A Scheme for MN-MAP Security in HMIPv6 draft-qiu-mipshop-mn-map-security-00.txt Jianying ZHOU Feng BAO, Robert DENG, Ying QIU Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore

Why need security between MN and MAP? When CN sends packets to MN's RCoA, MAP intercepts the packets and forwards them to MN's LCoA. Redirect Attacks: if BU message from MN to MAP is not authenticated when MN changes its AR, an attacker can redirect traffic from MAP to fake destinations. Only the authorized users can use the MAP HA: Home Agent CN: Correspondent Node MAP: Mobility Anchor Point AR: Access Router MN: Mobile Node movement MAP’s Domain

How to Provide MN-MAP Security? Authentication-only Mode In this mode, a MAP only needs to ensure that the same MN is sending the BUs to the MAP. It is not necessary for the MN to prove that it is authorized to use a MAP to manage its mobility. BU 1 Cookie1 Cookie0 MNMAP BA 1 BU i BA i long term messages short term messages Cookie0 = {Src=LCoA, Des= MAP, Opt=HoA, C0} Cookie1 = {Src=MAP, Des=LCoA, Opt=HoA, C0, C1, N1}. BU 1 = {Src=LCoA, Des=MAP, Opt=HoA, C0, C1, N1, N2, TS, SIG MN, Cert MN }, SIG MN = Sig(SK MN, LCoA|HoA|MAP|N1|N2|TS). BA 1 = {Src=MAP, Des=LCoA, Opt=HoA, RCoA, C0, C1, N1, N2}, BU i = {Src=LCoA, Des=MAP, Opt=HoA, old_LCoA, TS, SIG MN_i } SIG MN_i = Sig(SK MN, LCoA|MAP|HoA|old_LCoA|TS). BA i = {Src=MAP, Des=LCoA, Opt=HoA}

How to Provide MN-MAP Security? Authentication & Authorization Mode In this mode, the MAP and the MN need to know that the other end is "trusted". The MAP also needs to know if the MN is authorized for using it. All 3 parties need certificates; MN’s is issued by its HA Both MAP and HA only need to store a few trusted CAs’ public keys. Similar to SSL, no global PKI is need here. BU 1 Cookie1 Cookie0 MNMAP BA 1 BU i BA i long term messages short term messages HA Req_cert Rep_cert

How to Provide MN-MAP Security? Authentication & Authorization Mode BU 1 Cookie1 Cookie0 MNMAP BA 1 BU i BA i HA Req_cert Rep_cert BU 1 = {Src=LCoA, Des=MAP, Opt=HoA, C0, C1, N1, N2, TS, g x, SIG MN, Cert MN }, SIG MN = Sig(SK MN, LCoA|HoA|MAP|g x |N1|N2|TS) Cert MN = {HoA, PK MN, Valid_Iinterval, SIG HA } Req_Cert = {Src=MAP, Des=HA, request_cert} Rep_Cert = {Src=HA, Des=MAP, Cert HA } BA 1 = {Src=MAP, Des=LCoA, Opt=HoA, RCoA, C0, C1, g y, SIG MAP, Cert MAP } SIG MAP = Sig(SK MAP, LCoA|HoA|MAP|g y |BU 1 ) Cert MAP = {MAP, PK MAP, Valid_Iinterval, SIG CA } BU i = {Src=LCoA, Des=MAP, Opt=HoA, old_LCoA, TS, SIG MN_i } BA i = {Src=MAP, Des=LCoA, Opt=HoA, SIG MAP_i }

Conclusion The proposal considers security issues in binding update between mobile nodes and a mobility anchor point. Proposed solution for the above, with two security modes for different scenarios. Authentication of MN without the global PKI.

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