Dr. Kevin Lasher POL 315: Politics of War & Security

Democratic Peace Theory

Rising Tide of Democracies A number of states became democracies after WW II (West Germany and Japan) 36 democracies by 1962 Another wave of democratization in late 1970s and 1980s (South Korea, some Latin American states)

Rising Tide of Democracies Additional democracies created with the collapse of communism in USSR and Eastern Europe (not all suceeded) About half of the countries in the world today are democracies

Rising Tide of Democracies In 1992 Francis Fukuyama declared the “end of history” in that all states were moving along the path toward democratic capitalism Last twenty years has seen a slowing or ending of the process of new democracies Some countries have retreated from democracy

Rising Tide of Democracies Russia under Vladimir Putin is a prime example of a country that has moved far away from democracy after significant democratic reforms in 1990s

Rising Tide of Democracies So the spread of democracy seems to have slowed So what ?

“Democracies do not go to war against other democracies” is the closest thing to an empirical law in International Relations Theory

This statement is in dispute, depending on definitions of democracy, war and a host of other critiques

We can eliminate most of these problems by concluding that “Democracies almost never go to war with other democracies, especially in the last two hundred years.”

Therefore the number of democratic states that exist is relevant to the issues of war and peace More democracies, less war

Today war between the US and Japan or the US and Germany is almost “unthinkable.” The United States was at war with both countries seventy years ago.

War between Great Britain and France is equally “unthinkable” despite the many wars these two countries have fought in the past.

How did we get the phenomenon of the democratic peace?

Immanuel Kant ( )  Liberal republics will not fight each other because the citizenry must consent, and they do not want to pay the costs of war (lives, taxes, damaged infrastructure, etc.)

Immanuel Kant ( )  “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay” (1795)  Written when there were three “democracies” (or fewer)  Argues that republics (democracies) are inherently peaceful with other republics  The key to international peace is the spread of “republicanism”  No inevitability and no timetable

Immanuel Kant ( )  Republican states consist of a free market economy and representative government with separation of powers and equal citizenship  Liberal republics will establish a “pacific union,” a reality in which they will not wage war against each other  Liberal republics will obey a cosmopolitan law welcoming to foreign visitors and encouraging mutual commerce

Immanuel Kant ( )  Eventually all states will adopt a liberal republican system and the pacific union will expand to a universal “perpetual peace”  Kant makes no prediction when such a peace will be established, but clearly far in the future  Key point is that liberal republics (democracies) do not wage war against each other

Rare Democracies Kant’s idea about the “perpetual peace” was fairly well ignored since there were so few democracies Political scientists began to reexamine the idea as the number of democratic states grew

Bruce Russett Democracies operate under certain restraints that make them more peaceful in relations with other democracies Democratic peace is the result of features of democratic states, and not other factors correlated with democracy 1993

Bruce Russett Democracy  Voting rights for substantial fraction of citizens  Government brought to power in contested elections  Executive popularly elected or responsible to elected legislature

Bruce Russett Interstate wars with 1000 or more battle deaths

Bruce Russett Russett argues no clear-cut cases of interstate wars between democracies in the period 1815-today Other scholars disagree and examine specific examples of “democratic wars” American Civil War, Spanish-American War, 1898 World War I (Germany?) Several others

Bruce Russett Democracies do not wage war against other democracies (a few possible exceptons) However, democracies do wage war quite frequently against non- democracies Democracies are “peaceful” only when dealing with other democracies Many empirical studies confirming this fact

WHY?

Bruce Russett Structural/Institutional Model Cultural/Normative Model

Structural/Institutional Model Violent conflicts between democracies will be infrequent because:  In democracies, constraints of checks and balances, division of power, and a need for public debate to enlist widespread support will slow decisions to use large-scale violence and reduce the likelihood that such decisions will be made  Leaders of other states will perceive leaders of democracies as so constrained  Thus leaders of democracies will expect, in conflicts with other democracies, time for the processes of international conflict resolution to operate, and they will not fear surprise attack

Structural/Institutional Model Violent conflicts between non-democracies, and between democracies and non-democracies, will be frequent because:  Leaders of non-democracies are not constrained as leaders of democracies are, so they can more easily, rapidly, and secretly initiate large-scale violence  Leaders of states (democracies and non-democracies) in conflict with non-democracies may initiate violence rather than risk surprise attack  Perceiving that leaders of democracies will be constrained, leaders of non-democracies may press democracies to make greater concessions over issues in conflict  Democracies may initiate large-scale violence with non- democracies rather than make the greater concessions demanded

Cultural/Normative Model In relations with other states, decision-makers will try to follow the same norms of conflict resolution which characterize their domestic political processes. They will expect decision-makers in other states likewise to follow the same norms of conflict resolution which characterize those other states’ domestic political processes.

