7/13/061 Handover Keying Reqs IETF 66 Montreal. 7/13/062 Problem scope requirements (1) MUST Support multiple access technologies MUST not require full.

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7/13/061 Handover Keying Reqs IETF 66 Montreal

7/13/062 Problem scope requirements (1) MUST Support multiple access technologies MUST not require full EAP re-authentication within same AAA domain –Handover (inter and intra ADC) –Authorization Session Expiry MUST support deployments with disjoint AN and ADC –Distinct AN-ID and ADC-ID –Distinct per AN and per ADC keys (derivation and transport) –Channel binding for each key MUST be EAP-method independent in all aspects

7/13/063 Hierarchy Requirement (2) MUST determine whether to use MSK or USRK (from EMSK) –If USRK, then SHOULD develop spec USRK for handover (HRK) MUST define key derivation/ management at each level (i.e. at AAA server, at ADC level, at AN) –If outside IETF scope (MN-AN): Should define Requirement/ guidance/ parameters specifications (e.g. for channel binding, scoping, caching life time)

7/13/064 Signaling requirements MUST define key transport/management requirements. –SHOULD define key transport signaling protocols MUST investigate delay performance optimization alternatives –SHOULD support proactive and reactive signaling (pre and post HO)

7/13/065 Key Scope requirements Hierarchy level i=HLi (root key: i=0) MUST define key life/scope for keys at any HLi. –Should define life time relationships between HLi and HLi+1 Compromise of an HLi+1 key MUST not lead to compromise of keys at HLi at the same or other entities Compromise of an HLi key MUST not lead to compromise of keys at the same level (HLi) at other entities Compromise of an HLi key SHOULD not lead to compromise of HLi keys (same level) at same entity