Philosophy 220 Animal Rights

Regan and Animal Rights Tom Regan makes clear his commitment to the animal rights movement. As he articulates it, that movement has three central goals. 1. Abolition of the use of animals in science. 2. The dissolution of commercial agriculture 3. The elimination of sport hunting and trapping.  Only abolition is possible. “You don’t change unjust institutions by tidying them up” (489c1).

Unjust? According to Regan, the problem with our treatment of Non-Human Animals is that we conceive and treat them like resources—ours for the taking. This ignores what Regan considers to be their fundamental moral equality with us. Like with the Singer article, Regan offers us a summary of a larger book (The Case for Animal Rights), so we get only the key points of his argument for these claims.

Some Key Assumptions Regan specifies three assumptions central to his effort to establish that NHAs have moral rights and thus that we are wrong when we treat them like resources. 1. Some creatures are possessed of inherent value. 2. Those that are, are possessed of it equally. 3. Inherent value necessitates respect, where respect is understood (following Kant) as requiring treating possessors of IV in terms as ends in themselves rather than means.

Advantages of the Rights View According to Regan, there are a number of advantages to thinking about moral standing in terms of rights. 1. In principle finds all forms of racial, sexual and social discrimination immoral. 2. In principle denies that it is ever acceptable to trample on rights in pursuit of good consequences (the Justice Problem of consequentialism).

The Argument 1. No appropriately rational argument can limit the scope of this respect to human beings. He makes a similar argument to Singer’s about relevant differences and equality of consideration. 2. The property that explains our inherent value is being “the experiencing subject of a life” (491c1). In our other vernacular, this is the property that establishes DMS. 3. We do not know (can not?) how far this notion extends, but we do not need to. It is clear that NHAs exhibit this characteristic. 4. Therefore, they have inherent value and thus the same right to respect as human beings.

Implications? Abolition of animal testing. Abolition of commercial animal agriculture. Abolition of sport hunting and trapping.

Warren, “Rights Compared” Though Regan’s account did not seem to admit it, the common moral intuition about the rights of Non-Human Animals seems to be that if they have rights, these rights are limited relative to human rights. If you could only save one would it be your new born infant or a loyal family dog that you’ve had for a decade? Warren thinks that advocates of rights for NHAs need to account for this intuited difference and she aims to provide it.

Strength and Content Warren focuses our attention on two different features of rights where differences between rights of humans and rights of NHAs might be apparent. Content: what the right protects. Strength: how strong overriding reasons would have to be.

Human v. NHA: Content Given the differences between the forms of consciousness and activity of humans and NHAs, there are going to be many, specific distinctions in content between human and NHA rights. Freedom of Movement These distinctions should not mask a great deal of commonality in terms of content. Right to Life

Human v. NHA: Strength In those places of overlapping content, the distinguishing feature of human and NHA rights is strength. In general, human rights can only be overwhelmed by reasons stronger than those which would overwhelm the rights of NHAs. Even if this is not true, the lack of autonomy and reciprocity in the granting and respecting of rights is good reason to hierarchize rights holders.

Infanticide, Again? Does this argument once again strand the human infant or the severely retarded individual on the side of the limited rights holders? Warren thinks not, both because they are potentially or partially autonomous and have value for us

Curnutt, “Vegetarianism” Curnutt is convinced that moral arguments for vegetarianism coming from consequentialism and rights-based theories are incapable of addressing all of the issues that have been raised. He offers in replacement an argument grounded in something like the harm principle.

The Old Arguments Consequentialists like Singer will find it difficult to argue that the moral value of the consequences of actions will always require vegetarianism. Rights talk is so complex and contentious that even Regan doesn’t get the job done.

NEW Review the NEW argument for vegetarianism as it is presented on (501c1). Some Notes: Prima Facie: on its face, presumed to be (but can be overridden). Ultima Facie: on its face, (can’t be overridden. Animal: vertebrate. Clearly, (3), (5) and (6) are the key moves in the argument.

Killing Animals is Prima Facie Morally Wrong. Harm: something that adversely affects an individual or entity’s interests Severity of harm dependent on centrality of interests. Welfare interests are those that are (a) definitive of basic well-being, and (b) because their realization is the necessary precondition of having interests. Killing NHAs harms them, independent of any consequentialist or rights-based analyses. Therefore, assuming harm is prima facie morally wrong, it is wrong to kill NHAs.

Animal Eating is Prima Facie Morally Wrong Given that eating animals requires (except in very limited circumstances) killing them, eating them is PFMW. This is true even when we are not actually doing the butchering, not because we share some guilt with the butchers, but because we are benefiting from some morally dubious actions.

Moral Wrongness Cannot be Overridden 4 possible overriding concerns:  Traditional-Cultural: that something is traditional or culturally standard doesn’t mean it’s morally overriding. Ex., Slavery.  Esthetic: don’t overwhelm moral concerns.  Convenience: that a responsibility is difficult to satisfy doesn’t lessen it.  Nutrition: Lacto-Ovo vegetarianism is nutritionally complete; NEW doesn’t rule out eating of meat to satisfy necessary nutritional requirements. Thus, “the eating of animal flesh is ultima facie morally wrong” (507c1).