Cultural/Normative Model Violent conflicts between democracies will be infrequent because:  In democracies, relevant decision-makers expect to be able to resolve conflicts by compromise and non-violence, respecting the rights and continued existence of opponents.  Therefore democracies will follow norms of peaceful conflict resolutions with other democracies, and will expect other democracies to do so with them.  The more stable the democracy, the more will democratic norms govern its behavior with other democracies, and the more will other democracies expect democratic norms to govern its international behavior.  If violent conflicts between democracies do occur, at least one of the democracies is likely to be politically unstable.

Cultural/Normative Model Violent conflicts between non-democracies, and between democracies and non-democracies will be frequent because:  In non-democracies, decision-makers use, and may expect their opponents to use, violence and the threat of violence to resolve conflict as part of their domestic political process.  Therefore, non-democratic states may use violence and the threat of violence in conflicts with other states, and other states may expect them to use may use violence and the threat of violence in such conflicts.  Democratic norms can be more easily exploited to force concessions than can non-democratic ones. To avoid exploitation democracies may adopt non-democratic norms in dealing with non-democracies.

Which Model is Correct? “Evidence supports both of these explanatory models. The debate between their proponents is not settled, nor should it be seen entirely as a debate. They are not fully separable in theory or in practice. Both make a contribution, and the two kinds of influence reinforce each other to produce the democratic peace.” “Nevertheless, some evidence suggests that the normative model is the more powerful. Norms … were somewhat more strongly associated with peace between democracies than was our measure of structural/institutional constraints.” Russett, p.119

Which Model is Correct? Other scholars have elaborated on Russett’s explanatory models Empirical results show that democracies rarely fight one another There has been a fair amount of dissatisfaction with the causal explanations offered by Russett and others More work needs to be done to explain exactly WHY democracies rarely fight one another

Peaceful Democracies?  Are democracies generally more peaceful?

Peaceful Democracies?  Research is contradictory, but generally NO

Peaceful Democracies?  Democracies and non-democracies frequently go to war with other non-democracies

Peaceful Democracies? International Wars Democracies vs. Democracies0 Democracies vs. Non-Democracies166 Non-Democracies vs. Non-Democracies205

Peaceful Democracies?  Great Britain and France (and other stats) waged wars of colonialization and some wars during the process of de- colonialization in 1940s-1960s  US has frequently gone to war against non-democracies (for a variety of reasons) since World War II

US Wars since 1980s  1983: Invasion of Grenada  1986: Air attacks on Libya in response to terrorist actions  : Invasion of Panama  1991: Gulf War with Iraq  1995: US and NATO bombing of Bosnian Serbs  1999: Air attacks on Serbia to protect province of Kosovo  2001-present: Invasion of Afghanistan  : Invasion of Iraq  2004-present: Drone strikes on terrorist forces in various countries

More Democracies, More Peace  Ranks countries as “Free,” “Partly Free,” and “Not Free”  In 2015, 89 of 195 countries (46%) were ranked as “Free”  Democracies = “Free”  Very little change since 2000  Half-way to Kant’s notion of “perpetual peace”

Should the US (and other countries) try to support the spread of democracy as a means to promote world peace?

Clinton, Bush, Obama have all made the “more democracies, less war” argument

Yes, but only in the most general and broadest sense

Very difficult to help build democracy in other countries, except at the margins

Other policies such as strengthening international and regional institutions and encouraging most countries to participate in the global economy might be more beneficial than actually “promoting democracy”

Improving peacekeeping and combatting fragile states might also be more beneficial than actually “promoting democracy”

Interstate war between two countries of any type is becoming more and more rare