Become harder to achieve when more judgement and guesswork involved Transparency –What definitions, assumptions, methodologies, estimates and models lie behind conclusions –Can promote trust even if process flawed © Institute for Fiscal Studies

Clarity Too many numbers can confuse instead of enlightening Difficult to discern general principles –Depends on nature of debate and what people thought able to absorb Consistent methodology helps to make proposals comparable –Avoids bias –Suggests a simple approach –But might want fuller analysis where more known, or of major proposals? © Institute for Fiscal Studies

Practical considerations Dynamic scoring is costly –Would require major increase in resources dedicated to scoring –Do benefits outweigh these costs? –More worthwhile than alternative uses of funds? Dynamic scoring is slow –Policy-makers want analysis quickly –So do those responding: perceptions form quickly and media moves on! © Institute for Fiscal Studies

Conclusions Reliably accurate dynamic scoring is out of reach –Big advances have been made, but we must acknowledge the scale of our ignorance But might a ‘best guess’ be preferable to simply ignoring important effects? Dynamic scoring offers a big prize which should not be discarded lightly –More accurate picture of the budgetary consequences of policies –Fairer reflection of the advantages of policies that enhance economic performance But the difficulty of dynamic scoring implies significant downsides –Costly and slow –Hard to achieve consistency across proposals –Hard to keep impartial and trusted Do the potential advantages outweigh these disadvantages? Adopting a single dynamic cost estimate for each measure isn’t the only option –What exactly is held constant and what allowed to change? –Whole package versus individual measures? –Dynamic analysis of possible economic effects without a dynamic bottom line? Transparency is crucial –First step to improving the quality of analysis is to open it up to scrutiny © Institute for Fiscal Studies

Dynamic scoring: attractions, challenges and trade-offs Stuart Adam Antoine Bozio HMRC/ESRC International Conference on Institutional Taxation Analysis London, 21 September 2009