Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATFS)

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Presentation transcript:

Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATFS) Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Cell LCDR Frank Clark L T Craig Dziewiatkowski LT Donny Northrup Dz Group Intro: We selected the Organization – Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATFS) headquartered in Key West, FL. And specifically their Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Cell. Some of you already know our efforts from previous classes since Frank, Steve Miller, and I are working with the JIATFS CTF Cell on our MBA Project. Donny was gracious enough to join us in our efforts on this one. - One thing to mention is that we did see links to the FBI Case Study in class. Specifically in regard to how the CTF Cell exploits and explores, but we will touch on that more later. UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//REL TO USA, LBN, NGA

Agenda JIATFS Players/Stakeholders JIATFS CTF Cell Mission Organizational Structure Strategic Issue Activity Map SWOT Exploitation/Exploration Lessons Learned Dz- Here is a quick layout of our agenda: First: Donny will briefly describe what JIATFS & the CTF Cell do along with their Missions Second: Frank will quickly describe the organizational structure of JIATFS and the CTF Cell Next: I’ll explain the Strategic Issue that the JIATFS CTF Cell is facing, Donny will present an Activity Map, & Frank with conduct a SWOT analysis. I’ll follow-up with Exploitation & Exploration recommendations. And finally we’ll close up with our lessons learned.

JIATFS Players/Stakeholders Donny -Mission: “JIATF South conducts interagency and international Detection & Monitoring of suspect air and maritime drug activity in the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific. Their goal is to facilitate the interdiction of illicit trafficking and other narco-terrorist threats in support of national and partner nation security….” -Integrated Team of Stakeholders: Talk to the players and their involvement.

Organizational Structure Command Group Director, RADM, USCG Deputy Director, RDML, USN Vice Director, SES, CBP Chief of Staff, Col, USAF Command Master Chief, USCG J1J8 – DOR GS-12 J2 – Intel CAPT, USN J3 – Operations Col, USMC J4 – Logistics GS-15 J5 – Plans & Policy COL, USA J6 – C5I GS-15 J7 – Innovation & Technology GS-15 J9 – International Affairs GS-15 Frank Organizational Structure of JIATFS: “The JIATF–South team design evolved along with its operational concept… JIATF–South uses functional departmentalization to organize its personnel based on the similarity of tasks they perform (intelligence, operations, etc.). As intelligence began to drive operations, JIATF–South redistributed its internal assets to better support intelligence fusion and its Intelligence Directorate grew as a result.” FBI Case link: Intel drives Ops… “In 2003, the Operations and Intelligence watch floors were merged & greater physical collocation when they merged its Intelligence and Operations Directorates by knocking down the wall that separated their offices and eliminated individual cubicles in favor of more open spaces.” - The CTF Cell reports to the J2 as depicted on the org chart. The CTF Cell Chief is currently Tammy Bowers. Her cell consists of six additional members who are all GG-13s with the exception of one E-5 from the Army National Guard. CTF Cell CTF Cell Organization 1 x CTF Cell Chief (GG-14) 6 x CTF Cell Members 5 x GG-13s 1 x E-5 Army National Guard

Strategic Issue Current Strategy: Enable Law Enforcement (LE) and facilitate targeting of illicit trafficking Issue: JIATFS CTF Cell’s strategy and day-to-day activities are reactionary and do not address an evolving threat Defense Civilian Intelligence Performance System (DCIPS): Individual performance measurement system with incentives Lack of long-term focus = Loss of relevance Dz- As I mentioned, we are working with the JIATFS CTF Cell on our MBA Project and we have paid a visit to Key West to interview each team member, we have remained in contact with them for follow-up, and had the CTF Cell Chief visit NPS and give a brief to our Terrorist Financing Class (DA4601) last quarter (March 2015). Current JIATFS CTF Cell Strategy is to enable law enforcement and facilitate targeting of illicit trafficking (by building cases and providing intel analysis) that leads to arrests/indictments, or that leads to bulk cash/illicit good/asset tracking and seizures. We believe the key strategic issue with the JIATFS CTF Cell is that their strategy is and day-to-day activities are reactionary and do not address an evolving threat. As Donny will explain next in the Activity Map, the CTF Cell does their day job well and answers requests for information (RFIs) from numerous customers. They open and work multiple cases and build intel analysis products. The CTF Cell does have an individual performance measurement system through the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS). This system consists of 6 performance elements and 3 objectives which team members are graded on. However, this grading criteria focuses on current activity and does not incentivize forward looking performance. And as we’ve seen in case studies throughout this course, a lack of long-term focus leads to a loss of relevance. And in DoD, a loss of relevance means a loss of funding…

