Start – Thursday,

Primacy of mind, categorization, and the problem of “the Other” Two categories: I [me, my, myself,...] and Other [she, her, herself,...] c.f., Martin Buber’s I/Thou – I/It Consider Descartes: 1. Mind and body are separate (i.e., two categories). If the mind is primary, then how do we account for the body? How do we even know, for certain, that the body exists? 2. Cogito, ergo sum. Even if we accept the premise “I think,” and the conclusion, “therefore I exist,” we are still left with two problems: The problem of the body: does “I exist” mean the body exists? Really? The problem of “the Other” – what about other people? That is, the assertion that I am thinking does not at all justify the claim that that anyone else also thinks, feels, believes, experiences, etc, as I do. Descartes ignored the problem; perhaps he didn’t realize that it existed. So now we have at least three categories: Mind, body, Other.

In American psychology, we have mostly emphasized the primacy of mind in terms of the “self.” Self-concept, self-confidence, self-identity, self-image, self-worth, individual independence,.... “Me.” Even this course, cognition & perception, focuses on thinking & perceiving of the individual taken in isolation We don’t spend much time considering the influence of group contexts & relations (except parenthetically, when allowing for the “influence” of culture, society, etc). So for us, what’s the big deal about “the Other?” Can we sensibly speak of a “self” without acknowledging the Other?

The problem arises when I try to assert that I know that others think, experience, etc, just as I do. Specifically, when I behave as though I understand the thoughts, mental experiences, etc, of others. Your pain is similar to mine. Your joy is similar to mine. Your experience of...is similar to my experience of...; etc.

Suddenly the abstract idea “category” has immediate & important personal and social meaning. If we are to communicate with one another, understand one another, etc, there must be some kind of linking, some kind of commonality with others.... How do we account for these other minds?

Five proposed solutions to knowledge about other minds: Psychological behaviorism – no “solution” to questions about mental states is needed since behaviors are all that matter, and they are directly observable. [B. F. Skinner, J. B. Watson, & many other American psychologists over the past century]

Materialistic monism – “mind” does not exist except as a verbal utterance that refers to an imaginary entity. The only real entity to be discussed is the physical brain. Since there is no “causal” mind, we don’t have to account for the minds of others.

Analogical inference – based on my own mental experiences, I infer that others have similar mental experiences. This is probably our “everyday” position. The problem here is that I am making an inductive claim based on only one case: my own experience. Many philosophers sees this “one case” basis as an insurmountable objection to this solution.

Conceptual criteria – link between mind & behavior is merely conceptual; the existence of a behavior is the criterion for the presence of a mental state. E.g., the mental experience of “itch” is conceptually related to “scratching.” So if you see me scratching, then the scratching is taken for evidence that I’m having the mental experience of an itch. Since this would apply to all people, the problem of generalizing inductively from just one case is eliminated. However, the problem here is that the solution is a fiat: merely applying the label “concept” doesn’t provide any evidence that the relevant mental states actually exist.

Mind as theoretical entity We can’t directly observe mental states, but we nevertheless start with the assumption that mental states cause behaviors. Most psychologists & philosophers believe that this position provides us with our best explanation for observed behaviors. Problems with this position: The notion of a cause that cannot be directly observed does occur in science, so this position could be acceptable. However, scientific hypotheses must be testable, and the idea that a “mind” exists & influences behaviours cannot actually be tested. Further, phenomenal qualities such as pain are particularly troublesome. In psychological terms, for example, how much pain is represented by a “7” on the physician’s “pain scale?” How do we calibrate a purely phenomenal property?

Theory of Mind 1. Mind is not directly observable – each human can only intuit the existence of her own mind through introspection [Descartes’ method] 2. We have no access to the mind of another – so any notions we have about other minds is entirely conjectural 3. Having a theory of mind that includes both oneself and other is very useful: a. It allows one to attribute thoughts, desires, and intentions to others, b. to predict or explain their actions, c. and to posit their intentions.

How do we come to have a theory of mind that includes others? 1. by analogy with one's own mind 2. based on the reciprocal nature of social interaction – e.g., during joint attending 3. the functional use of language 3. observing the expression of emotions by others 5. observing the actions of others

Theory of mind seems to be an innate potential ability in humans Rudimentary ability appears around 4 -5 years, regardless of prior experience Sally & Anne experiments Social and other experiences greatly influence its development after it appears Thus, people vary in the efficacy of their theories of mind

Related concept - Empathy Experientially recognizing and understanding others’ states of mind: beliefs desires emotions Often characterized as the ability to "put oneself into another's shoes."

Language & TOM: Theory of Mind - ability to understand others as intentional agents, that is, to interpret behaviors in terms of theoretical mental states such as beliefs, desires, knowledge, etc that guide our intentions & hence our behaviors. Common in philosophy (Davidson, 1984; Dennett, 1987) to see this ability as intrinsically dependent upon our linguistic abilities. After all, language provides us a representational medium for meaning and intentionality: thanks to language we are able to describe others people’s and our own actions in an intentional way: “Professor X intends for the students to....”

Class exercise – categorization Sources:

End Knowledge Repre & Categ – part 2