What You Should Know About China’s Nuclear Strategy MG. Pan Zhenqiang (Retired) Former director Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, PLA China Washington DC., Beijing, October 6, 2015

Content 1.Terminology 2.No-first-use (NFU) –China’s nuclear doctrine, the heart of China’s nuclear strategy 3.Characteristics of China’s Nuclear Strategy 4.Contributions of China’s nuclear strategy to the global security 5.Challenges to China’s nuclear strategy in the Post Cold War era 6.China’s response 7.China’s view on the elimination of nuclear weapons.

1. Terminology

Nuclear doctrine Nuclear strategy Nuclear strategic guidelines

Nuclear doctrine refers to a theory based on carefully worked out principles or a codification of beliefs, or philosophical perspective towards nuclear weapons.

Nuclear strategy chiefly involves the optimal planning of the production and use of its nuclear weapons, in line with the nuclear doctrine of the country, and based on its threat perception. The major issues that the nuclear strategy must address include: under what conditions does it serve a nation's interest to develop nuclear weapons? What types of nuclear weapons should be developed? When and how should such weapons be used?

If doctrine is principle or philosophy, strategy is the science and art. To put it another way, doctrine seeks to provide a common conceptual framework for the military action. The former guides the latter. They are closely interrelated and often used interchangeably.

China does not like to use either term in the hope of highlighting the uniqueness of its nuclear doctrine. For quite a long time, China uses nuclear strategic guidelines to describe its nuclear strategy.

China’s nuclear doctrine: no first use of nuclear weapons. The rationale is that: as one of the most devastating category of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons should never be produced and used. Pending their complete prohibition and thorough destruction all the nuclear weapon states should at least limit the role of nuclear weapons to the only one of preventing and retaliating the use of nuclear weapons.

China nuclear strategy: strategy of self-defense A strategy of retaliation strategy, a strategy one might call delayed second strike (DSS). This means that China will retaliate after withstanding a nuclear strike, rather than attempting either a launch under attack (LUA) or a launch-on-warning (LOW)-type strategy.

Difference between a self-defensive strategy and nuclear deterrence strategy --Deterrence strategy is offensive while China’s strategy is defensive. --Deterrence is a major source of the arms race between nuclear weapon states. Deterrence is also a major source of nuclear proliferation. D

2. No-first-use (NFU): the heart of China’s nuclear strategy

When it first acquired nuclear capability in 1964, China declared that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances. Since then, China has consistently abided by the NFU obligation, guiding its nuclear arsenal build-up, its nuclear posture, all its other nuclear activities. China takes its NFU pledge as a symbol of a responsible nuclear weapon state.

The NFU is verifiable.

-No need to build up a large nuclear force for the preemptive strikes. -No need to put its nuclear force on a hair-trigger alertness. -No need to mate warheads to their carrying vehicles all the time. -No need to seek a war-fighting capability, or weapons for non-strategic purpose. -No need to deploy nuclear weapons abroad. -No need to be engaged in a nuclear arms race with any other nuclear weapon powers.

3. Characteristics of China’s Nuclear Strategy

1) Self-defense. 2) A dialectical outlook on nuclear weapons: nuclear weapons are paper tigers; they are also real, iron tigers. 3) Non-linkage of the use of nuclear weapons with the use of conventional weapons. 4) Primarily a tool to respond to the US nuclear threat 5) Strategic transparency vis-à-vis technical opaqueness.

4. Contributions of China’s nuclear strategy to the world security

1)Helping maintain global strategic stability among nuclear weapon states. 2) Setting a good example of a responsible nuclear weapon state pending the progress of nuclear disarmament. 3) Constituteing an effective first step towards both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

5. Challenges to China’s Nuclear Strategy In the Post Cold War Era

1)Intensification of China-US competition: closing the window of mutual vulnerability?