Activity Map OCDETF JWICS CIA Human INT Request for Info SIGINT FBI State Assets (Border/Customs) Mil Assets (Ships/Planes) Embassy Teams Panama Express OCDETF JWICS Law Enforcement Organic SIGINT CIA US Mil Services Human INT Request for Info Interagency Relationships SIGINT Centers Country Participants SIGINT JIATF-S Analysts FBI DEA Intel Fusion Bulk Cash Monitoring Donny -Activity Map: Everything flows from the JIATF-S Analysis team and their ability to enable law enforcement to make arrests. From that there are 5 key areas in which they operate which are highlighted in green. They leverage interagency relationships which includes US and Foreign agencies. It also is driven by those agencies assets and connections. Human Intelligence is gathered from multiple connections including the Panama Express and the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force. These could both also be considered interagency relations. Requests for Info from Law Enforcement helps to drive JIATF-S’s focus and also feeds from a myriad of sources. Signals Intel is driven by JIATF-S and their ability to leverage those resources they have which monitor signals/communications. Intel Fusion is the ability to piece all of the info together, create a common operating picture and feed that to LE. Enable LE & Facilitate Targeting Sea Traffic Monitoring Additional RFI Rumors

Activity Map Enable LE & Facilitate Targeting OCDETF JWICS CIA State Assets (Border/Customs) Mil Assets (Ships/Planes) Embassy Teams Panama Express OCDETF JWICS Law Enforcement Organic SIGINT CIA US Mil Services Human INT Request for Info Interagency Relationships SIGINT Centers Country Participants SIGINT JIATF-S Analysts FBI DEA Intel Fusion Bulk Cash Monitoring Donny -Activity Map: Everything flows from the JIATF-S Analysis team and their ability to enable law enforcement to make arrests. From that there are 5 key areas in which they operate which are highlighted in green. They leverage interagency relationships which includes US and Foreign agencies. It also is driven by those agencies assets and connections. Human Intelligence is gathered from multiple connections including the Panama Express and the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force. These could both also be considered interagency relations. Requests for Info from Law Enforcement helps to drive JIATF-S’s focus and also feeds from a myriad of sources. Signals Intel is driven by JIATF-S and their ability to leverage those resources they have which monitor signals/communications. Intel Fusion is the ability to piece all of the info together, create a common operating picture and feed that to LE. Enable LE & Facilitate Targeting Sea Traffic Monitoring Additional RFI Rumors

SWOT Frank Strengths Reputation: The JIATF South CTF Cell is sough out by other agencies in the DOD and Federal Government for their analytical skills. Organizations that typically do not trust “outsiders” reach out to the JIATFS South CTF Cell for their competency and discretion. Experience/knowledge: Then CTF Cell members bring a wealth of background knowledge and experience with them. Examples-one member worked in commercial banking for approximately 20 years and another worked at NSA. Networks: The CTF Cell has developed an extensive interagency network, leveraging information from HSI, ICE, CBP, the FBI and DEA just to name a few. Intrinsic motivation: The analysts love their jobs. The all take great personal pleasure in seeing their analysis result in decisive actions such as seizures, arrests, and convictions. Weaknesses Number of analysts: The CTF cell has only seven members. At least one cell member is typically always TAD/TDY. The CTF Cell Chief specifically identified the need for more analysts. Extrinsic motivators: There are few extrinsic motivators for the cell members. They cannot be promoted in their current billets and bonuses are typically not funded or given to upper level management. Number of Spanish speakers: Currently, only two of the cell’s members are Spanish speakers. The cell members often participate in TAD/TDYs in order to enhance Partner Nation CTF capabilities and not being fluent in Spanish diminishes training value. TAD/TDY reluctance: Most of the CTF cell members do not like TAD/TDYs and try to avoid them, posing a challenge when it comes to PN training opportunities. Opportunities Growing DOD focus on CTF: DOD has embraced CTF as a non-kinetic method of addressing threats. PN interest: Several countries in the JIATFS JOA are open to training opportunities in order increase their effectiveness in countering transnational organized crime. Increases in Financial Action Task Force (FATF) membership: FATF is an inter-governmental organization comprised of 34 nations that develops policy for anti-money laundering efforts and combatting the financing of terrorism. Membership is voluntary. As more countries join FATF, banking and reporting standards will improve, possibly improving the flow of information to the CTF cell. Interagency cooperation/coordination: The opportunity exists to grow the CTF cells’ interagency network, thus providing more sources to develop the intel cycle. Threats The DOD operates in a fiscally constrained environment. As an example, the CTF cell’s budget for FY15 was reduced by approx. $200,000. Public/political opinion: Some of the citizens/politicians in the countries comprising the JIATFS JOA favor legalization of all narcotics which may complicate the CTF cells ability to develop intel. Additionally, US ONDCP policy has recently tending to favor programs aimed at demand reduction vice supply reduction. Alternate forms of currency: The CTF cell currently specializes in tracking paper currency. Alternate forms of currency such as Bitcoin represent an unknown for the JIATFS CTF cell. Cyber analysts: The role of cyber analysts may likely grow in importance if/when alternate forms of currency such as Bitcoin become more widely utilized.

