Review of Safety Systems for the LHC Experiments & Experimental Areas Emmanuel Tsesmelis / TS-LEA LEMIC 20 March 2007

Scope of Review Review of safety systems for the LHC experiments and experimental areas - participation from TS, PH, SC Aims of review:  Providers: Summarise specification of each safety system Present status and future plans for their realisation Describe links to the clients (i.e. experiments)  Clients: State position on the baseline specifications Present any additional requirements Describe actions to be taken upon reception of signals from the safety systems  How to organise and handle (overlapping) phases Installation Commissioning/starting-up Maintenance and Operation

Safety Systems Reviewed Alarms and Monitoring  CSAM  RAMSES  Sniffer  Fire Detection & Oxygen Deficiency Monitor Protection  LACS & LASS  Experiment Sub-sectorisation  General Electrical Protection (AUL, AUG) Limitation of Damage  Associated Systems – Foam Extinguisher, Smoke Ventilation, Flood Detection

Major Issues Identified (I) Experiments expressed need for the XCR to be the primary contact for safety interventions.  All relevant safety information to be bundled there and experiment SLIMOS/GLIMOS will play a central role in interacting with the Fire Brigade.  XCR to be central point of information where safety personnel must pass before undertaking any activity at the experiments. Information centralised in the XCR.  CSAM synoptic view of all Level-3 alarms.  CSAM, Sniffer, RAMSES and Access Control consoles.  Hardware link to Detector Safety System (DSS).  Software information via Data Interchange Protocol (DIP) to Detector Control System (DCS).

Major Issues Identified (II) Sniffer System  Present specification of Sniffer limits number of gas types. Experiments request flexibility for additional gases (e.g. SF 6 ).  Adjustable alarm thresholds per sensor. Less strict smoke alarm thresholds when welding. Stricter CO 2 alarm threshold levels when cavern open.  Global procedures for safety actions needed Who/what triggers safety actions? Remove risk of contradictory safety actions  ODH vs. Fire Detection Preference for manual rather than automatic actions

Major Issues Identified (III) Radioprotection Issues  RAMSES operation.  Handling of radioactive material.  Consequences of INB procedures.  Radiation screening for persons/material exiting LHC experimental areas. Development and implementation of Patrol procedures remains outstanding. Incorporation of intercom/public address system to be revisited. Maintenance and fast 24/7 Piquet service.

Treatment of Outstanding Issues ActionDefinitionComment 2007Request accepted; to be implemented in 2007 Technical implementation (TS Dept. or SC/RP) is in progress tbd (to be defined)Request accepted; time frame & responsible of service to be defined Technical implementation to be done by TS Department or SC/RP tbc (to be confirmed)Request to be evaluated; ECR to be issued if accepted To be taken up by Task Force (SC/PH/TS)

General Conclusions The Review proved to be a very useful exercise in analysing the LHC Safety Systems for the experiments & experimental areas. The Review showed that good overall progress in installation and commissioning is being made to realise the baseline systems. Several important issues related to the proper functionality of the safety systems were identified.  Additional functionalities/procedures are being evaluated. Safety Commission  Provide (homogeneous) directives on several open safety policy issues. New requests (from experiments) would otherwise create contradictions in Safety Matrices if implemented as currently formulated. Prepare list of priorities.

Procedure Under approval Take implications regarding INB into account from the outset.