“US Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century: A Fresh Look at National Strategy and Requirements” by Center For Counter-proliferation Research at the US National defense university and Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, July 1998

“A policy that holds American society totally vulnerable to nuclear attack is not in the security interest of the United Sates or Russia. Emphasis on a policy of mutual vulnerability inhibits the long-term positive evolution in the relationship between these two states. Moreover, the United States should not allow a mutual vulnerability relationship to emerge with other states, either intentionally or otherwise. The ability of the Unite States to develop and deploy effective defenses against smaller- scale attacks will establish a firmer foundation for deterrence in the future and provide protection for forces and population.”

There was a heated debate in Pentagon around China’s nuclear weapons over a decade ago. The question pointedly asked was whether the US should take China as “a small Moscow” or a “big Pyongyang”. The outcome of the debate is unknown. The debate itself, however, undermined China’s confidence in the US willingness to maintain strategic stability between them. So far signals sent out from Washington are mixed, which may have confused Beijing.

2)The uncertain role of new technologies

New capabilities are emergubg that may threaten the creditability of China’s small nuclear retaliatory force. -Missile defense/offensive capability in space --Cyberspace capabilities --The advanced conventional capabilities

New technologies also bring about the change of the way how a future war is conducted, opening up to an entirely new strategic context for a nuclear exchange. Thus challenges to China: --Redefining a strategic attack? --Validity of a counter-value-based retaliation?

3) Nuclear proliferation in China’s periphery or where China has a huge stake for security. --India and Pakistan (South Asia) --North Korea nuclear crisis (Northeast Asia) --Iran and Israel (Middle East)

Implications of regional nuclear proliferation To China’s Security Regional nuclear proliferation such as in South Asia, and Northeast Asia (North Korea, Japan, and South Korea) has further complicated China’s security calculation. Nuclear further proliferation in the Middle East will also undermine China’s growing strategic interests in the region and beyond. For the first time, regional tensions are greatly affected by a nuclear element not directly from the major nuclear powers. Beijing will confront with a new challenge as how to put these nuclear capabilities into the regional equation of various forces.

4) A newly emerged role of non-state actors, who have become both the new source as well as the potential users of nuclear material, technology or know-how in proliferation.

5)Domestic pressure: debates whether China should abandon or modify the NFU --Learning from Japan, Germany, or South Africa? --learning from Russia, or the United States?

6. China’s response to the new challenges.

The mainstream view in China is that the real challenge to China’s nuclear strategy is not whether it should change its the NFU pledge, rather, how to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the NFU in the changing security environment. To that end, China must walk on two legs.

T he first leg Modernizing, upgrading and improving its nuclear forces..

“A lean and effective force and going with the tide of the development of military science and technology, …strives to raise the informationization level of its weaponry and equipment, ensure their safety and reliability, and enhance its capabilities in protection, rapid reaction, penetration, damage and precision strike.” China’s National Defense in 2008, Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, Beijing, January 2009.

The second leg Proactively participating in the international multilateral efforts for the progress of nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation

7. China’s view on the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The vision of a world free of nuclear weapons fits precisely into China’s long-term position on nuclear weapons as it has consistently advocated the goal of complete prohibition and through destruction of nuclear weapons.

A roadmap to a nuclear free world in China’s perspective

A new vision that nuclear weapons should play no role in the security strategy of any states. This should constitute an essential conceptual framework for the meaningful progress of nuclear disarmament. Pending reaching that goal, all the nuclear armed states should reach agreement not to be the first to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons (NFU)-the first step truly meaningful nuclear disarmament:

Global as well as regional conflict resolutions so as to develop a more propitious political environment and atmosphere for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.

The United States and Russia honoring their special responsibility for nuclear disarmament: --Further Deep-cuts. --Modifying nuclear operational posture and doctrines. --Restraints in the deployment of missile defense, and refraining from taking measures for the weaponization in the outer space. --Refraining from the quality upgrading of nuclear weapons while reducing their size. --Strengthening the global nuclear disarmament and non- proliferation mechanisms --Making nuclear disarmament verifiable and irreversible.

Major obstacles to the progress of nuclear disarmament 1) Lack of mutual trust 2) Cold-War mentality 3) Difficulty of achieving balanced progress of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-problems 4) Major technical constraints: --Loopholes of peaceful use of nuclear energy --the role of non-state actors --verification

Questions or comments?