Performance of prediction markets with Kelly bettors David Pennock (Yahoo!) with John Langford (Yahoo!) & Alina Beygelzimer (IBM)

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Performance of prediction markets with Kelly bettors David Pennock (Yahoo!) with John Langford (Yahoo!) & Alina Beygelzimer (IBM)

Research A prediction market 2011 the warmest year on record? (Y/N) $1 if$0 if I am entitled to: 2011 the warmest not the warmest

Research Wisdom of crowds More: When to guess: if you’re in the 99.7th percentile

Research Can a prediction market learn? Typical Mkt >> avg expert Static This paper Mkt >? best expert Dynamic/Learning (experts algos) Assumption: Agents optimize growth rate (Kelly)

Kelly betting You have $1000 Market price mp is 0.05 You think probability p is 0.10 Q: How much should you bet? Wrong A: $1000 P(bankruptcy)  1

Kelly betting You have $1000 Market price mp is 0.05 You think probability p is 0.10 Q: How much should you bet? Wrong A: fixed $1 No compounding magic

Kelly betting You have $1000 Market price mp is 0.05 You think probability p is 0.10 Q: How much should you bet? Optimal A: $52.63 or f* fraction of your wealth where f* = (p-mp)/(1-mp) “edge/odds”

Why? Kelly betting  maximizing log utility –Maximizes compounding growth rate Maximizes geometric mean of wealth –Minimizes expected doubling time Minimizes exp time to reach, say, $1M –Does not maximize expected wealth (“All in” does, but ensures bankruptcy)

Fractional Kelly betting Bet f* fraction of your wealth,  [0,1] Why? Ad hoc reasons –Full Kelly is too risky (finite horizon) –I’m not confident of p (2nd-order belief) Our (new) reason – fraction Kelly behaviorally equiv to full Kelly with revised belief p+(1- )mp –Has Bayesian justification

Wealth-weighted average Assume all agents optimize via Kelly and are “price takers” Then mp = ∑ w i p i Fractional Kelly: mp = ∑ i w i p i

Wealth dynamics Agents trade in a binary pred market Event outcome is revealed Wealth is redistrib. (losers pay winners) Repeat After each round If event happens: w i  w i p i /pm If event doesn’t: w i  w i (1-p i )/(1-pm) Wealth is redistributed like Bayes rule!

Wealth dynamics

Wealth dynamics: Regret Theorem: Mkt log loss < min i agent i log loss - ln w i Applies for all agents, all outcomes, even adversarial Same bound as experts algorithms  No “price of anarchy”

Learning the Kelly fraction Competitive equilibrium: = 1 Rational expectations equil: = 0 Practical (wisdom of crowds): =  A proposal: Fractional Kelly as an experts algorithm btw yourself and the market –Start with = 0.5 –If right, increase ; If wrong, decrease –Won’t do much worse than market (0) Won’t do much worse than original prior p

Summary and Questions Self-interested Kelly bettors implement Bayes’ rule, minimize market’s log loss If mkt & agents care about log loss: win-win Questions –Can non-Kelly bettors be induced to minimize log loss? –Can Kelly bettors be induced to minimize squared loss, 0/1 loss, etc.? –Can/should we encourage Kelly betting?