RISK COMMUNICATION APPROACH TSEAC 15 December 2006 Mark Weinstein, Ph.D. FDA, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research

TOPICS Development of Key Points Questions and Answers Review of –Key Points –Questions and Answers Communication Strategy

Key Points and Q’s and A’s Development Input from HHS (including FDA, CDC, NIH) Special Government Employee patient advocates Experts in risk communication Asked SGEs: Do you think the Issue Summary and the Summary Information documents adequately convey the findings, including the uncertainties, of the Risk Assessment? Are the documents easily understood? Please comment on any aspects of the documents that may lack clarity. Do you have suggestions about the delivery of the information from the point of view of a patient/family member? Input from SGEs and other consultants helped to clarify and improve the public health messages

Key Points In recent years, questions have been raised concerning the risk from variant Creutzfeldt- Jakob disease (vCJD) to hemophilia A and von Willebrand disease patients who receive US licensed plasma-derived Factor Eight (pdFVIII, Antihemophilic Factor) products. Since 2003, three people, all in the UK, have probably acquired the vCJD agent through blood cell transfusions. This has increased concern for the potential of vCJD transmission by blood products.

Key Points Principal concerns are to what extent if any, there could have been contamination of U.S. clotting factors with vCJD from infected donors, and whether products made from their plasma would transmit the disease. This is particularly true of donors who may have traveled to countries with a higher prevalence of vCJD and BSE than in the U.S.

Key Points FDA conducted a risk assessment for pdFVIII because it is made from the fraction of plasma that is likely to contain more of the vCJD infectious agent, if present, than the rest of the plasma, from which other products, such as albumin and immunoglobulins, are made. The FVIII containing fraction is further processed using a variety of methods that are likely to reduce or potentially eliminate vCJD from the final pdFVIII product.

Key Points vCJD originally came from a disease in cattle called bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or "mad cow disease"). Transmission of the BSE agent to humans, leading to vCJD, is believed to occur primarily via ingestion of cattle products contaminated with the BSE agent. Both BSE and vCJD are invariably fatal brain diseases with incubation periods typically measured in years.

Key Points From 1995 through November 2006, 200 human cases of vCJD were reported worldwide, with 164 cases in the United Kingdom (UK), and with three cases in the United States. Two of the human cases in the United States had lived in the UK during a key exposure period of the UK population to the BSE agent. The third most likely acquired the disease in Saudi Arabia. The incidence of vCJD (new case reports) in the UK peaked in 1999 and has been declining thereafter. In the UK, where most cases of vCJD have occurred, the current risk of acquiring vCJD from eating beef and beef products appears to be negligible, perhaps about 1 case per 10 billion servings.

Key Points Based on a recently completed risk assessment, the US Public Health Service, including FDA, CDC, and NIH, believes that the risk from vCJD to hemophilia A and von Willebrand disease patients who receive US licensed pdFVIII products is most likely to be extremely small, although we do not know the risk with certainty.

Key Points FDA, CDC, and NIH are not aware of any cases of vCJD having been reported worldwide in patients with hemophilia or other blood clotting disorders. This includes those who have received, over a long period of time, large amounts of blood clotting products manufactured from plasma donations from the UK where the risk of vCJD is highest.

Key Points In the United States, pdFVIII products have not been made from the plasma of anyone known to have developed vCJD, and no one who received any of these products is known to have developed vCJD. There is no test yet available to detect vCJD infection in healthy donors or recipients.

Key Points FDA used a computer model to assess the risk of vCJD from the current use of these products. However, there are many major uncertainties in the computer model, and a precise estimate of the risk is not currently possible. Again, there is no test yet available to detect vCJD infection in healthy donors or recipients.

Key Points Contacting a hemophilia specialist such as one at a Hemophilia Treatment Center is a good way to learn about new information as it becomes available. More information about Mad Cow Disease and vCJD is available on these websites: –FDA informational posting, containing current pdFVIII risk assessment, fact sheet, and briefing materials: –Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: –US Department of Agriculture: –Information also may be obtained from: HANDI; the National Hemophilia Foundation; Hemophilia Federation of America; Committee of Ten Thousand; World Federation of Hemophilia

Questions and Answers What is vCJD and how is it spread? Is it known that pdFVIII can transmit vCJD? What is the likelihood that a patient who received pdFVIII could become infected with vCJD? Why did FDA do a vCJD risk assessment for pdFVIII? What is the risk of vCJD to patients who receive transfusion products like red blood cells and plasma?

Q’s and A’s Why is FDA informing patients, healthcare providers, and the public about vCJD and pdFVIII now? Should patients inform their primary health care providers about a possible vCJD exposure from US licensed pdFVIII? Do patients who receive pdFVIII need to do anything special when seeking dental or surgical care?

Q’s and A’s What can recipients of pdFVIII do with this information? What are Hemophilia Treatment Centers, and where can I find out about them? Where can I find more information about vCJD and pdFVIII?

Communication Strategy Key Points, Questions and Answers, Risk Assessment, and Issue Summary are posted on an FDA web site Hemophilia Treatment Centers have been notified about this issue, have provided input, and will disseminate information Patient advocacy organizations have also been briefed, and will help to publicize these findings through newsletters and other media PHS will outreach to trade and physician organizations The Key Points and Questions and Answers lists sources for further information and answers to questions

QUESTIONS TO THE TSEAC Does the Committee have any comments on the technical aspects of FDA’s risk assessment, including the risk estimates and uncertainties, for pdFVIII from US donors? Does the Committee agree that the Key Points and Additional Information as described –a) capture the essential points of the Risk Assessment –b) provide a suitable and understandable interpretation of the results? Please comment on the communication strategy regarding the risk assessment and its interpretation.