Public Choice and the Political Process

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Presentation transcript:

Public Choice and the Political Process Chapter 5 Public Choice and the Political Process

The Supply of Public Goods Through Political Institutions Public Choice involves decisions being made through political interaction of many persons according to pre-established rules.

Political Equilibrium A political equilibrium is an agreement on the level of production of one or more public goods, given the specified rule for making the collective choice and the distribution of tax shares among individuals.

Tax Shares or Tax Prices Tax shares, sometimes called tax prices, are pre-announced levies assigned to citizens. They are a portion of the unit cost of a good proposed to be provided by government. ti = tax share to individual i  ti = average cost of good

Individual's Choice Individuals make choices given their most preferred political outcomes. Each person will favor the quantity of the government-supplied good corresponding to the point at which the person’s tax share is exactly equal to the marginal benefit of the good to that person.

Figure 5.1 The Most Preferred Political Outcome of A Voter Tax Output per Year MB Tax per Unit of Output ti Q* Z i

The Choice to Vote or Not Rational Ignorance is the idea that, to many voters, the marginal cost of obtaining information concerning an issue is greater than the marginal benefit of gaining that information. This leads the voter to fail to gather the information and then not to vote.

Determinants of Political Equilibrium the public choice rule average and marginal costs of the public good information available on the cost and benefit the distribution of the tax shares distribution of benefits among voters

Figure 5.2 Political Equilibrium Under Majority Rule With Equal Tax Shares Marginal Benefit,Cost, and Tax (Dollars) Security Guards per Week SMB 350 MC = AC E 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MBA MBB MBC MBF MBG MBH MBM 50 t

Median Voter Model The median voter model assumes that the voter whose most-preferred outcome is the median of the most-preferred political outcomes of all those voting will become the political equilibrium.

Increase Security Guards per Week to: Voting to Provide Security Protection and Election Result under Simple Majority Rule   Increase Security Guards per Week to: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Voters A Y N B C M F G H Result Pass Fail

Implications of Median Voter Model Only the median voter gets his most-preferred outcome. Others get either too little or too much.

Political Externalities Political Externalities are the losses in well-being that occur when voters do not obtain their most-preferred outcomes, given their tax shares.

Political Transactions Costs Political Transactions Costs are the measures of the value of time, effort, or other resources expended to reach or enforce a collective agreement.

Uniqueness and Cycling of Outcomes Under Majority Rule Voter Rankings For Fireworks Displays per Year Voter First Choice Second Choice Third Choice A 3 2 1 B C

Preferences Single-peaked preferences a unique optimal outcome exists   Multi-peaked preferences as people move away from their most preferred outcome, they become worse off until a certain point. After that point, as they move further away from their most-preferred outcome they become better off.

Figure 5.3 Voter Rankings of Alternatives Fireworks Displays per Year Net Benefit for A Single Peak 1 2 3 Net Benefit for A Multiple Peaks 2 3 1 Fireworks Displays per Year Net Benefit for A Single Peak 1 2 3 Net Benefit for A Single Peak 1 2 3

Election 1: How Many Fireworks Displays per Year, 1 vs 2 B votes for 1 A and C vote for 2 Result 2 wins

Election 2: How Many Fireworks Displays per Year, 3 vs 1 A votes for 3 B and C vote for 1 Result 1 wins

Election 3: How Many Fireworks Displays per Year, 2 vs 3 C votes for 2 A and B vote for 3 Result 3 wins

Pairwise Cycling Pairwise cycling is a phenomenon in which each outcome can win a majority, depending on how it is paired on a ballot.

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem It is impossible to devise a voting rule that meets a set of conditions that can guarantee a unique political equilibrium for a public choice.

Conditions of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem All voters have free choice; no dictator. We cannot rule out multi-peaked preferences. If all voters change their rankings of a particular alternative, the public choice that emerges must not move in the opposite direction. Public choices are not influenced by the order in which they are presented.  Public choices must not be affected by the elimination or addition of alternatives to the ballot. Public choice, like all economic choices, should be transitive.

