Case Study: Lessons learned from the assistance to the 2010 Earthquake in Haiti Kae Yanagisawa JICA October 22, 2015

Damage Earthquake in Haiti January, 2010 M 7.2 in richter scale Depth of the epicenter ： 10km Distance from the caiptal :17km 212,000 persons were killed 300,000 persons were injured Government buildings were destroyed, Killing government officials PKO (MINUSTA) headquarter building was Destroyed, killing SRSG and 8 Chinese UN POL officers Earthquake in Chile February, 2010 M 8.8 Depth of the epicenter: 35km Distance from the Capital :300km 528 persons were killed

JICA

Haiti before the disaster Politically, Supported by the UN stabilization mission (MINUSTAH), after long years of dictatorship and political turbulance. National military and police were under re-organization with the support of MINUSTAH Economically, Poorest country in the Western hemisphere In addition, Infrastructure had already been damaged by hurricanes in previous years. A typical case of “fragile state”

Challenges to international humanitarian assistance Weak leading role of the government Security concern Even before the earthquake, safety and security were at stake. UNDAC team requested every SAR team to arrange force protection. Logistic difficulties The international airport was the sole entry point and controlled by the US Air Force. Due to congestion, many relief teams made a detour via Dominican republic.

Japan’s engagement A civilian medical team (JDR team) was deployed, succeeded by a medical unit of the JSDF (JDR team), and then, Japan Red Cross (NGO) The Government of Japan decided to participate in the MINUSTAH to assist recovery and reconstruction and deployed engineering corps of JSDF

Cluster Meeting UNOCHADPKO US Government UN CMCoord Officer In NY In Washington DC UN CMCoord Officer US Southern Command UN CMCoord Team Joint Operations and Tasking Centre Foreign military Civilian HA organization In Miami In Port au Prince Humanitarian Exchange Magazine Coordination framework

Lessons learned Coordination among “enlightened” humanitarian workers, both civilians and militaries, was made relatively well. But without the strong presence of the Haitian Government Overall, response was rather chaotic because of the influx of unregulated assistance. Some NGOs were believed to be there just to show their presence to donors for fundraising. Some 1,800 rescue workers were on the scene, but their size and capability were uneven. Some medical care did not fit local conditions and was not sustainable.

Changes brought by the lessons USAR coordination cell was devised as sub- component of UNDAC team to further facilitate coordination among SAR teams. Classification and standardization of foreign medical teams are in progress, with a proposal of registration and monitoring on the ground. They were tested during the earthquake in Nepal.

Fragility and disasters Weak governance of Haiti resulted in - lack of disaster prevention and preparedness - inefficient response - prolonged recovery Cholera outbreak and political tension further exacerbated the situation and delayed the recovery Nevertheless, international assistance should be provided to support the Government, not replace it.