Japanese Development in the Use of Operating Experience Session1 Operational Experience Feedback: Actual Experiences Michio Ishikawa President Japan Nuclear Technology Institute May 2006

Establishment of JANTI  Established on April 13, 2005  Members … 113 companies electric utilities, manufacturers, subcontractors, etc.  Purpose 1)On the model of INPO, support the industrial initiatives for safer operation. 2)Improve the regulation practices agree with nuclear technology.

Function and Organization of JANTI Nuclear Industry Regulatory Bodies Academic Societies (Standards Development) Public Promote safety culture and best practice Request the scientific and rational rule based on operating experience Assist development of Codes and Standards Show third party evaluation and accountability Japan Nuclear Technology Institute Operating Experience Analysis Division Codes and Standards Division Nuclear Safety Network Division General Affairs Division Base on Nuclear Engineering and Technology with Expertise and Sustainability

Why JANTI was established  Reinforcement of safety regulation  Reinforcement of safety regulation after JCO accident and TEPCO scandal.  It put heavy burden on utilities and exhausted their plant sites  Mihama accident accelerated the needs further.  JANTI was established. One year earlier than Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, INC.(JAIF)

 JNES: governmental body Regulation and inspection … according to the law.  JANTI: private society  Support to improve safety to manage … according to the nuclear technology rationale.  Request to improve regulatory practice based on plant data a Vigilance Committee Difference to JNES JNES: Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization … subsidized organization of METI

NUCIA since 1966 NUClear Information Archives (A) Accident Information requested by the law (B) Safety Quality Information, (B) Safety Quality Information, events shared among utilities to improve Safety (C) Other Information, (C) Other Information, events not required but voluntary published (A)(B)(C)Total 1,0721, ,099 As of March

Comparison of NPP shutdown period between U.S. and Japan Condition of Data CollectionAverageData Source U.S.Actual shutdown period7.3 days Unit:103 units Collection period:1 year(‘04) Data:54 events Japan Actual shutdown period34.4 days Unit:52-53units Collection period:6 years (’99-’04) Data:31 events Estimated Shortest process period (Shutdown + Recovery process ;exclude investigation process) 6.8 days 4.7times equal

Transition of NPP Capacity Factor

Inspection System in Japan; past  “ Annual inspection ” : Traditional inspection method  Originally came from conventional power plant, back to 80 years ago  Systematic but focused on disassemble test  Successful achievement in nuclear power generation in 1980s-1990s … vice versa “ undesirable load ”  Strict QMS were added on the annual inspection Site exhaustion At present

Mihama accident  Rapture of large steam pipe.  FAC (Flow accelerated corrosion) of piping was not measured for 28 years because not on the list.  Fatality: 5 persons Serious injury: 6 persons  Site worker eyes stay on list, not on plant condition.

TEPCO scandal  the falsification of inspection data in the whole organization.  Rice culture: no individual but unite group is important.  Hiding for the group not shame problem.  irrational action out of the world fashion of glasnost.  The scandal was revealed by such a peculiar way as an anonymity from a foreigner, to fire 4 presidents from public office.

Conclusion  "Disclosure" is the one and only commitment made by the nuclear industry today.  Japanese culture exists some time in the root causes of recent incidents.  “ Too-much is too-less ”  Feedback from operating experiences is only tool to recover balance of system avoiding off- set.

Thank you !