Cause of Cycling: Multi-peaked preferences Voter Rankings For Fireworks Displays per Year: All Voters with Single Peaked Preferences Voter First Choice Second Choice Third Choice A 3 2 1 B C

Election 1: How Many Fireworks Displays per Year, 1 vs 2 B votes for 1 A and C vote for 2 Result 2 wins

Election 2: How Many Fireworks Displays per Year, 3 vs 1 A votes for 3 B and C vote for 1 Result 1 wins

Election 3: How Many Fireworks Displays per Year, 2 vs 3 A votes for 3 B and C vote for 2 Result 2 wins Net Result: if “2” is on the ballot, it wins

Figure 5.4 The Median Peak as the Political Equilibrium under Majority Rule Medium Peak (Voter C ) Peak for Voter B' Peak for Voter A Net Benefit 1 2 3 Fireworks Displays per Year

Figure 5.5 Declining Marginal Benefit of a Pure Public Good, Meaning That Preferences are Single Peaked Marginal Benefit and Tax per Unit Net Benefit Output of a Pure Public Good Q * MB t

Political Processes Constitutions Minority Rule Majority Rule

Costs and Benefits of Collective Action Benefit: decrease in political externalities Cost: increase in political transaction costs

Possible Alternatives Methods Unanimity Relative unanimity (2/3, 7/8 etc.) Plurality rule (more than 3 outcomes possible) Point-count voting (enables voters to register the intensity of their preference) Instant Runoffs

Political Institutions in U.S. Cities In the United States, municipal government takes two basic forms. City Manager Form: The city manager makes day-to-day decisions, and advises elected officials. The mayoral and council elections are typically nonpartisan. Mayor – City Council Form: The mayor makes day-to-day decisions and elections are typically partisan. Researchers have found that relative to cities run by managers, those run by elected mayors: have greater capital stock (roads, parks, police and fire stations), use relatively less labor in providing public services, spend the same amount of money.

Figure 5.6 The Median Voter And Political Platforms Net Benefit Net Benefit for the Median Voter Q * Output of Government Goods and Services per Year

Forms of City Government and their Effects on Spending Manager/Council Government Unelected city manager makes most executive decisions, with policy recommendations by elected city council. Mayoral Government Elected mayor makes most executive decisions. Results: Similar total expenditures Mayoral systems utilize more capital intensive public goods production.

Figure 5.7 Number of Voters and Government Output Output of Government Goods and Services per Year Q *

Logrolling or Vote Trading Logrolling is the act of voting for something you would ordinarily vote against so that someone else will vote for something that they would ordinarily vote against. This is typically done when people care deeply about passage of their issue and less about other issues.

Implicit Logrolling Implicit logrolling occurs when political interests succeed in pairing two (or more) issues of strong interest to divergent groups on the same ballot or the same bill. The willingness of each special-interest group to vote for the combined package is a function of the relative intensity of preference on the two issues.

State Government Spending and the size of the Legislature The theory of logrolling suggests that, as more districts are available to distribute the costs of public spending, there will be more incentives for individual legislators to engage in vote trading to expand state government spending. Researchers found a positive relationship between the size of the state Senate and spending. Spending on highways and education were most affected by the size of the legislature.

Figure 5.8 Logrolling A Cost, and Tax (Dollars) Marginal Benefit, Cost, and Tax (Dollars) Marginal Benefit, Fireworks Displays per Week B Cost, and Tax (Dollars) Marginal Benefit, 300 MC 300 MC MBC MBB MBA 250 1 250 1 MBA MBB MBC 100 t 100 t C Cost, and Tax (Dollars) Marginal Benefit, Security Guards and Fireworks Displays per Week 600 MC = MSC 250 1 500 SMB MBC MBA MBB 200 t

Special Interests Special Interests are groups that lobby on particular issues. An example of a special interest is unions and/or steel companies lobbying for Tariffs and Import Quotas to protect their jobs or profits. Efficiency losses per job saved almost always exceed the pay of the retained worker. Estimates of the net effect run between –$9000 and –$38,000

Bureaucracy and the Supply of Public Output Officials measure their power in terms of the size of their budgets, not the efficiency of the outcomes they generate. This causes bureaucrats to have a self-interest in inefficiently high levels of government spending.

Figure 5.9 Bureaucracy and Efficiency Output per Year Cost (Dollars) Benefit and B A B QB TSB TSC MSC MSB * Q E TSB' B Q’

Comparing Public and Private Financing -Advantages of Public Financing -Advantages of Private Financing -Types of Private Financing Deals: Going Private and Leveraged Buyouts

Advantages of Private Financing -One advantage of private financing is that private investors may infuse the company with more capital than was available to it from public financing. Private financing also saves on administrative costs of being a publicly traded company. Private financing can improve incentives for management, and increase investor involvement. One advantage of private financing is that private investors may infuse the company with more capital than was available to it from public financing.

Which of the following is the main advantage for a company to go public? A) The company can diversify its equity base. B) The company can attract and retain better managers and employees. C) By being publicly traded, the company has greater access to capital. D) The company has more opportunities for acquiring other businesses.