Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse Presentation by William J. Frey

Agenda Case Narrative Case Chronology Relevant Facts Reenactment of walkway collapse Code of Ethics Issues

Case Narrative On July 17, 1981, the second and fourth story walkways of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel collapsed killing 114 people and seriously injuring an additional 200. Cause: “A deviation in the design in the way the rods connected the lower skywalk to the upper and the upper to the ceiling of the atrium was clearly described and zeroed in on as the ultimate cause of the accident.” Petroski: 86

Relevant Facts (from Pfatteicher, 64) Project put on fast track Construction begun before design was completely finished Walkway design details were left “unspecified” Gillum could not directly supervise plans as his firm grew In this case, the responsibility fell on Duncan But Gillum still sealed the plans after the designing was finished

Relevant Facts Warning Signs (from Petroski) The Atrium ceiling collapsed during construction; but a study carried out by an independent engineering firm found nothing wrong with the skywalk Workers carrying loaded wheel barrows across the skywalk complained about excess vibration and swaying Faulty connection recognized six times “Duncan assured each inquirer that replacing the single, long hanger rods with double, offset rods would not compromise the safety of the walkways.” (Pfatteicher, 64)

Aftermath Petroski “After twenty months of investigation, the U.S. attorney and the Jackson County, Missouri, prosecutor announced jointly that they had found no evidence that either a federal or state crime was committed…” (TAMU Instructor Manual) However in an investigation carried out by the attorney general of Missouri… Duncan, Gillum, and GCE International Inc. were found guilty of “gross negligence, misconduct and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering.” (TAMU Instructor Manual)

Responsibility in Engineering Herbert Fingarette, in Criminal Insanity, identifies legal responsibility as “response to essential relevance” Moral responsibility can be formulated as moral response to essential moral relevance. Cognitive skills: The ability to view a situation and identify those aspects that have moral relevance Volitional skills: The ability to formulate or design actions that are morally responsive to the moral relevance in a situation

Relevance involves the skill of seeing these models fleshed out in reality… B C W A 5 6 B W 1 3 1 3 C W 2 4 2 4 Case 1 Case 2

as this… Initial Design Proposed Modification 4th Floor 2nd Floor Long rods threaded over entire length Shorter rods threaded only near connections And allows that one can imagine the enactment of the proposed modification as…

…ultimately as the risk of this…

Moral Responsibility has different levels Minimum level What is morally obligatory Identify the minimum necessary to avoid blame and locate action above this minimum As the senior engineer, Gillum sealed the plans Was he responsible for approving the change that led to the fall of the walkway? Could part of this responsibility be delegated to the engineer on the scene, namely, Duncan? How should state licensing boards and engineering professional societies assign blame and punish in cases like these?

Other levels of responsibility Above and beyond minimum responsibilities are… Those morally permissible but not morally obligatory Going beyond one’s role responsibilities Proactively taking measures to identify and prevent harm or failure Using one’s engineering skills to promote values such as environmentally sustainable engineering, social justice, and community solidarity Questions for Hyatt What would a good engineer have done in Gillum’s or Duncan’s place after the collapse of the atrium roof? How would an exemplary engineer have responded to the six warnings given to Duncan? How would an exemplary engineer have acted to prevent “gaps” arising from the responsibilities of the designers and the responsibilities of the constructors?

Chronology (Adopted from TAMU Instructor Manual Chronology) Date Event Early 1976 Crown Center Redevelopment Corporation begins project to build Hyatt Regency Hotel July 1976 Gillum-Colaco, Inc. selected as consulting structural engineer Project enters schematic design stage Summer 1977 GCE works with PBNDML architect to decide upon basic design Late 1977 Bid set of structural drawings and specifications Early 1978 Project prepared under regional building codes

Chronology Date Event April 4, 1978 Contract finalized between GCE and PBNDML Spring 1978 Construction begins August 28, 1978 Project specifications issued for construction based on AISC standards (American Institute of Steel Construction) December 1978 Eldridge Construction Company , general contractor, finalizes subcontract with Havens Steel Company. “Havens agrees to fabricate and erect the atrium steel for the Hyatt project.” February 1979 “Havens makes design change from a single to a double hanger rod box beam connection….” Havens claims GCE approved. GCE denies approving this. Oct 14, 1979 Atrium roof collapse November 1979 Seiden-Page investigates collapse and carries out “a thorough design check” of all elements of atrium roof. Assures owners of overall safety of newly designed roof.

Chronology Date Event July 1980 Construction of hotel completed 2nd and 4th story walkways collapse killing 114 and injuring 200. February 3, 1984 “Missouri Board of Architects, Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors files complaint against Daniel M. Duncan, Jack D. Gillum and GCE International Inc., charging gross negligence, incompetence, misconduct and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering in connection with their performance of engineering services in the design and construction of the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri.” November 1984 “Duncan, Gillum, and GCE International Inc. found guilty of gross negligence, misconduct and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering. Subsequently, Duncan and Gillum lost their licenses to practice engineering in the State of Missouri, and GCE had its certificate of authority as an engineering firm revoked. American Society of Civil Engineering (ASCE) adopts report that states structural engineers have full responsibility for design projects. Duncan and Gillum now practicing engineers in states other than Missouri.”

Physical Surroundings People, Groups, and Roles Procedures Walkway Design Physical Surroundings People, Groups, and Roles Procedures Laws, Codes, Statutes Information and Information Structures Abstract model of mechanical design Atrium with 60 foot high ceiling. Hotel Owner Architect Design Engineer and firm Construction Manager and firm Professional Societies in engineering and architecture Hotel Design Process (fast track and not adding specifications) Licensed engineer seals plans State licensing board investigates accident and role of engineers Engineering Codes Contract , Civil and Criminal Law Regulatory authority delegated to Professional Society Post accident investigation US attorney investigation Experience with past designs (recalling and learning from past failures) Three Walkways suspended from Roof State engineering licensing boards Communicating and approving design changes Engineering Codes: who sets them and who enforces them Trial by Missouri attorney general Create ethereal walkway while obeying principles of mechanical design Large space below walkways on first floor Engineers approving design Investigating firm Insurance firms investigate accident to determine who pays victims Black Box: account of case in textbooks

Resources Hyatt Regency Kansas City Walkway Collapse" Online Ethics Center for Engineering 11/24/2010 National Academy of Engineering Accessed: Thursday, December 16, 2010 <www.onlineethics.org/Resources/Cases/24338.aspx> Henry Petroski (1985). To Engineer is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design. St. Martin’s Press: 85-97. http://ethics.tamu.edu/ethics/hyatt/hyatt1.htm The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse Department of Philosophy and Department of Mechanical Engineering Texas A&M University NSF Grant Number DIR-9012252 http://ethics.tamu.edu/ethics/hyatt/hyatt2.htm Photos by Dr. Lee Lowry, Jr. at TAMU Pfatteicher, S (2000). “The Hyatt Horror”: Failure and Responsibility in American Engineering”