Exploitation/Exploration Exploitative Business Alignment of: Exploitative Business Exploratory Business Strategic intent Enable LE & facilitate targeting of illicit activity Identify adversary alternative financing methods Critical tasks Answer RFIs, Provide solid intel analysis/fusion Highlight adversary networks, expand relationships Competencies Intel analysis to support tactical level ops Knowledge expansion Structure Departmentalized, but flat Loose Controls, rewards Performance objectives (Quantity & Quality) Knowledge growth Culture Customer-oriented, collaborative/team effort Knowledge sharing, application of knowledge Leadership role Firm CTF Cell Chief oversight Open-minded CTF Cell Chief encouraging exploration Dz When we read the FBI case, we had a supplemental Harvard Business Review titled The Ambidextrous Organization. In this review, O’Reilly & Tushman explaining organizations “must constantly look back, but also must gaze to the future.” This is the heart of the issue with the JIATFS CTF Cell. They do their day job well, but are failing to focus on what lies ahead in the CTF world. Here is how we believe the JIATF CTF Cell should innovate using, “The Scope of the Ambidextrous Organization”: Exploitative Business: Enable LE & facilitate targeting by answering the RFIs & providing solid intel analysis/fusion supporting tactical-level ops. Very departmentalized but flat organization that should be controlled by performance measures that are properly measured via quantity and quality. Culture will remain customer-oriented and continue to have a collaborative/team effort that has a firm CTF Cell Chief oversight. Exploratory Business: Identify adversary alternative financing methods by highlighting adversary networks and expanding relationships with partner nations, interagencies, and international organizations (Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists (ACAMS), etc.). Focus on knowledge expansion in order to be ahead of the adversary financing techniques (e.g. understand vulnerabilities of BITCOIN, cutting edge of corruption, etc.) and in a loose organization that rewards knowledge growth. Culture will need to adapt to support knowledge sharing and allow for application of new knowledge that has a open-minded CTF Cell Chief. ISSUES: Weaknesses/Threats from SWOT are very real and restrictive -> Budget cuts, limited number of analysts, and heavy workload will limit the JIATFS CTF from expanding into an exploratory business. Basically, the Cell is “too caught up in today to be looking at tomorrow…”

Lessons Learned JIATFS CTF Cell is a real organization & CTF is still a new concept -> “Follow the Money” Cost of 9/11: $400K-$500K Cost of London Transportation System Attack (2005): $14K Cost of Suicide Bombing Vest: as low as $1,200 (JIEDDO) Abu Sayyaf killed 15May15: Oversaw ISIL’s illicit oil & gas Ops Strategy should be forward looking Continue to show added value All Why is this organization/topic interesting? JIATFS CTF Cell is a real organization for our MBA Project. The CTF concept is relatively new since 9/11 and current operations show us just how important understanding adversary financing operations are. Think about the low costs of terrorist operations and how much damage they inflict. How much are we willing to spend on CTF? Based on current operations ,the U.S. is willing to put U.S. service members lives on the line to gather even more intel about ISIS’s operations and financing methods as seen by taking out Abu Sayyaf on 15May15. What did you learn? Strategy and day-to-day activities need to be forward looking. Just because an organization is good at what they do today doesn’t mean they’ll be in business tomorrow. JIATF CTF Cell needs to continue to show added value. If arrests/indictments/bulk cash seized decrease, where else are they adding value?